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Kurzzusammenfassung 
Automatisiertes Valet-Parken (AVP) ist ein Dienst, welcher das Potential besitzt den Fahrer 
von der Last des manuellen Parkens zu befreien und ihm wertvolle Zeit zu ersparen. Die 
Einführung eines AVP-Systems in schon bestehende Parkhäuser kann zum Mischverkehr 
zwischen manuell geführten und automatisierten Fahrzeugen führen. Hierbei können Funk-
tionsmodule zur Ausführung des AVP-Dienstes im Fahrzeug und/ oder in der Infrastruktur 
untergebracht werden. Zwei, in diesem Szenario bis dato ungelöste Forschungsfragen, sind 
die Definition von notwendigen Mindestkriterien an einen sicheren AVP-Dienst und die 
Verteilung von Funktionen zwischen der Infrastruktur und dem automatisierten Fahrzeug. 
Insbesondere die Definition von Mindestkriterien ist erforderlich, um die notwendige Si-
cherheitsauslegung in der frühen Systementwicklungsphase zu gewährleisten. Diese Arbeit 
spezifiziert solche Mindestkriterien für AVP-Systeme, um das Risiko von Gefährdungen zu-
künftig eingesetzter AVP-Systeme zu reduzieren. Die notwendige Sicherheitsauslegung 
wird für verschiedene Parkhaustopologien bei Berücksichtigung der benötigten Kooperation 
zwischen Infrastruktur und automatisiertem Fahrzeug hergeleitet. Im ersten Schritt wird das 
Fehlen von Mindestkriterien und möglicher AVP-Konfigurationen im Stand der Technik 
identifiziert. Die Methodik zur Identifikation der Mindestkriterien ist dabei in drei Teile ge-
gliedert: Mindestsicherheitsanforderungen, eine mindestens erforderliche Wahrnehmungs-
zone und funktionale Anforderungen. Mindestsicherheitsanforderungen definieren die not-
wendig zu bestimmenden Parameter und zugehörige Schwellenwerte. Sie verhindern, dass 
das AVP-System potenzielle Gefahren und kritische Situationen verursacht. Eine mindestens 
erforderliche Wahrnehmungs- und Sicherheitszone beschreibt technologieunabhängige, ge-
ometrisch basierte und minimal sicherheitsrelevante Bereiche um das Ego-Fahrzeug. Die 
Bestimmung notwendiger Parameter für das kollisionsfreie Anhalten wird in dieser mindes-
tens erforderlichen Wahrnehmungszone gefordert. Zusätzlich wurden aus definierten Sze-
narien funktionale Anforderungen an das AVP System abgeleitet. Diese funktionalen Anfor-
derungen werden Funktionsmodulen zugeordnet und bilden als Systembausteine eine 
modulare AVP-Systemarchitektur. Die Mindestsicherheitsanforderungen, die mindestens 
erforderliche Wahrnehmungszone und die funktionalen Anforderungen bilden die Mindest-
kriterien für die in dieser Arbeit erarbeitete Checkliste. Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit dienen 
Mindestkriterien und Einflussfaktoren auf Kosten, Zeiteffizienz, Sicherheit und Verfügbar-
keit als Grundlage für die Ableitung benötigter AVP-Konfigurationen. Dabei besteht ein 
Zielkonflikt zwischen den Gesamtkosten, der Zeiteffizienz, der Sicherheit und Verfügbar-
keit von AVP-Systemen mit heutigen Fahrzeugen. AVP Konfigurationen und Mindestkrite-
rien erleichtern die Migration von AVP-Systemen in existierende und neu errichtete Park-
häuser. Mindestkriterien legen die Grundlage für die Entwicklung einer notwendigen 
Sicherheitsauslegung. 
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Summary 
Automated valet parking (AVP) is a service which potentially releases the driver from the 
burden of parking the vehicle manually and saves his valuable time. However, the integration 
of AVP systems into today’s parking facilities may result in a mixed traffic of manually 
driven and automated vehicles. Thereby, function modules to execute the AVP Service can 
be placed inside the vehicle and/ or inside the infrastructure. The two yet unresolved research 
questions in such a scenario are the definition of necessary minimum criteria for a safe AVP 
service and the distribution of functions between the infrastructure and the automated vehi-
cle. In particular, the definition of minimum criteria is required to ensure the necessary safety 
by design in the early system development phase. This thesis specifies such minimum crite-
ria for AVP systems to minimize the risks of harm for future deployed AVP systems. The 
necessary safety design is derived for different topologies of parking garages by considering 
the needed cooperation between the infrastructure and the automated vehicle. 
In the first step, the lack of minimum criteria and the lack of possible AVP configurations is 
identified in the state-of-the-art. The methodology to identify minimum criteria is divided in 
three parts: minimum safety requirements, minimum required perception zone and minimum 
functional requirements. Minimum safety requirements define the parameters and corre-
sponding thresholds that are required to be investigated. They prevent the AVP-system to 
cause potential hazards and critical situations. A minimum required perception and safety 
zone describe technology-independent, geometric-based and minimum safety-relevant areas 
around the ego-vehicle. The determination of necessary parameters for a collision-free stop 
is required in the minimum required perception zone. Additionally, minimum functional re-
quirements are derived from defined scenarios. The functional requirements are assigned to 
function modules and form as system building blocks modular AVP system architecture. 
Minimum safety requirements, the minimum required perception zone and minimum func-
tional requirements form the minimum criteria for the elaborated checklist.  
In the scope of this work, minimum criteria and impacts on costs, time efficiency, safety as 
well as availability serve as a justification to derive needed AVP configurations. Distributed 
functions range from the perception to the execution. A tradeoff exists between overall costs, 
time efficiency, safety and availability of AVP systems with today’s vehicles. AVP configu-
rations and minimum criteria ease the migration of AVP systems in today’s existing and in 
newly constructed parking garages. Minimum criteria lay the foundation for the develop-
ment of a necessary safety design. 
   1 
1 Introduction 
The continuous urbanization and the increasing number of registered vehicles results in an 
increasing shortage of parking space in big cities1. Additionally, today’s aerodynamic design 
of the bodywork decreases the driver’s field of view.2 As a consequence, the parking process 
becomes more complicated. Parking assistance systems are already integrated in series to 
support the driver with this increasingly demanding task. While early parking assistance sys-
tems provided informing signals based on ultrasonic technology, other systems such as fully 
automatic parking assistance systems take over longitudinal and lateral control of the vehicle 
and park the vehicle supervised automatically. The driver is monitoring the environment and 
is always keeping a dead man’s switch activated.3 More recent parking assistance systems 
provide a remote control for initiating the parking process.4 The driver may monitor the 
parking process from outside the vehicle. Autonomous parking pilots which do not require 
the driver’s presence are under research and development.5 Automated valet parking (AVP) 
is a service which releases the driver from the burden of parking manually and potentially 
saves his valuable time. Thereby, the driver parks the vehicle at the entrance of a parking 
facility in the handover zone and initiates the AVP process via a terminal. Thereafter, the 
AVP system consisting of automated vehicle and the infrastructure (Parking Area Manage-
ment, PAM) system takes over the responsibility for the driving mission. The driving tasks 
of perception and planning can be accomplished cooperatively by sharing required AVP 
functions. Once the vehicle is parked properly, the user can instruct a hand back request to 
continue his journey.  
                                                 
1 Zixiong, J.: Report shows extreme shortage of parking spaces in China's megacities (2017). 
2 Bartlett, J. S.: Best and Worst Cars and SUVs for Visibility (2019). 
3 Gotzig, H.: Parking Assistance (2016). 
4 Daimler AG: Remote Parking Pilot: Remote parking with the smartphone app (2015). 
5 Banzhaf, H. et al.: The future of parking: A survey on AVP with an outlook on high density parking (2017). 
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Figure 1–1: Automated valet parking starts at the entrance of the parking garage. The vehicle is 
dropped off at the handover zone for driverless automated parking. The parking pilot parks the vehi-
cle at a parking spot and waits in standby for a driver’s back request. Once the user initiates a hand-
back request, the vehicle is parked at the pick-up zone. 
1.1 Motivation 
Today’s parking facilities mainly target the provision of parking spaces for manually driven 
vehicles. The introduction of automated valet parking in these parking facilities may lead to 
a mixed traffic in which manually driven and automated vehicles are operating. The involve-
ment of pedestrians and manually driven vehicles raises the issue of safety for life and health. 
The integration of AVP systems shall avoid additional risk in comparison to a manually op-
erated parking garage. However, challenges lie in the release of safe automated driving sys-
tems. A major problem is the test coverage of the rapidly expanding parameter space to val-
idate the safety of the automated system.6,7 The Non-Traffic Surveillance (NTS) recordings 
from 2012 to 2014 show that around 5,700 people were killed and 277,000 were injured in 
the United States in non-traffic crashes such as on private roads, two-vehicle crashes in park-
ing facilities, or collisions with pedestrians in driveways.8 AVP systems could potentially 
decrease accidents in such non-traffic scenarios. However, just as a human driver proved his 
                                                 
6 Amersbach, C.; Winner, H.: Functional decomposition: An approach to reduce the approval effort (2017). 
7 Wachenfeld, W. H.: How Stochastic can Help to Introduce Automated Driving (2017). 
8 Singh, S.: Non-traffic surveillance: fatality and injury statistics in non-traffic crashes, 2012 to 2014 (2016). 
P
ic
k-
u
p
 
Zo
n
e
Handover 
Zone
 1.1 Motivation 
  3 
capability by passing a driving license test it would be beneficial to define criteria for the 
use case automated valet parking to standardize required capabilities of AVP systems and to 
provide consistency through the diverse development and implementation processes before 
automated systems are seriously deployed.9 Minimum criteria have to be defined to provide 
a subset of minimum capabilities for automated driving in parking garages. The investigation 
of the state-of-the-art shows that existing minimum criteria for AVP are high-level (cf. chap-
ter 2). Standard and guidelines provide an abstract definition of the system’s capabilities for 
automated driving systems.10,11 On the other hand the race of developing AVP systems is 
already taking place.12 Sensing, planning and execution modules are developed and im-
proved. However, still those AVP systems lack a definition for a required performance. Since 
manufacturers are trying to win the battle of introduction and release the first parking pilot 
in series, the need for definite test criteria of developed AVP systems becomes crucial. The 
consideration of the developed AVP systems for further release tests needs definite criteria. 
Manufacturers and suppliers require minimum criteria to design safe AVP system’s in the 
concept phase. Minimum criteria shall minimize the risks of harm possibly caused by AVP 
systems. The integration of minimum criteria in the early system development process shall 
ease the design of safe AVP systems. Minimum criteria serve as a basis for safety by design13. 
Hereby, diverse topologies of parking garages exist.14 A major issue is to find the necessary 
safety design for different topologies of parking garages by considering the needed cooper-
ation between the infrastructure and the automated vehicle. The allocation of responsibilities 
between infrastructure and automated vehicle for the required safety design is challenging. 
A major problem is to specify justified thresholds which are applicable to diverse AVP im-
plementations for different parking garage topologies. 
When considering automation in parking facilities another yet unresolved research question 
is the distribution of functions between the vehicle and the parking facility. Functions hereby 
refer to sensing, planning and acting capabilities which can be taken over by the automated 
vehicle or by the infrastructure or shared between both entities. Thereby, there are two ex-
tremes: the functions can be implemented only inside the vehicle (vehicle-based AVP15) or 
placed inside the PAM system (infrastructure-based AVP16). Both extremes provide their 
benefits in terms of costs, time-efficiency, safety, availability, and early introduction. The 
                                                 
9 Grubmüller, S. et al.: Automated Driving from the View of Technical Standards (2016). p. 38 
10 SAE International Standard J3016: Taxonomy for Automated Driving Systems (2014). 
11 ISO: ISO 26262: Road vehicles - Functional safety (2018). 
12 Banzhaf, H. et al.: The future of parking: A survey on AVP with an outlook on high density parking (2017). 
13 van de Poel, I.; Robaey, Z.: Safe-by-Design: from Safety to Responsibility (2017). 
14 Pech, A. et al.: Parkhäuser - Garagen (2009). pp. 375 – 410. 
15 Jeevan, P. et al.: Realizing autonomous valet parking with automotive grade sensors (2010). 
16 Daimler AG: Daimler and Bosch jointly premiere automated valet parking in China (2018). 
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extremes raise the question how functions can be distributed between infrastructure and au-
tomated vehicle and based on which kind of criteria this should be decided. Today’s AVP 
configurations17 vary in their technical realizations and approaches, but similarities lie in the 
preferred selection of a specific AVP configuration. The minimum criteria cover the sensing, 
planning and execution phase. The issue remains whether a vehicle-based or infrastructure-
based AVP system is able to provide the identified minimum criteria standalone and which 
intermediate configuration is more beneficial. A distribution which is optimal in terms of 
costs, time efficiency, safety and availability is hereby desirable but may be a tradeoff. The 
description of different AVP configurations allows the parking garage operator and manu-
facturers to choose the desired degree of infrastructure support according their preferences. 
Some configurations are more beneficial in terms of time efficiency and early introduction 
whereas others can be preferred in terms of costs or availability. It is up to the parking garage 
operators and the manufacturers to decide which distribution of functions they find more 
beneficial. One of the configurations can be chosen due to its more appropriate suitability 
for certain parking facilities. 
 
Figure 1–2: Since the race for AVP systems has already started17 and a multitude of AVP systems is 
expected to be released by different manufacturers, safety by design14 will become crucial before the 
deployment of such automated systems. Minimum criteria are elaborated by considering diverse to-
pologies of parking garages and the cooperation between the infrastructure and the automated vehi-
cle. Defined minimum criteria are integrated in the concept phase of the early development process 
to minimize the risks of potential harm (safety by design) and avoid larger costs after deployment. 
The figure is modified and taken from Szymberski18. 
 
                                                 
17 Banzhaf, H. et al.: The future of parking: A survey on AVP with an outlook on high density parking (2017). 
18 Szymberski, R.: Construction Project Safety Planning (1997). 
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1.2 Research Objectives 
Following the motivation described in 1.1 two main research questions can be derived: 
 RQ1: What is the essential subset of minimum criteria AVP configurations require to 
fulfill for safe operation? 
 RQ2: Which degrees of infrastructure support are needed and what are their benefits? 
Based on the two research questions the following research objectives (RO) are elaborated: 
 RO1: The identification of minimum criteria valid for AVP configurations to mini-
mize the risks of harm. 
 RO2: A specification of the required infrastructure support for AVP to achieve a de-
sired AVP performance. 
Research objective RO1 shall answer the research question RQ1. Minimum criteria for all 
degrees of infrastructure support have to be identified to minimize the risk of harm. Mini-
mum criteria which are mandatory for AVP configurations in a mixed traffic are specified to 
avoid hazards and collisions. Minimum criteria can be used to identify whether a specific 
AVP configuration may suitable to execute a collision-free AVP process. Minimum criteria 
can be used in the early development phase for the design of safe AVP systems. However, 
completeness of requirements and sufficient specifications for all gathered criteria cannot be 
guaranteed. The elaborated set of minimum criteria shall target diverse topologies of parking 
garages and indicate the required support of the infrastructure. A subset of defined criteria 
may not be able to certify the AVP system or provide a safety approval for AVP systems. 
However, this thesis contributes to the minimization of possible harm which is potentially 
caused by safety-critical AVP systems. For that purpose, a mandatory checklist which defines 
required minimum criteria targeting the collision-free performance of the AVP service is 
presented. A minimum criteria-based capability checklist shall reduce the amount of safety-
critical AVP deployed in future parking garages. The AVP system has to meet every single 
criterion to pass the checklist. The checklist provides potential for reduction of hazards be-
fore the deployment of AVP systems. The research question RQ1 raises additional sub-ques-
tions concerning minimum safety requirements to prevent hazards and unreasonable risks, 
minimum areas required to be perceived to detect potential collision partners and minimum 
required functions to ensure the performance of an AVP service. This thesis focuses on these 
sub-questions addressed in Figure 1–3 and in the methodology: 
 RQ1-1: Which parameters of the ego-vehicle’s and object’s state space does every 
AVP configuration have to determine and which situations have to be prevented to 
provide a safe AVP-service? (Minimum safety requirements) 
 RQ1-2: In which minimum areas does the identified parameters require to be per-
ceived? (Minimum required perception zone) 
1 Introduction 
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 RQ1-3: Which minimum functionalities does every AVP configuration have to pro-
vide in order to perform an automated parking pilot? (Minimum functional require-
ments) 
 
Figure 1–3: Minimum criteria is based on three main pillars. Minimum safety requirements prevent 
hazards and unreasonable risks (RQ1-1, left pillar), minimum areas required to be perceived contrib-
ute to the detection of potential collision partners (RQ1-2, middle pillar) and minimum required func-
tions ensure the performance of an AVP service (RQ1-3, right pillar). 
Research objective RO2 shall answer the research question RQ2. The specification of the 
required infrastructure support shows to which degree today’s parking facilities have to be 
adjusted to increase the performance of a valet parking service. More precisely, possible 
degrees of infrastructure-support can be described for cooperative AVP to optimize the park-
ing process. Cooperative AVP in this context refers to the collaboration between automated 
vehicle and PAM infrastructure. The garage operator can adjust his parking facility accord-
ing the desired degree of infrastructure-support to increase the performance of the parking 
garage. Thereby, the degree of infrastructure automation may vary between a complete ve-
hicle-based AVP service or an automated vehicle which only executes instructions of an in-
telligent infrastructure. The allocation of modules between infrastructure and vehicle pro-
vides a recommendation how a specific AVP configuration can be designed. The required 
support of the infrastructure is evaluated by considering specified impacts on costs, time-
efficiency, safety and availability. This thesis contributes hereby, by providing distributions 
of functions which should rather be executed by the infrastructure and/ or by the automated 
vehicle. In particular, the results of this work ease the migration of AVP system’s in today’s 
existing parking garages and in newly constructed parking facilities. Parking garage opera-
tors and manufacturers can select their preferred degree of infrastructure support. Both can 
STOP
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Safety Areas Functions
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p
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choose between personally preferred version of AVP configurations based on the relevance 
of costs, time-efficiency, safety, availability and early introduction. Compared to existing 
literature on AVP systems, this thesis hereby contributes to identification of the necessary 
safety design for the individual parking garage and the needed infrastructure support.  
 
Figure 1–4: Functions which are required to be performed during the AVP service can be allocated 
to the automated vehicle and/ or to the intelligent infrastructure. This raises the research question 
which possible degrees of infrastructure support do exist for AVP. Furthermore, a definition of 
minimum criteria summarized in a checklist minimizes the risks of harm throughout the early 
safety design process. The two yet unresolved research questions are the definition of minimum 
criteria and the distribution of functions between the infrastructure and the automated vehicle. 
1.3 Research Methodology 
The overall methodology developed in this thesis contains the three pillars to determine min-
imum criteria for automated valet parking, namely, minimum safety requirements, minimum 
required perception zone and the minimum functional requirements. The minimum safety 
requirements, minimum required perception zone and minimum functional requirements 
form hereby together the minimum criteria as a foundation for the safety by design (RQ1, 
RO1). If a specific AVP implementation does not fulfill the minimum criteria, the system is 
potentially safety-critical and may require modification. In particular, this thesis introduces 
a checklist of minimum criteria to minimize risks of harm already in the early concept phase. 
However, considering the overall automated driving system is fairly complex. A broad range 
of parameters concerning the system’s behavior and environment renders definition of re-
quirements infeasible extensive. If the overall system is considered, the number of occurring 
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situations might be unlimited.19 An abstraction of the system’s behavior is necessary to limit 
the excessive number of existent parameters. Therefore, this thesis introduces a split of the 
overall automated driving system into a manageable amount of functional scenarios in order 
to provide a functional description of the system. The system’s functional behavior is de-
composed into functional scenarios according to Ulbrich et al.20. An abstraction of the sys-
tem’s behavior is proposed in functional scenarios which occur during the AVP service.21 A 
scenario describes snapshots of the environment and the interaction of entities while time is 
progressing. The decomposition in scenarios is in compliance with the item definition of ISO 
2626222. The ISO 26262 is an international standard for functional safety of E/E systems in 
road vehicles which provides a systematic approach to prevent unreasonable risks. The ap-
proach suggests an item definition. The item definition describes the functionality, interfaces, 
and environmental conditions of the item. Identified functional scenarios introduced in this 
thesis provide the input for the analysis of minimum safety requirements, a minimum required 
perception zone and minimum functional requirements. 
Minimum safety requirements (RQ1-1) are elaborated from a situational analysis in the way 
of a Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA). An ISO 26262-compliant approach is 
used to assess hazards and elaborate safety requirements to risks and reduce them to accepta-
ble levels. The objective of the HARA is the identification of potential malfunctions to de-
termine related top-level safety requirements called safety goals. These safety goals can be 
further broken down into low-level safety requirements. Low-level safety requirements de-
fine the parameters that are required to be investigated and corresponding thresholds for 
parameter determination. Parameters are required to be perceived in specific areas of interest 
around the ego-vehicle.23 The minimum required perception zone (RQ1-2) consists of safety-
relevant areas around the ego-vehicle. Areas of interest are derived from occurring maneu-
vers in the parking garage. Each functional scenario is examined according to specific ma-
neuvers that are instructed by the automation system. Additionally, maneuvers are extracted 
from layouts of car parks.24 Worst case constraints for the operational domain and serve as 
an input for each maneuver to specify a minimum required areas for collision avoidance. 
The superposition of relevant areas forms the minimum zone around the ego-vehicle.25 The 
AVP system can be safe, but may not provide the minimum functional performance. Mini-
mum functional requirements (RQ1-3) that every AVP configuration has to fulfill are there-
fore derived from the item definition by investigating the required functional behavior for 
                                                 
19 Amersbach, C.; Winner, H.: Defining Required and Feasible Test Coverage for HAV (2019). 
20 Ulbrich, S. et al.: Defining and Substantiating the Terms Scene, Situation, and Scenario for AD (2015). 
21 cf. Schönemann, V. et al.: Scenario-based functional Safety for AD on the Example of AVP (2018). 
22 ISO: ISO 26262: Road vehicles - Functional safety (2018). 
23 cf. Schönemann, V. et al.: Fault Tree-based Derivation of Safety Requirements for AVP (2019). 
24 Pech, A. et al.: Parkhäuser - Garagen (2009). pp. 375 – 408. 
25 cf. Schönemann, V. et al.: Maneuver-based adaptive Safety Zone for infrastructure-supported AVP (2019). 
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each functional scenario. Functional requirements are building functional modules that AVP 
system have to provide. The system building blocks can be assigned to the vehicle or to the 
infrastructure. 
Minimum criteria and impacts are used to specify degrees of infrastructure support for AVP 
to achieve a desired AVP performance (RQ2, RO2). This thesis introduces a set of possible 
function distributions between infrastructure and automated vehicle. functions range from 
the perception to the control of actuators. Thereby, the following impact factors are consid-
ered for the arbitration of modules:  
 Costs: Characterizes additional efforts and expenses that have to be made to imple-
ment the described functionality apart from today’s state-of-the-art parking garages 
or vehicles. 
 Time efficiency: Describes a quick handover, parking and pickup process to increase 
the vehicle throughput in a parking garage and decrease congestion. 
 Safety: Refers to a collision-free AVP process and the avoidance of critical scenarios. 
 Availability: Specifies the impact if the function cannot be performed anymore. The 
degree may vary from a single AVP vehicle in standstill to a complete breakdown of 
the parking facility operation. 
Figure 1–5 illustrates the described methodology as introduced in this thesis. The research 
questions RQ1 and RQ2 as defined in section 1.2 are hereby assigned to corresponding 
blocks. 
1 Introduction 
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Figure 1–5: The overall methodology developed in this thesis. Decomposition of the automated driv-
ing system in functional scenarios which serve as input for the following steps: hazard identification 
and derivation of safety requirements from safety goals (left), maneuver-based specification of areas 
of interest (middle), analysis of system requirements (right) to achieve minimum criteria for AVP 
and characterize possible degrees of infrastructure support 
The main contribution of this thesis is hereby the definition of minimum criteria for AVP 
systems (RQ1) and a detailed analysis for the distribution of functions between the auto-
mated vehicle and the parking facility (RQ2), which has not been fully provided in the state-
of-the-art before. In order to contribute to the research questions RQ1 and RQ2 this work is 
structured as follows: 
 Chapter 2 summarizes the state-of-the-art of today’s standards, future valet parking 
systems and research projects to investigate if minimum criteria were targeted yet. 
Furthermore, it is described which AVP configurations are present in the state-of-the-
art 
 Chapter 3 describes the functionality, interfaces, and environmental conditions of the 
item. The sections provide a system description which serves as a basis for the further 
safety and functional analysis. 
 Chapter 4 identifies hazards and assesses risks based on the item definition to derive 
top-level safety requirements (safety goals). 
 Chapter 5 breaks down top-level safety requirements into low level-safety require-
ments to determine minimum thresholds valid for all AVP configuration in all parking 
facilities. 
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 Chapter 6 specifies minimal areas of interest around the ego-vehicle for specific ma-
neuvers in a parking garage. The superposition of maneuver-based zones leads to a 
minimal area for which the defined minimum criteria are valid. 
 Chapter 7 illustrates the implementation of an adaptive safety zone which character-
izes the least point for initiating a deceleration. The chapter describes used software 
tools and the interaction of the components to avoid collisions. 
 Chapter 8 identifies functional system blocks based on the item definition. The sys-
tem modules are distributed according the impacts on costs, time-efficiency, safety 
and availability between vehicle and infrastructure to derive possible AVP configu-
rations. 
 Chapter 9 summarizes the key insights, contributions and limitations of this work 
and provides an overview about possible directions for future research. 
2 State-of-the-art 
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2 State-of-the-art 
Future AVP systems26 raise the research question whether developed AVP systems are suffi-
cient to provide a safe automated valet parking service or whether modifications would be 
necessary before the release of such systems. In the following sections, the state-of-the-art 
of AVP is investigated to clarify to which extent answers exists for these issues. First of all, 
standards and guidelines are summarized to find out whether recommendations and re-
strictions are specified for automation systems. Subsequently, the associated minimum ca-
pabilities for automated valet parking systems are described. Finally, the design process for 
functional safe road vehicles and for the safety of the intended functionality as introduced in 
literature to date is illustrated. Finally, related to the contributions of this thesis selected re-
search projects for scenario-based testing, verification and validation of automated driving 
functions are presented. A mathematical model, called Responsibility-Sensitive Safety 
(RSS), is introduced to describe main differences between the results in RSS and the contri-
butions of this thesis. 
2.1 Standards and Guidelines 
The diversity of actual and potential automated driving systems gives need for standardized 
approaches for the assessment and categorization of different levels of automation. Such 
standards may contribute to a general consensus of minimum criteria for automated driving 
systems. Different organizations have already targeted the definition of automation levels 
and assigned system capabilities to each automation level. These entities are the Society of 
Automotive Engineering (SAE), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA), the German Federal Highway Research Institute (BASt) and the German Associ-
ation of the Automotive Industry (VDA). 
The SAE International27 provides a taxonomy for the six levels of driving automation rang-
ing from no driving automation (level 0) to full driving automation (level 5). The interna-
tional standard categorizes automated valet parking as a level 4 automated driving system. 
Thereby, the automation system shall perform both the longitudinal and the lateral vehicle 
motion control tasks of the dynamic driving task. The automation system shall monitor the 
driving environment (detecting, recognizing and classifying objects and events) and respond 
to such events as required to execute the dynamic driving task and/ or the fallback. The 
automated driving system does not operate outside of its operational design domain unless a 
                                                 
26 Banzhaf, H. et al.: The future of parking: A survey on AVP with an outlook on high density parking (2017). 
27 SAE International Standard J3016: Taxonomy for Automated Driving Systems (2014). p. 23 
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conventional driver takes over the dynamic driving task. The automated driving system per-
forms the fallback and is required to achieve a minimal risk condition in case of perfor-
mance-relevant system failure or upon exit of the operational design domain. The fallback-
ready user does not have to be receptive to a fallback request. 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration28 (NHTSA) released a preliminary 
statement of policy concerning automated vehicles. NHTSA distinguishes between 5 levels 
of automation starting with level 0 to 4. A level 4 system involves automation of two primary 
control functions such as lateral and longitudinal control. The automation system performs 
all safety-critical driving functions and monitors the roadway conditions for an entire trip. 
The driver is not responsible for the monitoring of the roadway or safe operation anymore. 
The driver does not have to be physically present inside the vehicle, but has to activate the 
automated vehicle system. The regain of manual control with an appropriate amount of tran-
sition time (fallback) is not expected and therefore safe performance is solely based on the 
automated system. 
The German Federal Highway Research Institute29,30 (BASt) provided definitions for auto-
mation which range from driver only to full automation. The level full automation requires 
the system to take over lateral and longitudinal control completely and permanently within 
the individual specification of the application. Before the system’s limits are reached, a take-
over request needs to be initiated with a sufficient time buffer. A takeover request does not 
have to be performed by the driver. In absence of driver control after a takeover request, the 
system has to establish a minimal risk condition in all situations. The driver is no longer 
required for monitoring purposes. 
Similarly, the German Association of the Automotive Industry31 (VDA) categorizes valet 
parking as a level 4 automation system. The driver can hand over the entire driving task to 
the system in a specific use case which are characterized by the type of road, the speed range 
and the environmental conditions. The system requires to recognize its limits and shall per-
form longitudinal and lateral driving actions within the defined use case. The system must 
execute the monitoring at all times and the driver does not have to resume the dynamic driv-
ing task within the use case. The VDA assumes the introduction of automated valet parking 
around 2020 as shown in Figure 2–1. 
As a first legal basis the Vienna Convention on road transport32 allows since 2015 the influ-
ence of automated systems only if they can be overruled or turned off at any time by the 
driver. Therefore, the Vienna Conventions still requires that each vehicle must have a driver. 
                                                 
28 NHTSA: Preliminary Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles (2013). 
29 Gasser, T. M. et al.: Rechtsfolgen zunehmender Fahrzeugautomatisierung (2012). pp. 8-12 
30 Gasser, T. M.; Westhoff, D.: BASt-study: Definitions of automation and legal issues in Germany (2012). 
31 VDA: Automation: From Driver Assistance Systems to Automated Driving (2015). 
32 United Nations: Vienna Convention on Road Traffic (1968). 
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The operation of driverless vehicles is not possible in the current situation on public roads. 
However, there is an on-going discussion for a novel convention of driverless vehicles. 
 
Figure 2–1: Former and expected periods of introduction for assisting and automated driving func-
tions according to the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA)31. The VDA assumes 
the introduction of automated valet parking around 2020. 
Considering the various definitions of the automated driving levels, the following minimum 
capabilities can be deduced for automated valet parking. The criteria are summarized in Ta-
ble 2–1: 
 Automated valet parking shall perform both the longitudinal and the lateral vehicle 
motion control tasks of the dynamic driving task simultaneously and permanently. 
 The automation system shall monitor the driving environment and respond to such 
events as required to execute the dynamic driving task and/ or the driver fallback. 
 The automated driving system by design shall not operate outside of its operational 
design domain unless a conventional driver takes over the dynamic driving task. 
 The automated driving system shall be capable of performing the fallback and 
achieving a minimal risk condition in case of performance-relevant system failure or 
upon exit of the operational design domain. It may allow the user to perform the 
fallback. 
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Table 2–1: Minimum criteria for AVP assigned by today’s standards 
VDA 
Level 
Narrative Definition Lateral and longitu-
dinal motion control 
Moni-
toring 
Fallback Operational 
design domain 
4 
Performance of the dynamic 
driving task in the operational 
design domain and fallback 
even if the user is not recep-
tive to a fallback request. 
System System System Limited 
 
Such a high-level definition of minimum criteria ensures the suitability and applicability for 
all use cases in the automated driving domain. After a parking request the valet parking is 
performed without presence of a human driver. Therefore, the driver will not be involved in 
a potential fallback situation. The self-driving system requires safety mechanisms to transfer 
the system into a minimal risk condition at any point in time. Beside the categorization of 
automated driving levels, standards exist which target the functional safety of road vehicles. 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) released the ISO 26262 as an au-
tomotive adaptation of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 6150833. ISO 
26262 specifies a development process for functional safety of electrical and/ or electronic 
(E/E) systems within road vehicles. The standard is based upon a V-model for the different 
phases of product development and aims to identify hazards caused by malfunctioning be-
havior. In the first step, ISO 26262 suggests an item definition in which a system description 
has to be performed. The objective of the item definition is to support an understanding of 
the item by listing the functionalities, behavior, interfaces and environmental conditions to 
perform subsequent phases. One of the subsequent phases is a hazard analysis and risk as-
sessment (HARA) in which potential risks are identified to formulate safety goals in order 
to prevent or mitigate unreasonable risk. Safety goals are assigned a risk level called auto-
motive safety integrity level (ASIL) determined by the severity, exposure and controllability 
of the hazardous event. It is crucial that safety mechanisms34 are evaluated during the HARA 
and are not assumed prior to the analysis. Functional safety requirements are derived from 
safety goals and has to be allocated to architectural elements. Functional safety requirements 
are derived from the associated safety goal. The derivation can be supported by established 
methods e.g. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis, and Hazard 
and Operability (HAZOP). The application of ISO 26262 is not mandatory. However, the 
international standard provides a standardized methodology which is generally-acknowl-
edged as state-of-the-art. Hazards may be caused not only by faults addressed in the ISO 
26262, but also by lack of the intended functionality or by misuse. The safety of the intended 
                                                 
33 IEC SC 65A: Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems 
(2010). 
34 cf. 6.4.1.2. ISO: ISO 26262-3: Road vehicles - Functional safety - Part 3: Concept phase (2018). 
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functionality (SOTIF) is addressed in the ISO/PAS 2144835 and defines methods to achieve 
the absence of unreasonable risk for these types of hazards in compliance with ISO 26262. 
The aim is to minimize hazards that are unsafe and known by either improving the function 
or by restricting its use or performance. Unsafe and unknown risks shall be reduced with an 
acceptable level of effort. In the verification phase, the system is proved to behave as ex-
pected to avoid known hazards and it is examined if its components are covered sufficiently 
by sensor, decision-algorithm and actuator tests. In the validation step, system functions per-
formed by sensors, decision-algorithms and actuators are analyzed for causation of unrea-
sonable risk in real-life situations such as field experiences, long-term vehicle test or worst-
case scenarios. This can be achieved by applying the process indicated in Figure 2–2 and by 
considering performance limitations of the intended functionality. Figure 2–2 shows the V-
model methodology proposed by ISO 26262 and SOTIF. 
 
Figure 2–2: V-model methodology according to ISO 26262 and SOTIF35. The item definition de-
scribes the system behavior, its interfaces and the interaction with the environment. The hazard 
analysis and risk assessment (HARA) aims to identify top level safety requirements called safety 
goals which can be used to derive low level safety requirements for a functional and technical 
safety concept. The safety concept is implemented in hardware and software and requires verifica-
tion and validation. 
                                                 
35 International Organization for Standardization: ISO/PAS 21448: Road vehicles - SOTIF (2019). 
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The described standards and guidelines are targeting automated driving systems in general. 
However, to the best of the author’s knowledge specific minimum criteria for AVP are not 
specified in today’s standards. 
2.2 Automated Valet Parking 
The following sections summarize the state-of-the-art of the scientific and the practical per-
spective on automated valet parking. It is investigated which limitations exists and which 
parameters require a specification of minimum criteria. Furthermore, this section describes 
how the distribution of AVP functions between infrastructure and vehicle is implemented in 
the state-of-the-art. Existing research results are taken into account for the development of 
minimum criteria and for the identification of possible AVP configurations. Thereby, current 
valet parking systems are categorized according the distribution of functions between vehi-
cle and infrastructure with the following definition: 
 Vehicle-based AVP: The AVP service is executed by the automated vehicle 
standalone. No additional infrastructure support is required. 
 Cooperative AVP: Automated vehicle and infrastructure are sharing the responsibil-
ity for the driving task. System modules can be allocated between the vehicle and the 
infrastructure. 
 Infrastructure-based AVP: The entire process chain of perception and planning is 
managed by the infrastructure. The vehicle is only executing instructions via trajec-
tory control. 
2.2.1 Vehicle-based AVP 
In 2007, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) announced the Urban 
Challenge which initiated the development of test vehicles in numerous research projects to 
tackle the challenges of automated driving.36,37,38 Automated vehicles were designed to drive 
in urban environments in compliance with traffic rules. Beside a merging into a moving 
traffic, the driving on long and complex routes with stationary obstacles and intersections, 
the test consisted of an automated parking scenario. In this parking scenario, the vehicle had 
to navigate towards the parking spot, detect the free space and park. The DARPA challenge 
allowed to use the Global Positioning System (GPS), due to the line-of-sight in the test en-
vironment. The test vehicles were equipped with a broad variety of expensive sensors, e.g. 
the Chevrolet Tahoe called Boss which won the DARPA Urban Challenge was equipped 
                                                 
36 Montemerlo, M. et al.: Junior: The stanford entry in the urban challenge (2008). 
37 Urmson, C. et al.: Autonomous Driving in Urban Environments: Boss and the Urban Challenge (2008). 
38 Rauskolb, F. et al.: Caroline: An Autonomously Driving Vehicle for Urban Environments (2008). 
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with a combination of sensors such as five radar, two camera and eleven lidar sensors. The 
Urban Challenge proved the feasibility of the demanded driving tasks in a closed test envi-
ronment under controlled environmental conditions. However, for commercial use the sen-
sor setup was too expensive and required heavy modifications of series vehicles. 
 
Figure 2–3: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) boosted the development of 
automated driving. One major task was an automated parking scenario. The Chevy Tahoe named 
Boss that won the DARPA Urban Challenge was equipped with an extensive sensor setup containing 
11 lidar sensors, 5 radar sensors, 2 cameras and GPS37 
Jeevan et al.39 combined the learned lessons from the DARPA Urban Challenge to develop 
an automated valet parking system by using automotive grade sensors. The authors reused 
software modules from the Junior 3 test vehicle of the DARPA Urban Challenge and focused 
on a parking spot detector and a localization system in a GPS-denied environment such as a 
parking garage. The localization approach combines the visual-based landmark detection 
and odometry through a Kalman filter. The odometry serves complimentary for the predic-
tion whereas the camera-based detection of artificial landmarks on the road surface provides 
the observation update. The landmarks are georeferenced offline and known in the map be-
fore entering the parking garage. Costs are kept at a minimum for the parking garage opera-
tor. The authors state that typical position inaccuracies are around 20 centimeters and head-
ing accuracy are within 2°. Predominant factors are uneven road surface or sharp turns which 
causes inaccuracies in landmark detection. The vehicle uses only odometry during the park-
ing maneuver. Therefore, errors accumulate over the course of the parking maneuver to 40 
cm in lateral, 11 cm in longitudinal direction and 3.5° for the heading angle. 
Chirca et al.40 describes a valet parking system developed by Renault for private home resi-
dences without the need of infrastructure support. The vehicle stores the final parking posi-
tion only if a manual driving procedure was performed once. While the driver is parking, the 
                                                 
39 Jeevan, P. et al.: Realizing autonomous valet parking with automotive grade sensors (2010). 
40 Chirca, M. et al.: Autonomous valet parking system architecture (2015). 
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AVP perceives the environment and stores the driven trajectory. Thereafter, the starting po-
sition can be adapted and the AVP system is still able to execute an AVP process. The test 
vehicle is equipped with sensors that exists in high volume series for Advance Driver Assis-
tance Systems (ADAS). It contains a front and rear camera, four wheel odometer encoders, 
steering encoder, GPS and ultrasonic sensors. A Controller Area Network is used for data 
transmission. An occupancy map is computed with 12 ultrasonic sensors. Ultrasonic sensors 
are capable to detect objects in the range of 0.2 m to 4 m. Due to a high rate of false positives 
caused by echoes from the ground, a filtering system was added. Odometer sensors were 
fused with visual data for localization. The authors used Simultaneous Localization And 
Mapping (SLAM) based on an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF). Currently perceived images 
are continuously matched with key-images previously saved along the trajectory. Images are 
inspected against the current view to detect the pose. The maximum deviation was ±0.1 m 
for distances shorter than 500 m.  
Continental41 presented at the International Automobile Exhibition (IAA) an AVP system 
which finds a parking spot without the help of an infrastructure in the parking garage. No 
other efforts are required in the parking facility. The automated vehicle is able to navigate 
on the first floor of the parking garage. The environment is perceived via four surround-view 
cameras, four short range radar and a forward-facing mono camera. Pedestrians and other 
vehicles can be detected. The handling of ramps is expected to be possible by 2022.  
2.2.2 Cooperative AVP 
Beside the placement of functions inside the vehicle, a cooperation between the automated 
vehicle and the infrastructure is possible to accomplish the dynamic driving task. Different 
researchers targeted the interaction of both entities. Min and Choi42,43 implemented an auto-
mated valet parking system divided in three modules. The system architecture consists of an 
AVP server, an AVP mobile and an AVP vehicle controller. Each module provides function-
alities shown in Figure 2–4:  
 AVP mobile system: Valet parking requires to be instructed via a human machine 
interface. The AVP service is requested and can be monitored via the user’s mobile 
device. A parking area map is transmitted to the user’s mobile device to assign a 
parking space. The computed parking trajectory is displayed and the user is notified 
if the vehicle is parked successfully. 
 AVP Server: Environment data is provided by an AVP server which also generates a 
driving path and monitors the current state of the automated vehicle. Infrared sensors 
                                                 
41 Continental AG: Pull Up and Have Your Car Parked for You (2017). 
42 Min, K.-W.; Choi, J.-D.: Design and implementation of autonomous vehicle valet parking system (2013). 
43 Min, K.; Choi, J.: A control system for autonomous vehicle valet parking. 
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detect static obstacles and generates an alternative trajectory. Additionally, the server 
assesses occupied parking spots and the geometry of the free parking space.  
 AVP Vehicle Controller: A controller module is required to follow the computed tra-
jectory. The control commands de-/accelerating, steering and gear shifting are per-
formed in-vehicle to follow the trajectory transmitted from the AVP server. The ve-
hicle contains lidar sensors to detect dynamic objects and to stop or to continue the 
valet parking process. 
 
Figure 2–4: AVP System according to Min and Choi42 based on an AVP server, an AVP mobile and 
an AVP vehicle controller. An AVP mobile ensures the selection of a parking spot for an AVP re-
quest. Thereafter, a corresponding trajectory is sent to the automated vehicle which executes the 
control commands. AVP Server and vehicle perceive the environment in cooperation. 
 
Löper et al.44 sees automated valet parking as an integrated travel assistance. An infrastruc-
ture camera that observes the parking area from a top view, detects free and occupied parking 
spaces. The infrastructure transmits the information to the vehicle using a communication 
device equipped with IEEE 802.11p standard. The information is incorporated in an occu-
pancy grid framework. The remaining parts of the map are built by simultaneous localization 
and mapping (SLAM) with four IBEO LUX laser scanners. A highly accurate map and 
DGPS is used for the positioning task. The system is only able to handle static objects, dy-
namic objects were considered for future work. A smartphone displays the status, position 
and route of the automated vehicle and can be used for pickup and request purposes. 
Schwesinger et al.45 implemented in the European research project V-Charge an automated 
valet parking service using close-to market sensors cameras and ultrasonic sensors in a GPS-
                                                 
44 Löper, C. et al.: Automated valet parking as part of an integrated travel assistance (2013). 
45 Schwesinger, U. et al.: Automated valet parking and charging for e-mobility (2016). 
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denied parking garage for electric vehicles. According the authors electric vehicles will be 
one of the key factors to reduce CO2 emissions. However, electric vehicles have two major 
disadvantages: reduced driving ranges and increased charging duration. Automated parking 
charging shall ease the traveler’s transfer. Charging stations can be shared without human 
interaction by switching electric vehicles once the charging process has finished. Besides 
high density parking, AVP provides the possibility to reduce the number of required charging 
stations. The AVP procedure was shown in the low-speed range up to 10 km/h. The VW e-
Golf platform is equipped with front- and rear facing stereo cameras with a horizontal field 
of view (FoV) of 45° and 120°. Additionally, four monocular fisheye cameras provide a 360° 
surround view. 12 ultrasonic sensors are used to detect close-range objects. All sensor data 
is fused in an occupancy grid map. The accuracy for both stereo sensors lies in the range of 
11-21 centimeters.  
 
Figure 2–5: An automated valet parking service using close-to market sensors cameras and ultrasonic 
sensors in a gps-denied parking garage for electric vehicles. The sensor setup according to Schwe-
singer et al.45 consists of two stereo cameras in front and to the rear, four fisheye monocular cameras 
and twelve ultrasonic sensors 
Similarly, Klemm et al.46 gives insights about the test vehicle which navigates to an assigned 
parking spot and is docked with a charging robot. The electric vehicle drives indoor in a 
multi-story building without external localization. According to the authors the infrastructure 
does not have to be heavily adapted: no sensors need to be installed and no other construc-
tional changes are required. The infrastructure assigns a parking space and sends geometric 
and topological maps to the automated vehicle. The system provides a single charging robot 
to serve multiple parking spaces. The localization estimation is based on an Extended Kal-
man Filter (EKF) which fuses vehicle odometry, 2D laserscans with the geometric map 
                                                 
46 Klemm, S. et al.: Autonomous multi-story navigation for valet parking (2016). 
2 State-of-the-art 
22 
model. The authors claim that the accuracy is sufficient for parking and navigating within 
the parking facility. The mission control communicates the vehicle’s current state to the user. 
Friedl et al.47 gives an overview about BMW’s valet parking system that was presented at 
the Consumer Electronics Show (CES) 2015 in Las Vegas. BMW uses a smartwatch for the 
human machine interface to order instructions. The infrastructure transmits a digital map and 
assigns a free parking space. A priori map information contains the floor plan, the route net-
work and semantic information. Thereafter, the automated vehicle navigates to the desired 
parking spot. A grid map is created based on lidar and ultrasonic sensor data combined with 
odometry. Perceived reference objects are matched with static map elements in an occupancy 
grid map. The estimation of the position is based on a Kalman filter. GPS data is not required. 
A major requirement was that maneuvering in unstructured environments should be possible 
since the destination is not always known at the starting point and the data correctness based 
solely on the stored map data cannot be assumed. The planning task is divided in submodules 
to accomplish the mission. A route planner determines a route towards the destination based 
on a route network by using the A* search algorithm. Maneuvers are planned to accomplish 
route segments. Occurring events are taken into account and a trajectory is computed in the 
trajectory planner from the current to the desired position. The automated vehicle is kept at 
the lane center to its destination via control actions determined in the trajectory controller. 
The hierarchical approach allows to plan complex maneuvers. 
Even though a multitude of AVP systems tackle the technical challenges of automated driv-
ing in a parking environment, none of these focuses on the definition of minimum required 
criteria to show insufficiencies of AVP systems. 
2.2.3 Infrastructure-based AVP 
Bosch and Daimler48,49 jointly implemented the first infrastructure-supported automated 
valet parking in a mixed traffic at the Mercedes-Benz Museum in Stuttgart. Bosch provides 
an intelligent parking garage which is equipped with a Wireless Local Area Network 
(WLAN) access points and lidar sensors to monitor the corridors and the vehicle’s surround-
ing. In the next steps lidar sensors will be replaced by cheaper stereo cameras. A free parking 
space is assigned at the entrance of the parking garage. If the assigned parking space is oc-
cupied by a human driver, the system assigns another one. Daimler provides the vehicle 
technology. The transmitted control instructions are transmitted via WLAN and executed by 
the vehicle. In case of an object in the vehicle’s trajectory, two types of braking are imple-
mented: a distance-dependent soft and an emergency braking. The object can be a pedestrian, 
another vehicle or even an animal. The system accelerates once the obstacle is gone. The 
                                                 
47 Friedl, M. et al.: Vollautomatisiertes Valet Parking: Funktions-und Planungsarchitektur (2015). 
48 Ebberg, J.: Bosch and Daimler demonstrate driverless parking in real-life conditions (2017). 
49 Pluta, W.: Lass das Parkhaus das Auto parken! (2017). 
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maximum allowed velocity is limited by 6 km/h. The system response time shall be short 
enough to remain within the legal framework. How short the latency time is, is not stated. 
The infrastructure-based AVP shortens the parking process and allows vehicles equipped 
with limited sensor setups to use the parking function. Instead of waiting until every vehicle 
is capable for automated driving, the transition phase is shortened by an infrastructure-based 
solution. Existing multi-storey car parks can be upgraded and used in a mixed traffic. If there 
is no need to open the door, additional 20% of vehicles can be parked in the available space. 
Environment perception and trajectory planning are performed by the infrastructure whereas 
the execution is realized by the vehicle. Reasons for the choice of an infrastructure-based 
configuration are not provided. Additional information which zones are perceived by the 
infrastructure to establish a safe service or which requirements overall system requires to 
fulfill are not mentioned.  
 
Figure 2–6: Fully infrastructure-supported valet parking implemented by Bosch and Daimler50. The 
infrastructure provides the perception and planning for the automated vehicle. The vehicle executes 
the received control commands. 
Ibisch et al.51 propose a new approach on vehicle localization and tracking for infrastructure-
embedded lidar sensors in a parking garage. A major benefit is that common vehicles can 
use the localization system and do not require specific equipment. The system is transferable 
into today’s parking garages without the need of additional modifications. The authors use a 
2D grid and estimate the occupation of a quadratic cell in a single time frame. The hypothe-
ses provide the vehicle’s center and its orientation based on the best traceable feature of the 
                                                 
50 Robert Bosch GmbH: Die Infrastruktur kennt den Weg. (2018). 
51 Ibisch, A. et al.: Towards autonomous driving in a parking garage (2013). 
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vehicle: the well-known shape of the wheel. A rectangle contains the four wheels with a 
certain tolerance. The authors used the Random Sample Consensus (RANSAC) algorithm to 
eliminate outliers and an Extended Kalman filter for prediction. The sensor setup consists of 
six 2D SICK lidar LMS 500 distributed in the parking garage with a field of view of up to 
190° and a range of 65 m. Test scenarios included the entrance area, a ramp and the parking 
area. Results were compared to human labeled data within unfiltered and raw recorded lidar 
data in every single timeframe. Differential GPS would have been more accurate compared 
to human labeled ground truth (GT) data, but was not used due to unavailability of DGPS 
hardware. The velocity error between the human labeled GT data and the prediction was 
0.82 km/h and a standard deviation of ±0.6 km/h. The mean orientation error was 1.07° with 
a standard deviation of ±1.16°. The mean absolute lateral and longitudinal errors amount to 
6.3 cm and 8.5 cm with a standard deviation of ±4.4 cm and ±5.6 cm. The authors adjusted 
all lidar sensors parallel to the ground plane which results in challenges in case of occlusion. 
Top-mounted infrastructure sensors may perceive occluded areas from the vehicle’s view 
caused by dynamic objects. 
Additional advances have been done in research projects which target the verification and 
validation of automated driving systems. Some of the research projects which are related to 
the contributions of this thesis shall be briefly described in the following. 
2.3 Research Projects 
Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) is a mathematical model introduced by Shalev-
Shwartz et al.52 which specifies safety-relevant distances for collision avoidance. A distance 
is considered safe if an accident is not possible. Worst-case scenarios are assumed to remove 
the need to estimate the traffic participant’s intentions. A safe longitudinal distance is defined 
by the following situation: Two vehicles are driving towards each other with velocities 𝑣𝑥,ego 
and 𝑣𝑥,obj, accelerate with maximum acceleration 𝑎𝑥,max during the system response time 
𝜏R,RSS, and thereafter immediately brake with the always expected deceleration 𝐷x,0 (the 
signs of the velocities are according to the definition of Shalev-Shwartz et al.52). The longi-
tudinal safety distance is depicted in Figure 2–7 and is given by 
  
𝑑𝑥,req = 𝑑𝑥,reqEgo + 𝑑𝑥,reqObj (2–1) 
𝑑𝑥,reqEgo = 𝑣𝑥,ego ∙ 𝜏R,RSS + 
𝑎𝑥,max ∙ 𝜏R,RSS
2
2
+
(𝑣𝑥,ego + 𝜏R,RSS ∙ 𝑎𝑥,max)
2
2 ∙ 𝐷𝑥,0
 (2–2) 
                                                 
52 Shalev-Shwartz, S. et al.: On a Formal Model of Safe and Scalable Self-driving Cars (2017). 
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𝑑𝑥,reqObj = |𝑣𝑥,obj| ∙ 𝜏R,RSS + 
𝑎𝑥,max ∙ 𝜏R,RSS
2
2
+
(|𝑣𝑥,obj| + 𝜏R,RSS ∙ 𝑎𝑥,max)
2
2 ∙ 𝐷𝑥,0
 (2–3) 
 
Figure 2–7: A safe longitudinal distance is specified according to Shalev-Shwartz et al.52 as the sum 
of the ego-vehicle’s and object’s travelled distances when accelerating longitudinally during re-
sponse time and thereafter immediately braking.  
The safety distance between two vehicles in lateral direction is defined by a similar scenario 
in lateral direction. A lane-based coordinate system is used for lateral maneuvers. Figure 2–
8 shows two vehicles applying lateral acceleration of 𝑎𝑦,max towards each other during the 
response time 𝜏R,RSS and thereafter applying lateral deceleration of 𝐷𝑦,0 until the lateral ve-
locity 𝑣𝑦 is zero. The remaining distance between both vehicles is a safety margin 𝑑tol. Ac-
cording to Shalev-Shwartz et al.52, this is formalized by  
𝑑𝑦,req = 𝑑tol + [𝑑𝑦,reqEgo + 𝑑𝑦,reqObj]+
 (2–4) 
𝑑𝑦,reqEgo = 𝑣𝑦,ego ∙ 𝜏R,RSS + 
𝑎𝑦,max ∙ 𝜏R,RSS
2
2
+
(𝑣𝑦,ego + 𝜏R,RSS ∙ 𝑎𝑦,max)
2
2 ∙ 𝐷𝑦,0
 (2–5) 
𝑑𝑦,reqObj = −(𝑣𝑦,obj ∙ 𝜏R,RSS − 
𝑎𝑦,max ∙ 𝜏R,RSS
2
2
−
(𝑣𝑦,obj − 𝜏R,RSS ∙ 𝑎𝑦,max)
2
2 ∙ 𝐷𝑦,0
) (2–6) 
 
Figure 2–8: A safe lateral distance is specified according to Shalev-Shwartz et al.52 as the sum of the 
ego-vehicle’s and object’s travelled distances when accelerating laterally during response time and 
thereafter immediately braking. 
Safe distances in longitudinal and lateral direction have to be violated for occurrence of a 
collision. A dangerous situation occurs for two vehicles if both the longitudinal and lateral 
distances between them are non-safe. Hereby, the authors claim that the RSS model will 
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never cause an accident if safety distances are maintained. A traffic participant is not neces-
sarily responsible for the collision if he did not obey the right of way. The responsibility for 
an accident is assigned to the traffic participant who did not comply with a so called proper 
response even though he is prioritized. The proper response characterizes the set of actions 
required to be applied to avoid a potential collision. A proper response is to brake laterally, 
if beforehand there was a safe lateral distance or to brake longitudinally if beforehand there 
was a safe longitudinal distance.  An evasive maneuver is legal only if the accident can be 
avoided without causing another one. Hence, an evasive maneuver has to comply with the 
longitudinal and lateral safety distances after the execution. Furthermore, RSS targets the 
occlusion of pedestrians. The automated vehicle is not blamed for a collision with an oc-
cluded pedestrian if it did not accelerate during response time, performed a longitudinal 
brake and if the average vehicle velocity is below the average pedestrian velocity in the time 
duration from first seen to full stop.  
 
Figure 2–9: The upper two figures illustrate the proper response of longitudinally braking. When 
approaching a vehicle in front, only a non-safe lateral distance was present. Once the longitudinal 
distance becomes unsafe, the ego-vehicle has to brake longitudinally since beforehand the longitudi-
nal distance was safe. The bottom two figure show the proper response of laterally braking. When 
changing the lane, a safe lateral distance was present. Once the longitudinal distance becomes unsafe, 
the ego-vehicle has to brake laterally since beforehand the lateral distance was safe. 
However, RSS is a distance-based safety approach for automated vehicles: A deceleration is 
triggered if longitudinal and lateral safety distances are violated. RSS does not relate to 
safety by design. This thesis proposes an area-based definition of minimum perception re-
quirements. The necessary perception- and safety-relevant space around the ego-vehicle is 
defined for the specific use case AVP. Compared to RSS lateral safety distances are consid-
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ered by tractrix curves which take the bending of stopping envelopes into account. An inte-
gration of manually driven vehicles into the RSS concept is not specified concretely since it 
cannot be assumed that a human driver will follow the RSS policy and that corresponding 
response times are similar. RSS follows a vehicle-based concept. Infrastructure support is 
not taken into account. This thesis considers not only collision avoidance, but the overall 
safety design process for AVP.  
Wachenfeld and Winner53 estimated billions of test kilometers required to be driven for the 
verification of a highway chauffeur. Hereby, no state-of-the-art methods are present to over-
come this dilemma. New methods are required for time-efficient testing, verification and 
validation of automated driving (AD) functions. Instead of testing random cases, the research 
project PEGASUS54 (Project for the Establishment of Generally Accepted quality criteria, 
tools and methods as well as Scenarios and Situations for approval of highly automated driv-
ing functions) addresses a scenario-based approach for testing, verification and validation of 
automated driving functions. Results of different workpackages were combined in an overall 
PEGASUS method for the assessment of highly automated driving functions. The overall 
process flow of the PEGASUS method consists of five basic blocks: definition of require-
ments, data processing, information storage and processing in a database, assessment of the 
highly AD function and argumentation. In the first step, logical scenarios, which describe the 
parameter space in the state space, are identified systematically for the AD function and 
recorded scenarios are converted into a common format (data processing). In parallel, re-
quirements are defined as evaluation criteria for test cases (definition of requirements). In 
the third step, scenario descriptions are transferred into a database to define parameter spaces 
for logical test cases with pass and fail criteria. In the forth step, logical scenarios are exe-
cuted in simulation and on proving grounds. Results are compared with the defined pass and 
fail criteria for evaluation of the AD function. In the last step, the predefined five-layer safety 
argumentation is compared with the evaluation. The PEGASUS method was applied exem-
plary on a SAE level 3+ highway chauffeur. The PEGASUS report concludes that additional 
use cases in other operational design domains have to be evaluated in future projects. Oc-
curring scenarios for a highway chauffeur and AVP differ in the occurrence of handover and 
pickup zones, in the driver interaction during automated driving, in the execution of allowed 
maneuvers (e.g. reverse driving, intersection crossing, turning) as well as in the constraints 
for the operational design domain (e.g. weather conditions, expected velocities). This thesis 
investigates functional scenarios and maneuvers for a closed parking garage instead of the 
highway. This work formalizes necessary conditions for AVP. 
                                                 
53 Wachenfeld, W.; Winner, H.: Die Freigabe des autonomen Fahrens (2015). 
54 Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e. V.: The PEGASUS Method (2019). 
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Figure 2–10: PEGASUS54 targets a scenario-based approach for testing, verification and validation 
of automated driving functions. The PEGASUS method consists of five basic blocks: definition of 
requirements, data processing, information storage and processing in a database, assessment of the 
highly AD function and argumentation. 
The research project ENABLE-S355 (European Initiative to Enable the Validation of highly 
Automated Safe and Secure Systems) investigated tools for a cost-efficient way to verify 
and validate automated functions from different domains, namely automotive, aerospace, 
rail, maritime, health and farming. 68 industrial and academic partners from 16 European 
countries provided a basis for future certification and homologation processes. Hereby, mod-
ular structures and standardized interfaces shall avoid vendor lock-in and the switching be-
tween tools and platforms. This has been shown in the automotive domains by pushing the 
standardization of Open Simulation Interface (OSI) and contributing to OpenDrive56 and 
OpenScenario. Significant time and costs are saved due to the interchangeability of individ-
ual components and standardized descriptions for dynamic contents in driving simulations 
or for road networks. Some of the standardizations are addressed in chapter 7. 
                                                 
55 Leitner, A. et al.: ENABLE-S3: Summary of Results (2019). 
56 Dupuis, M. et al.: OpenDRIVE Format Specification Rev. 1.5 (2019). 
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2.4 Summary 
The state-of-the-art reveals diverse implementations of AVP systems ranging from fully ve-
hicle-based to infrastructure-based AVP. Banzhaf et al.57 investigates core components and 
platforms of automated valet parking systems in his survey on the future of parking. Accord-
ing to the author AVP promises the increase in parking capacity and decrease the land use of 
on-street parking spaces. This can be either established by parking vehicles denser or by 
allowing shunting operations. AVP has the potential to become one of the first considered 
driving systems for release due to the simplifications that can be made such as low velocities 
in a closed and controlled environment and the possibility of infrastructure-support. Banzhaf 
states that recent approaches aim to reduce the amount of required sensors and use close-to-
market sensors to fulfill the valet parking function. Thereby, LIDAR- and camera-based lo-
calization approaches are preferred for AVP. Either online or offline maps are used. Offline 
maps may contain static obstacles and parking spot occupancies whereas online maps con-
tain the dynamic data. Banzhaf et al. divides in his survey the motion planning in a route 
planner called global planner, a trajectory planner defined as local planner and a parking 
planner for the maneuvering. Thereby, the A*-algorithm is mostly implemented for the route 
planning in the state-of-the-art. Banzhaf concludes that none of the existing literature de-
scribes how to integrate the AVP into existing parking structures and which technological 
requirements have to be fulfilled. Banzhaf realizes that requirements for measurement accu-
racies are not addressed yet and have to be defined. 
Einsiedler et al.58 notices in his survey that modern vehicles primarily use global navigation 
satellite systems (GNSS) to determine their position. However, due to the lack of a line-of-
sight the parking garage is a GPS-denied environment. Therefore, alternative positioning 
systems are demanded. Compared to GNSS-based outdoor positioning systems, no predom-
inant indoor positioning technology has been established until today. The spectrum of indoor 
positioning technologies is broad and often used in combination. According to the authors 
all indoor positioning systems can be classified into the categories internal and external. 
Internal positioning systems determine their position with the help of the surroundings 
whereas for external systems the infrastructure is responsible for the localization of the ve-
hicle. Additionally, the positioning systems can be distinguished between absolute and rela-
tive localization. Einsiedler observes that the following positioning systems are used in the 
state-of-the-art which are summarized in Table 2–2: 
A. Internal Systems 
 Visual systems: Visual landmarks are installed in the parking garage. The landmarks 
have to be georeferenced manually integrated in a static map that is transmitted at 
                                                 
57 Banzhaf, H. et al.: The future of parking: A survey on AVP with an outlook on high density parking (2017). 
58 Einsiedler, J. et al.: Vehicle indoor positioning: A survey (2017). 
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the entrance. The vehicle detects the landmark with its camera and calculates its po-
sition.  
 Vehicle odometry: Based on the last known position, dead reckoning and digital 
maps, the vehicle can localize itself within the parking garage. However, vehicle 
odometry only reaches the precision requirements in combination with other indoor 
positioning systems. 
 LIDAR SLAM: Simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) requires the con-
struction of a map in an unknown environment while simultaneously localizing 
within. This allows the vehicle equipped with lidar sensor to maneuver inside the 
parking garage. 
 
B. External Systems 
 LIDAR: Infrastructural lidar sensors locate and track objects in a parking garage. The 
determined position is transferred to the vehicles 
 Visual systems: A top-mounted camera-based system monitors the environment and 
detects the position of the objects. 
Table 2–2: Indoor positioning accuracy according to Einsiedler et al.58 
 Type Basic Technology Position Accuracy 
Masuda et al. Intern Visual Landmark n.a. 
Jeevan et al. Intern Visual Landmark < 0.60 m (median: 0.2 m) 
Qu et al. Intern Visual odometry < 5 m (median: 2 m) 
Heissmeyer et al. Intern Optical beacons 0.29 m 
Wagner et al. Intern Odometry and gyro < 2.5 m (± 1 parking spot) 
Bojja et al. Intern Odometry and gyro < 2.5 m (confidence level 95%) 
Kümmerle et al. Intern 3D SLAM (LIDAR) n.a. 
Klemm et al. Intern 2D SLAM (LIDAR) n.a. 
Ibisch et al. Extern LIDAR <0.09 ± 0.06 m 
Ibisch et al. Extern Multi-camera < 1.2 m (median: 0.24 m ± 0.19 m) 
Einsiedler et al. Extern Monocular camera 1.5 m (confidence level 95%) 
 
Table 2–2 indicates that today’s indoor positioning systems are able to locate objects within 
centimeter range. However, the survey of Einsiedler raises the question which longitudinal 
and lateral errors are acceptable for safe AVP systems. The issue which kind of indoor posi-
tioning system is required to meet the constraints of automated valet parking is still unre-
solved. To the best of the author’s knowledge none of the upper publications concerns a 
definition of a minimum criterion for the measurement accuracy. 
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The described research results focus on the development of automated valet parking plat-
forms and the improvement of today’s algorithms. However, a definition of a bottom limit 
expected from AVP systems is not provided. Moreover, it is still unresolved if future AVP 
systems require modifications or if these are already sufficient. For example, the authors do 
not clarify if their sensor setup is sufficient for valet parking purposes in different parking 
facilities and if the vehicle perceives the safety-relevant spaces for all relevant critical sce-
narios. A specification of areas around the ego-vehicle which are mandatory to be investi-
gated is not given. The issue of a minimum perception area around the vehicle remains yet 
undefined. The definition of a geometric and technology-independent perception zone would 
provide a commitment for AVP providers to fulfill these perception constraints.  
The DARPA Urban Challenge influenced fully vehicle-based AVP concepts. These ap-
proaches are by far not the only way. The state-of-the-art shows that cooperative valet park-
ing is of major interest. Future technical realizations focus on the provision of a digital map 
at the entrance in combination with the detection of free parking spaces to assign a free spot. 
Fully infrastructure-based AVP services benefit from the possibility of an early introduction 
into the market since the AVP service can be used by standard vehicles. However, imple-
mentations of infrastructure-based AVP systems are yet rarely to find. The choice for an AVP 
configuration lacks quantifiable statements which show under which constraints a specific 
configuration should be preferred. Furthermore, the state-of-the-art reveals three major types 
of configurations. However, other configurations can be investigated which provide major 
benefits. Considering the state-of-the-art, two main research questions can be derived as in-
troduced in chapter 1: 
 RQ1: What is the essential subset of minimum criteria all AVP configurations require 
to fulfill for safe operation? 
 RQ2: Which degrees of infrastructure support are needed and what are their benefits? 
Figure 2–11 indicates missing technical ways between fully vehicle- and fully infrastructure-
based AVP defined in section 2.2 and links corresponding research questions. This thesis 
contributes to the specification of minimum criteria to ensure the necessary safety design by 
considering minimum safety requirements, the minimum required perception zone or the 
minimum required functional requirements (RQ1). Additionally, the detailed analysis for the 
distribution of functions between automated vehicle and infrastructure is provided to inves-
tigate further possible AVP configurations and corresponding benefits for parking garage 
operators and manufacturers. 
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Figure 2–11: AVP configurations in the state-of-the-art with an increasing degree of infrastructure 
influence: fully vehicle-based AVP (left), provision of a static map, free parking space detection and 
inclusion of the mission planner (middle), fully infrastructure-based AVP (right). 
The methodology described in chapter 1 is applied in order to contribute to the research 
questions starting with a scenario decomposition of the valet parking procedure. In the fol-
lowing chapter, a system description is given in the item definition which is in compliance 
with the ISO 26262 and SOTIF.  
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 Urmson & Montemerlo (2008)
 Jeevan et al. (2010)
 Chrica et al. (2015)
 Löper et al. (2013)
 Friedl et al (2015)
 Schwesinger et al. (2016)
 Klemm et al. (2016)
 Bosch and Daimler (2017)
? ?
Research Question (RQ2): 
Which degrees of infrastructure support are 
needed and what are their benefits?
Research Question (RQ1): 
What is the essential subset of minimum criteria AVP configurations require to fulfill for safe operation?
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3 Item Definition 
The development of fully automated vehicles in the upcoming future requires new method-
ologies to target safety challenge.59 However, a broad range of parameters exists for auto-
mated driving systems concerning the system’s behavior and the environment. Considering 
the overall system is fairly complex and too extensive.60 A functional decomposition of the 
systems behavior is required to deal with the rising complexity. The international standard 
ISO 26262 suggests an item definition before the application of a hazard analysis and risk 
assessment (HARA). The item definition describes the functionality, interfaces and environ-
mental conditions of the item. According to Ulbrich et al.61, scenarios can be used to give a 
functional description of the system. Ulbrich describes a scene as a snapshot of the environ-
ment and the interaction of entities while time is progressing. A scenario presents actions 
and events of the traffic participants within a certain time frame (sequence of scenes). In this 
thesis, the system’s functional behavior is decomposed into functional scenarios62 in order 
to reduce the system’s complexity and provide a functional description of the system. The 
following pre-conditions are hereby assumed for AVP: 
 Infrastructure and automated vehicle may manage the perception and planning of the 
driving task cooperatively. The infrastructure may support the automated vehicle dur-
ing the AVP service. 
 The procedure of handing the automated vehicle over to and requesting it back from 
the infrastructure is instructed via a terminal (human-machine interface, HMI). 
 Manually and automatically operated vehicles are allowed to enter the parking gar-
age. A mixed traffic in the car park is assumed. 
 Pedestrians, animals (e.g. dogs), stationary objects, etc. are potentially present in the 
parking facility. Special attention has to be paid to pedestrians due to a mixed traffic. 
 Drivers and passengers have to leave the automated vehicle before AVP is activated. 
So, the driver is not further involved in the driving task and has no controllability 
during the AVP process. 
These constraints serve as an input to break down the system’s functional behavior into sce-
narios. As a first contribution towards the goal of safe AVP systems the following functional 
scenarios are proposed as introduced in Schönemann et al.63. 
                                                 
59 Wachenfeld, W.; Winner, H.: Die Freigabe des autonomen Fahrens (2015). 
60 Amersbach, C.; Winner, H.: Defining Required and Feasible Test Coverage for HAV (2019). 
61 Ulbrich, S. et al.: Defining and Substantiating the Terms Scene, Situation, and Scenario for AD (2015). 
62 cf. Form, T.: PEGASUS Method for Assessment of Highly Automated Driving Function (2018). 
63 Schönemann, V. et al.: Maneuver-based adaptive Safety Zone for infrastructure-supported AVP (2019). 
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3.1 Vehicle Handover to AVP System 
Every automated valet parking procedure starts with the arrival of the vehicle at the handover 
zone in the parking garage. The AVP system requires an activation process for the AVP ser-
vice in the handover zone. The driver and other passengers get off the vehicle. In such a 
handover scenario the system checks whether all requirements for automated valet parking 
are met e.g. whether the vehicle is located in the handover zone, is in standstill and, correctly 
oriented and, whether all doors are closed and all persons have left the handover zone. The 
driver or a passenger hands over the responsibility for the vehicle to the automated valet 
parking system by using a Human Machine Interface (HMI) to instruct a parking request. If 
the request is accepted, several options exist: the infrastructure sends a predefined trajectory 
to the vehicle, the vehicle calculates a trajectory by itself, or the trajectory is determined in 
a cooperative mode. The infrastructure may transfer a static map of the parking garage and 
a predefined trajectory to the corresponding parking spot. A parking spot can be assigned by 
the infrastructure system. After the parking request is instructed, the vehicle is handed over 
to the parking area management and the automation takes over the responsibility for the 
further steps of the driving task. The handover is successful if the specified constraints are 
met. Delays may result from activating the AVP process, from unloading items or from a 
shortage of handover spots during rush hour. Table 3–1 provides the scenario description for 
the vehicle handover. 
Table 3–1: Scenario description for vehicle handover to infrastructure system 
Scenario Name Vehicle handover to AVP system 
Scenario ID 1 
Procedure 1. Vehicle is parked by a human driver at the handover zone (in 
standstill, correctly oriented) 
2. All passengers leave the handover zone and close vehicle doors. 
3. User confirms the activation of the AVP process via an HMI. 
Key Scenes 
 
Figure 3–1: Vehicle handover to the automation system for AVP 
Successful end 
condition 
Procedure constraints are met and system is ready for handover. 
Handover 
Zone
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3.2 Automated Driving to a Point of Interest 
After a successful handover, the vehicle is required to navigate driverless in the parking 
facility. Hereby it needs to navigate to different points of interest. The point of interest is 
defined as a desired location which mainly includes the assigned parking spot, the pickup 
zone or another point of interest such as a charging station. The system has to assign a safe 
mission. The destination’s pose and its dimensions needs to be known in order to assign a 
mission. To this end, the automated vehicle requires to estimate its state such as its pose, its 
velocity and have knowledge about its dimensions and class to navigate in the parking garage 
(ego-vehicle state estimation). Additionally, other traffic participants have to be considered 
(object state estimation). The environment can be perceived via radar, lidar, camera and ul-
trasonic sensors. Once the required parameters are determined, a collision-free trajectory is 
calculated to the point of interest. Thereby, the system shall ensure that the vehicle stays in 
the statically defined drivable area. Perception and planning can be performed by the vehicle, 
the infrastructure or collaborative. Thereby, several degrees of infrastructure support are pos-
sible. The vehicle executes the desired control instructions. Several maneuvers have to be 
accomplished such as following a straight or curved lane, turning left/right, crossing of an 
intersection and driving on a ramp. The end state is reached if the vehicle arrives at the 
desired point of interest without colliding. This scenario does not include the maneuvering 
into the parking space. Table 3–2 shows the scenario specification for the automated driving 
to a point of interest. 
Table 3–2: Scenario description for automated driving to a point of interest 
Scenario Name Automated driving to a point of interest 
Scenario ID 2 
Procedure 1. Ego-vehicle and object state estimation 
2. Mission and trajectory planning to point of interest 
3. Execution of control commands 
4. Data transmission between vehicle and infrastructure 
Key Scenes 
 
Figure 3–2: Possible situations during navigating to a point of interest such 
as traversing parking spots (left), intersection crossing/ turning (middle) and 
driving on a ramp (right)  
Successful end 
condition 
Collision-free arrival at the desired point of interest. 
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3.3 Automated Maneuvering into the Parking Spot 
When the automated vehicle arrives nearby the parking spot, the parking maneuver can be 
executed. Either the infrastructure has already checked the required free parking space and/ 
or the vehicle takes over the analysis of the parking spot to decide whether the parking space 
is appropriate for parking. The system has to assign the free parking space for the automated 
vehicle. Thereafter, longitudinal or lateral actions have to be executed to place the vehicle 
properly. For such a parking maneuver, a precise positioning system is crucial. The vehicle 
may park forward or reverse. The parking spots are arranged from 0° to 90° with respect to 
the lane. The final state is successfully reached if the assigned parking spot is arrived colli-
sion-free, the vehicle size does not exceed the parking spot, the parking brake is set and the 
vehicle is on standby. A standby-mode ensures the automated vehicle’s availability on call 
in case of a driver’s handback request. Table 3–3 illustrates the maneuvering into the parking 
space. 
Table 3–3: Scenario description for automated maneuvering into the parking space 
Scenario Name Automated maneuvering into the parking space 
Scenario ID 3 
Procedure 1. Free Parking space detection 
2. Trajectory planning into the parking space 
3. Execution of parking control commands 
4. Data transmission between vehicle and infrastructure 
Key Scenes 
 
Figure 3–3: Maneuvering into an assigned parking spot 
Successful end 
condition 
Collision-free arrival, vehicle placed within parking markings, parking 
brake set and vehicle is on standby  
Parking 
Spot
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3.4 Automated Leaving of the Parking Spot 
Once the driver desires to continue his journey, (s)he has to send a handback request to the 
AVP system. If the driver initiates a handback request, the automated vehicle is triggered to 
leave the parking spot. The required trajectory to the pick-up zone is either planned by the 
ego-vehicle or received from the infrastructure. Maneuvering out of the parking spot is pos-
sible in forward and reverse direction. If no obstacles are located in the area required for 
maneuvering out of the parking spot, longitudinal and lateral driving actions can be per-
formed. Leaving the parking spot is successful if it is collision-free and the automated vehi-
cle is placed such that scenario automated driving to a point of interest can be executed. 
Table 3–4 provides the scenario description for the automated leaving of the parking space. 
Table 3–4: Scenario description for automated leaving of the parking space 
Scenario Name Automated leaving of the parking space 
Scenario ID 4 
Procedure 1. Free space detection for maneuvering out 
2. Trajectory planning for leaving the parking space 
3. Execution of control commands 
4. Data transmission between vehicle and infrastructure 
Key Scenes 
 
Figure 3–4: Automated leaving of the parking spot after a handback request 
Successful end 
condition 
Collision-free leaving of the parking space and vehicle placed properly 
to execute scenario 2. 
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3.5 Vehicle Handover to Driver 
After the driver requests his vehicle back, the ego-vehicle drives to the exit of the parking 
garage (scenario 2: automated driving to a point of interest). The automated vehicle has to 
be parked at the pickup-zone. The HMI confirms the successful arrival at the pick-up loca-
tion. If the vehicle is located in the pick-up zone in standstill, the parking brake is set, the 
vehicle engine is turned off and automated valet parking is deactivated, the driver can enter 
the vehicle in order to continue his journey. If the constraints are met and no traffic partici-
pant is harmed, the scenario is considered to be successful. Delays may result from loading 
items into vehicles or from a shortage of pickup spots during rush hour. This may lead to 
additionally required pickup time for the driver and passengers. Table 3–5 presents the ve-
hicle handover to the driver. 
Table 3–5: Scenario description for vehicle handover to driver 
Scenario Name Vehicle handover to driver 
Scenario ID 5 
Procedure 1. Vehicle is parked at pickup zone (in standstill, correctly oriented) 
2. System confirms the deactivation of the AVP process via an HMI. 
3. Driver and passengers can enter the vehicle. 
Key Scenes 
 
Figure 3–5: Handover of the vehicle to the driver at the pickup zone 
Successful end 
condition 
Upper constraints are met and system transitions to manually driving 
mode. 
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3.6 Aborting the Valet Parking Procedure 
This scenario describes the abort of the valet parking service while driving inside the car 
park, which is equivalent to an early initiated handback request. The abort is instructed via 
the HMI in order to get back to the vehicle. The automated vehicle does not drive to the 
assigned parking spot but instead directly to the exit of the parking garage. The system shall 
determine a safe trajectory back to the pickup zone. Therefore, scenario 2 and 5 still have to 
be executed. Once the vehicle is located in the pick-up zone in standstill, the valet parking 
procedure can be deactivated and the driver is able to enter the vehicle. Table 3–6 shows the 
scenario characteristics for an abort of the valet parking service. 
Table 3–6: Scenario description for the abort of the valet parking service 
Scenario Name Aborting the Valet Parking Procedure 
Scenario ID 6 
Procedure 1. Abort is instructed via a HMI 
2. Automated vehicle performs scenario 2 and 5. 
3. Driver and passengers can enter the vehicle. 
Key Scenes 
 
Figure 3–6: Abort of the valet parking service and return of the automated 
vehicle to the pickup zone 
Successful end 
condition 
Upper constraints are met and system transitions to manually driving 
mode. 
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3.7 System Behavior outside the parking garage 
Automated valet parking is designed to operate in a parking area with its characteristics. 
These characteristics such as velocity limitations, friction coefficient or occurring maneuvers 
are well known for a parking garage. Once the driver picks up his vehicle, the vehicle will 
leave the target operational design domain. However, automated valet parking will not be 
developed to operate in other operational design domains outside the parking garage such as 
on highways or urban scenarios. Unauthorized use of the valet parking function outside the 
operational design domain has to be prohibited since higher velocities and more complex 
driving scenarios have to be expected outside the parking area. Additionally, the infrastruc-
ture cannot support the vehicle and therefore cooperation is not possible anymore. Compared 
to the upper defined scenarios the driver may serve as a fallback and can take over. The case 
may be relevant for the controllability of a potential hazardous event. Table 3–7 illustrates 
the system behavior outside the parking garage. 
Table 3–7: Scenario description for the system behavior outside the parking garage 
Scenario Name System Behavior outside the parking garage 
Scenario ID 7 
Procedure 1. Vehicle leaves operational design domain 
2. Different scenarios and constraints are present outside the opera-
tional design domain. 
3. Infrastructure support cannot be provided and driver may serve as 
a fallback. 
Key Scenes 
 
Figure 3–7: More complex scenarios outside the operational design domain 
Successful end 
condition 
Unauthorized use of the valet parking function outside the operational 
design domain is prohibited. 
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4 Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment 
This chapter analysis hazards that may be present in AVP systems. The analysis is in com-
pliance with the international Standard ISO 2626264 which proposes a systematic approach 
to achieve functional safety for road vehicles. This chapter contributes to the specification 
of top level safety requirements called safety goals for AVP systems to avoid unreasonable 
risks. The vocabulary used in this thesis can be found in IS0 2626265. The identification of 
potential malfunctions to determine related safety goals is explored in a hazard analysis and 
risk assessment (HARA). This thesis proposes a systematical methodology in compliance 
with the international standard ISO 26262 to identify hazards according to the divide and 
rule policy. Thereby, the overall AVP service is broken down into functional scenarios66 in-
troduced in chapter 3. The previously defined functional scenarios in the item definition 
provide an abstraction of the system’s behavior and serve as an input for a scenario-based 
hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA). Since the overall system is split into a man-
ageable small number of functional scenarios, the complexity is reduced and a situational 
analysis in the HARA can be performed for each scenario more specifically. As a result, a 
more complete set of safety goals can be potentially elaborated which in turn leads to a more 
extensive safety concept. The methodology is applied to the use case automated valet park-
ing to derive minimum safety requirements from safety goals and to identify necessary and 
sufficient conditions. Figure 4–1 demonstrates the corresponding methodology. The chapter 
is taken from Schönemann et al.67 
                                                 
64 ISO: ISO 26262: Road vehicles - Functional safety (2018). 
65 ISO: ISO 26262-1: Road vehicles - Functional safety - Part 1: Vocabulary (2018). 
66 Form, T.: PEGASUS Method for Assessment of Highly Automated Driving Function (2018). 
67 Schönemann, V. et al.: Scenario-based functional Safety for AD on the Example of AVP (2018). 
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Figure 4–1: Scenario-based functional safety analysis for automated driving. The system’s functional 
behavior is decomposed into functional scenarios and for each scenario a hazard analysis and risk 
assessment is performed to determine corresponding top level safety requirements called safety 
goals. Safety goals are further broken down into low level minimum safety requirements for AVP 
systems. Derived minimum safety requirements contribute to minimum criteria to ensure safety by 
design. 
An extract of the developed hazard analysis and risk assessment is presented in Table 4–1. 
For clarity reasons, each safety goal is described by only one hazard. 
Hazard 1 specifies a collision after an unintended activation of the AVP function inside the 
operational design domain. The user of the valet parking service tries to get into the vehicle 
just before it starts moving. The hazard occurs in the handover scenario in which the transi-
tion from manually to automated driving takes place. Thereby, the user might be located 
outside of the vehicle and wants to enter his vehicle which simultaneously initiates a valet 
parking procedure. The reasons for the user’s intentions may vary between pulling out of 
personal belongings or unclear HMI communication. 
Hazard 2 characterizes a collision due to incorrect data transmission between the infrastruc-
ture and the automated vehicle. The infrastructure may transmit an incorrect map or incorrect 
trajectories. The transmission of data starts at the handover scenario. As a result, the vehicle 
will collide with objects assuming transmitted data is not validated. 
Hazard 3 to 5 differentiates between the collision of the automated vehicle with static ob-
jects, pedestrians and vehicles. The hazards take place during the scenario of automated 
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driving to a point of interest and an error occurs in the sense-, plan-, act-phases of the pro-
cessing. The differentiation is done due to the difference of relative velocities and passive 
safety capabilities. Static objects are in standstill whereas dynamic objects such as other 
vehicles are moving. Pedestrians do not have a deformable zone which protects from colli-
sions and therefore are exposed to higher degrees of severity. 
Hazard 6 presents a potentially safety-critical AVP system which continues the AVP service 
without emergency call after a collision. The automated vehicle continues the valet parking 
service without informing a supervisor of its insufficiency. The hazard occurs when driving 
to a point of interest or while maneuvering. 
Hazard 7 categorizes a collision with pedestrians due to unintended leaving of the drivable 
area. The hazard may result from an error in the sense-, plan- or act-processing while driving 
such as an inaccurate localization or incorrect lane detection. 
Hazard 8 describes a collision in which a passenger located inside the vehicle gets out of the 
vehicle while driving. Other users may initiate an abort of the valet parking procedure to 
prevent harmful consequences such as getting off the vehicle or being trapped inside. The 
hazard arises when a passenger is not detected inside the vehicle. 
Hazard 9 illustrates a safety-critical traffic situation resulting from an unintended activation 
of the valet parking outside the operational design domain. Especially, the activation of a 
valet parking service when driving on a highway increases the severity for the traffic partic-
ipants. 
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Table 4–1: Extract of the developed HARA for the use case valet parking, the extended HARA can 
be found in the appendix. 
ID Scenario Failure Mode Hazard Specific Situation 
Hazardous events 
& consequences 
S Rationale E Rationale C Rationale ASIL 
Safety 
Goal 
1 1 
Unintended ac-
tivation of AVP 
inside the oper-
ational design 
domain 
Safety-critical situa-
tion due to unclear 
handover status 
Persons getting into the vehi-
cle just before it starts moving 
Collision with per-
son 
S1 
Activation in low 
speed 
E4 
AVP activation pro-
cess every handover  
C3 
Automated vehicle is 
uncontrollable 
B SG04 
2 1 
Incorrect data 
transmission by 
PAM 
Collision due to in-
correct data received 
by vehicle 
Incorrect map/ path is loaded 
Collision with per-
son 
S3 Incorrect speed profiles  E4 
Communication be-
tween PAM and ve-
hicle throughout 
every AVP 
C3 
Automated vehicle is 
uncontrollable  
D SG02 
3 2 
Missed detec-
tion 
Collison with object 
Automated vehicle crashes 
into object which in turn col-
lides with persons 
Medium structural 
damages or flying/ 
falling objects 
S1 
The vehicle’s medium 
speed causes lower ki-
netic energy  
E3 
Limited combination 
of dangerous objects 
for moving persons 
C3 
Automated vehicle is 
uncontrollable; Proba-
bly less than 90% per-
sons are able to evade 
A SG09 
4 2 
Missed detec-
tion 
Collison with other 
vehicle 
Automated vehicle crashes 
into other vehicle 
The system does not 
detect the vehicle 
S1 
Person protected in ve-
hicle 
E4 
Encounters with 
moving vehicles 
every drive 
C3 
Limited space for 
evading maneuvers; 
Automated system can-
not be controlled. 
B SG05 
5 2 
Missed detec-
tion 
Collision with per-
son 
Person runs into moving vehi-
cle 
The AVP system 
does not detect the 
Person 
S2 
Collision at medium 
speed causes severe in-
juries 
E4 
Encounters with 
moving persons 
every drive 
C3 
Missed detection dur-
ing fully automated 
driving 
C SG03 
6 2 
Missed emer-
gency call 
Disregarded emer-
gency call after col-
lision 
Collision occurred 
Unexpected continu-
ation of AVP with-
out emergency call 
S2 
Emergency call re-
quired if collision oc-
curs; every second 
counts 
E4 
Encounters with 
moving persons 
every drive 
C2 
Other persons can still 
set up an emergency 
call 
B SG06 
7 2 
Unintended 
leaving of the 
drivable area 
Vehicle falls off the 
brim and crashes 
into people  
Automated driving close to the 
brim, people stand below the 
brim. 
Collision with per-
son 
S3 Fatal injury E4 
Staying in drivable 
area has to be always 
ensured during AVP 
C1 
Other objects prevent 
vehicle from leaving 
drivable area 
B SG07 
8 6 
Missed passen-
ger 
Undetected passen-
ger in vehicle getting 
out during AVP 
Passenger tries to get off dur-
ing AVP 
Collision with per-
son 
S2 
Collision at medium 
speed causes severe in-
juries 
E4 
Passengers almost 
every drive expected 
C1 
Passengers are able to 
stay in the vehicle 
A SG08 
9 7 
Unintended ac-
tivation of AVP 
outside the op-
erational design 
domain 
Safety-critical traffic 
situation resulting 
from an unintended 
activation 
Driving on highway 
Unexpected vehicle 
behavior on highway 
S3 
Life-threatening inju-
ries due to accidents at 
high speeds 
E4 
AVP is available 
during normal vehi-
cle use 
C3 
Assumption: it is not 
possible to override 
D SG01 
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4.1 Safety Goals 
After the hazards are identified, the corresponding risks need to be assessed and correspond-
ing safety goals have to be formulated. Hereby, safety goals represent top-level safety re-
quirements and are derived from the introduced hazard analysis and risk assessment 
(HARA). Elaborated safety goals represent necessary conditions for AVP systems. Elabo-
rated safety goals inherit the hazard’s Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) with ASIL 
D representing the highest and quality management (QM) the lowest safety risk. The ASIL 
serves as a recommendation, but is not a mandatory minimum threshold since the application 
of the ISO 2626268 is not obligatory. Thereby, the ASIL determination is a function f of se-
verity S, exposure E and controllability C, whereby 
𝑆 = {S1, S2, S3} with 𝑆𝑖 ϵ 𝑆 and 𝑖 ≤ 3 ∧ 𝑖 ϵ ℕ , (4–1) 
𝐸 = {E1, E2, E3, E4} with 𝐸𝑗  ϵ 𝐸 and 𝑗 ≤ 4 ∧ 𝑗 ϵ ℕ, (4–2) 
𝐶 =  {C1, C2, C3} with 𝐶𝑘 ϵ 𝐶 and 𝑘 ≤ 3 ∧ 𝑘 ϵ ℕ. (4–3) 
The severity S estimates the extent of harm for the hazardous event. The exposure E contains 
the expected frequency of the hazard. The controllability C specifies the ability of hazard 
participants to avoid the occurring harm. The classification of the severity S, exposure E and 
controllability C results in five risk levels of the Automotive Safety Integrity Level given by 
ASIL =  {QM, A, B, C, D} (4–4) 
Σ𝑆𝐸𝐶 = 𝑖 + 𝑗 + 𝑘 = 10⟹ ASIL D (4–5) 
Σ𝑆𝐸𝐶 = 9⟹  ASIL C (4–6) 
Σ𝑆𝐸𝐶 = 8⟹  ASIL B (4–7) 
Σ𝑆𝐸𝐶 = 7⟹  ASIL A (4–8) 
Σ𝑆𝐸𝐶 ≤ 6⟹  QM. (4–9) 
The German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA) released a situational catalogue 
for the classification of the exposure parameter.69 A recommendation in both time and fre-
quency domain is given for parking in a parking garage. For both cases, the exposure clas-
sification E4 is recommended. For a combinatorial analysis of the event parking and the 
given hazards (e.g. event parking in combination with unclear handover status) statistics are 
still missing. Therefore, the recommendation is accepted and most scenarios are classified 
                                                 
68 ISO: ISO 26262: Road vehicles - Functional safety (2018). 
69 Verband der Automobilindustrie e.V.: VDA 702 E-Parameter according ISO 26262-3 (2015). 
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conservatively as E4. Since a fully automated vehicle without driver presence is not control-
lable, the classification C3 in terms of controllability is preferred. Considered parameters 
and corresponding assumptions are shown in Table 4–2.  
Table 4–2: Assumptions for the categorization of ASILs for AVP systems 
Parameter Assumed Value 
Maximum allowed velocity 𝑣max in-
side the operational design domain 
𝑣max ≤ 30 km  
Maximum expected velocity 𝑣max 
outside the operational design do-
main 
𝑣max ≫ 30 km  
e.g. highway 𝑣max ≤ 120 km 
Exposure E for the event parking in 
time and frequency domain 
E4 
Controllability C for AVP systems 
without the driver’s presence (in 
most cases) 
C3 
 
In this thesis, the definition and categorization of the following safety goals is introduced 
which were derived from the HARA as illustrated in Table 4–1.  
Safety goal SG01 accounts for an unintended activation of the valet parking function outside 
of the parking garage area such as highways or urban environments. This safety goal receives 
the ASIL D since high velocities can be present (S3). Additionally, no safety mechanisms 
can be expected beforehand and therefore it is assumed that the AVP service is always avail-
able (E4). 
Safety goal SG02 considers the case that incorrect data such as maps or trajectories are trans-
mitted to the automated vehicle by the infrastructure. Incorrect speed profiles may cause 
fatal injuries (S3). Data transmission for the execution of the AVP-service is expected to be 
frequently (E4). Additionally, from the controllability prospective the automated vehicle is 
assumed to be uncontrollable (C3). This thesis therefore proposes ASIL D. 
Safety goal SG03 and SG05 describe a collision with persons and vehicles. The major dif-
ference between a direct collision with a person and a person in a vehicle is the protective 
body. The latter situation is less severe. Hence, the severity class S2 and S1 are assigned, 
respectively. Encounters between vehicle and persons are expected during every AVP pro-
cess (E4). In the context of uncontrollability for fully automated driving, risks are estimated 
to be ASIL C and ASIL B. 
Safety goal SG04 prevents the vehicle from activating the valet parking function inside the 
parking garage unintendedly. The situation occurs every time within a valet parking proce-
dure and as a result exposure is set to E4. In terms of severity the situation is assumed to be 
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in low speed and collisions with a persons are less severe (S1) which finally results in ASIL 
B. 
Safety goal SG06 notifies a human supervisor in case of a collision or fire. This considers 
an emergency call after a collision inside the parking garage. In case of a severe or life-
threatening injury (S2) every second counts. Exposure is determined similarly to SG03 (E4). 
It is expected that pedestrians not involved in the collision are still able to set up an emer-
gency call and controllability is classified as C2. The setting yields to ASIL B. 
Safety goal SG07 ensures that the vehicle does not leave its specified operating area during 
AVP (E4) since the automated vehicle might crash into persons (S3). However, other objects 
such as barriers will prevent the automated vehicle from leaving its drivable area (C1) and 
ASIL B is expected. 
Safety Goal SG08 disables the valet parking function if persons are still inside the automated 
vehicle. The mechanism prevents the possibility to get off the vehicle during AVP. Severity 
and exposure is assumed to be similar as in SG04 (S2, E4). Since no safety mechanisms are 
implemented beforehand, passengers are not able to override or push the emergency off 
switch. However, passengers are able to stay in the vehicle (C1). The risk is classified to 
ASIL A. 
Safety Goal SG09 indicates a collision with an object which in return injures persons. The 
kinetic energy of such an object is expected to be low (S1) and the combination of dangerous 
objects and moving persons is unlikely (E3). Probably less than 90% of persons are able to 
evade (C3) which results in ASIL A. 
After the safety goals are elaborated, their necessity and sufficiency is investigated. Neces-
sity and sufficiency are terms to describe conditional statements70. These terms are intro-
duced in the following to derive conditional statements between a safe AVP service and elab-
orated safety goals. 
A condition G is necessary for an event H if H cannot be true unless G is true. In other words 
H implies G (𝐻 → 𝐺). Therefore, it is never the case that H occurs and G does not occur. If 
there is a number of necessary conditions 𝐺1, 𝐺2…, and H is true, then all necessary condi-
tions have to be fulfilled. This can be expressed by logical AND operations 
𝐻 → 𝐺1 ∧ 𝐺2 ∧ 𝐺3 ∧ … (4–10) 
On the other hand, a condition G is sufficient for an event H if and only if it is never the case 
that G occurs and H does not occur. An event H has multiple sufficient conditions. The event 
H is fulfilled if only one sufficient condition is true. This is given by logical OR operations 
𝐺1 ∨ 𝐺2 ∨ 𝐺3 ∨ … →  𝐻 (4–11) 
                                                 
70 Facione, P. A.: A modal truth-tabular interpretation for necessary and sufficient conditions (1972). 
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Transferred to AVP and related safety goals, this results in the following conditional state-
ment: 
An AVP service is considered as safe if all necessary conditions for a safe AVP system are 
fulfilled. If safety goals are a subset of those necessary conditions, then a safe AVP system 
cannot occur if related safety goals are not fulfilled (logical AND operation). A safe AVP 
service implies the fulfillment of all related safety goals. 
These safety goals (necessary conditions) are summarized in Table 4–3 and sorted according 
their ASIL.  
Table 4–3: Safety goals/ necessary conditions for a safe automated valet parking. The ASIL serves 
as a recommendation, but is not a mandatory minimum threshold since the application of the ISO 
2626271 is not obligatory.  
ID Safety Goal ASIL 
SG01 
Unintended activation of the valet parking function outside of 
the PAM-controlled parking area shall be prevented. 
D 
SG02 
The integrity of the communication between the PAM and the 
vehicle shall be ensured if communication is present. 
D 
SG03 
The system shall prevent a collision between automated vehi-
cles and persons if persons are inside the parking garage. 
C 
SG04 
Unintended activation of the valet parking function inside the 
PAM-controlled parking area shall be prevented. 
B 
SG05 The system shall prevent collisions with other vehicles. B 
SG06 
The system shall notify a human supervisor in case of a colli-
sion or fire.  
B 
SG07 
The system shall ensure that the vehicle stays within the (stati-
cally defined) drivable area during AVP. 
B 
SG08 
The valet parking function shall be disabled if people are inside 
the vehicle. 
A 
SG09 
The system shall prevent collision of automated vehicles with 
objects. 
A 
 
The HARA was performed to identify potential hazards. Top-level safety requirements called 
safety goals are elaborated and serve as necessary conditions for a safe AVP service. An 
unintended activation of the valet parking function outside of the PAM-controlled parking 
                                                 
71 ISO: ISO 26262: Road vehicles - Functional safety (2018). 
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area and incorrect data transmission between PAM and vehicle are identified as most dan-
gerous (ASIL D). ASILs serve as a recommendation, but are not obligatory. In the following 
chapter the defined safety goals will be further refined into low-level safety requirements by 
considering the processing flow. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the fulfillment of a 
safety goal will be marked in the following chapters. 
5 Minimum Safety Requirements 
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5 Minimum Safety Requirements 
The derivation of safety requirements for complex automated driving functions lacks a cat-
egorization in the literature to date to tackle the completeness issue. This chapter introduces 
a structure for a fault tree-based approach to derive safety requirements from safety goals 
systematically in compliance with the international standard of functional safety for road 
vehicles known as ISO 2626272. The approach utilizes a fault tree-based Sense-Plan-Act 
architecture to achieve a large coverage of possibly derivable safety requirements from 
safety goals. The methodology presented in this work provides means to systematically de-
rive safety requirements from safety goals. A fault tree-based approach is proposed to ensure 
a larger coverage of safety requirements. The methodology presented in this chapter draws 
hereby inspiration from sequential robot control architectures known as Sense-Plan-Act or 
Sense-Model-Plan-Act architectures. Thereby, the signal processing steps of the sensor data 
acquisition, the environment modeling, the planning, and finally the actions are executed 
sequentially. Sequential architecture elements serve for achieving a long-term goal, e.g. the 
execution of a driving mission.73 This thesis categorizes safety goal violations according to 
such sense-, plan-, act-failures architecture, as the sequential decision making process, fol-
lowing the sense plan act cycle, transfers well from mobile robots to AVP systems. Figure 
5–1 indicates the safety analysis of a safety goal’s violation. A violation of a safety goal 
occurs if at least one of the failure events in the sense-, plan-, and act-phase is present. The 
presented structure is applied on valet parking for use case specific derivation of minimum 
safety requirements. The safety requirements can be derived systematically by covering a 
larger set of safety requirements due to the application of a deductive fault tree-based ap-
proach. The methodology is suitable for safety goals which follow the specified sense-plan-
act pattern. The approach is not suitable for all derived safety goals since for example C2X-
communication does not follow the specified sense-plan-act pattern. In the following the 
terms Sense, Plan, Act and the corresponding breakdown into segments are introduced. The 
chapter is extracted from Schönemann et al.74 
                                                 
72 ISO: ISO 26262: Road vehicles - Functional safety (2018). 
73 Hertzberg, J. et al.: Mobile Roboter (2012). p. 321. 
74 Schönemann, V. et al.: Fault Tree-based Derivation of Safety Requirements for AVP (2019). 
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Figure 5–1: The sense-plan-act cycle is a common sequential system architecture for mobile robots. 
In this chapter it is transferred to derive low level safety requirements. A violation of a safety goal 
occurs hereby if at least one of the failure events in the sense-, plan-, and act-phase is present.  
5.1 Minimum Requirements for Sensing 
The sense phase contains the acquisition of sensor data and modelling of the environment. 
According to Dietmayer et al.75 detecting static and dynamic objects and physically measur-
ing them as precisely as possible, leads to three uncertainties which are visualized in Figure 
5–2: 
 State uncertainty: Represents the measuring errors of physical measured variables, 
especially the object’s dimensions (length, width, height), the object’s pose and the 
object’s velocity. 
 Existence uncertainty: Outlines the uncertainty whether an object captured by the 
sensors and mapped into the representation actually exists. This concerns mainly 
false positives and false negatives. For example, emergency braking should only be 
executed in case of a high existence probability. 
 Class uncertainty: Describes uncertainty of the capability to classify the object’s 
membership in order to predict the object’s behavior. Type of object might be for 
example pedestrians, bicyclists, trucks, or cars. The degree of granularity is depend-
ent on the use case.  
                                                 
75 Dietmayer, K.: Predicting of machine perception for automated driving (2016). 
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Figure 5–2: A sense failure occurs if uncertainties are present in the object’s state variables, the ob-
ject’s existence or its class of membership. State variables are defined as the object’s pose, the ob-
ject’s dimensions, and the object’s velocity. The categorization according to Dietmayer et al.75was 
adapted for the derivation of low level safety requirements in the sense phase. 
In order to avoid a collision between the ego-vehicle and other traffic participants both ve-
hicles have to be able to execute a full stop without colliding. This thesis introduces a mini-
mum required stopping distance 𝑑req as visualized in Figure 5–3. This minimum required 
stopping distance consists of the ego-vehicle’s stopping distance 𝑑req,ego, the object-vehi-
cle’s stopping distance 𝑑req,obj and a safety margin 𝑑tol 
𝑑req ≥ 𝑑req,ego + 𝑑req,obj + 𝑑tol (5–1) 
The ego-vehicle’s stopping distance 𝑑req,ego is represented by 
𝑑req,ego ≥ 𝑣ego ∙ (𝜏B,lag + 𝜏R,ad) +
𝑣ego
2
2 ∙ 𝐷0,ego
 (5–2) 
with the ego-vehicle’s velocity 𝑣ego, the brake delay time 𝜏B,lag, the automated system’s re-
sponse time 𝜏R,ad, the always given deceleration capability 𝐷0,ego. The object-vehicle’s stop-
ping distance 𝑑req,obj is calculated by  
𝑑req,obj ≥ 𝑣obj ∙ (𝜏B,lag + 𝜏R,obj) + 𝑣obj ∙ 𝜏𝑥 +
𝑣obj
2
2 ∙ 𝐷0,obj
 (5–3) 
which is given by the object’s velocity 𝑣obj, the reaction time 𝜏R,obj, an additional duration 
𝜏𝑥 due to different reaction times between automated and manually driven vehicles, an al-
ways given deceleration capability 𝐷0,obj. Ego-vehicle velocity 𝑣ego is positive in the ego-
vehicle’s driving direction, object-vehicle velocity 𝑣obj is positive in the object-vehicle’s 
OR
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driving direction and the ego- and object deceleration capabilities 𝐷0,ego and 𝐷0,obj are pos-
itive in opposite driving direction of the respective vehicle. In the following, the ego-vehi-
cle’s and object-vehicle’s deceleration capabilities are assumed to be equal.  
 
Figure 5–3: Minimum required stopping distances 𝑑req,ego and 𝑑req,obj consists of partial distances 
given by unequal reaction times, brake delay time, the braking process and a safety margin. Ego-
vehicle velocity 𝑣ego is positive in the ego-vehicle’s driving direction, object-vehicle velocity 𝑣obj 
is positive in the object-vehicle’s driving direction and the ego- and object deceleration capabilities 
𝐷0,ego and 𝐷0,obj are positive in opposite driving direction of the respective vehicle. 
The minimum required stopping distance 𝑑req is compared with the actually measured dis-
tance to the object which requires the knowledge of the object’s position and its dimensions. 
The object’s orientation and velocity are required to predict the moving behavior. The ob-
ject’s state variables only have to be known in a minimum required perception zone. The 
minimum required perception zone determines the required field of view and the correspond-
ing range. In this area of interest objects have to be detected under all possible environment 
conditions in the PAM area even if these are occluded. The system has to reduce the auto-
mated vehicle’s velocity till these requirements are met. Thereby, broken/ covered or mis-
placed sensors have to be diagnosed to ensure the environmental perception. The definition 
of the minimum required perception zone is given in chapter 6. 
Beside the knowledge of the object’s state variables, a definition of the acceptable measure-
ment error valid for all AVP systems is necessary. Pose, size dimensions and velocity are in 
reality inaccurate. In the following the maximum allowed lateral and longitudinal measure-
ment error will be presented. 
Longitudinal Measurement Error: Minimum stopping distances have to be maintained in 
order to avoid a collision when an automated and manually driven vehicle are driving to-
wards each other. The overall longitudinal error is given by the superposition of absolute 
longitudinal errors for the stopping distances ∆𝑥stop,ego and ∆𝑥stop,obj and the absolute lon-
gitudinal errors for the determination of the object’s and ego-vehicle’s state variables ∆𝑥obj 
and ∆𝑥ego as indicated in Figure 5–4 
 
Thereby, the lag time of the brake 𝜏B,lag, response time 𝜏R, the additional duration 𝜏𝑥 and 
always given deceleration capability 𝐷0 are fixed parameters when considering worst-case 
constraints for stopping distances. Only the measurement of the velocity 𝑣 remains in the 
D0,ego automated
ego
manually 
driven obj
vego vobj D0,obj
dreq
safety 
margin
ego braking 
distance
ego 
reaction
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time of 
the brake
obj braking 
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reaction
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obj lag 
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∆𝑥max  = ∆𝑥ego + ∆𝑥stop,ego  + ∆𝑥stop,obj + ∆𝑥obj < 𝑑tol (5–4) 
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equation. The inaccurate measurement of the ego-vehicle’s velocity 𝑣ego and the object’s 
velocity 𝑣obj causes the absolute longitudinal error for the worst case stopping distances. 
Therefore, the maximum allowed absolute longitudinal errors ∆𝑥max  shall not exceed the 
safety margin 𝑑tol when determining the object’s and the ego-vehicles pose, size and velocity 
in longitudinal direction. The safety margin prevents the vehicle from colliding with an ob-
ject. The safety margin has to be set such that measurement inaccuracies in longitudinal 
direction are compensated by the safety margin 𝑑tol. 
 
Figure 5–4: Maximum accepted longitudinal errors ∆𝑥max  for the determination of the ego’s and the 
object’s state variables and their corresponding stopping distances is restricted by the safety margin  
Lateral Measurement Error: The system has to detect the object’s state variables to avoid a 
collision. The maximum allowed absolute lateral error of measurement ∆𝑦max is given by 
the narrowest part of the operational design domain 𝑤ODD,min and the vehicle width 𝑤V. 
Considering the lateral error from lane center, results in 
∆𝑦max ≤
𝑤ODD,min
2
−
𝑤V
2
 (5–5) 
The maximum absolute lateral measurement error ∆𝑦max is given by the present absolute 
measurement inaccuracies of the ego-vehicle ∆𝑦ego and the object ∆𝑦obj. The ego-vehicle 
has to estimate its own state variables (self-perception) and the state variables of the object 
(object state estimation) 
∆𝑦max ≤ ∆𝑦ego + ∆𝑦obj (5–6) 
In case of an infrastructure-based measurement the ego-vehicle’s and the object-vehicle’s 
state variables are measured equally inaccurate (∆𝑦obj = ∆𝑦ego)  
∆𝑦max ≤  2 ∙ ∆𝑦ego for ∆𝑦obj = ∆𝑦ego (5–7) 
Inserting (5–6) in equation (5–5) yields 
∆𝑦ego ≤
𝑤ODD,min
2
−
𝑤V
2
− ∆𝑦obj in general (5–8) 
∆𝑦obj = ∆𝑦ego ≤
𝑤ODD,min−𝑤V
4
 for infrastructure-based AVP (5–9) 
Where ∆𝑦obj and ∆𝑦ego denotes the maximum absolute lateral error each participant is al-
lowed to perform. Figure 5–5 indicates an ego-vehicle driving straight and approaching an 
object-vehicle. The ego-vehicle estimates its state variables with an absolute lateral error 
∆
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∆𝑦ego. Thereafter, the ego-vehicle measures the object with an absolute lateral error ∆𝑦obj 
are present. If not considering absolute measurement errors, the ego-vehicle would assess a 
collision-free area, but in reality the ego-vehicle would collide with a traffic participant.  
 
Figure 5–5: Maximum accepted lateral error for the determination of the object’s state variables is 
given by the narrowest part in the operational domain 𝑤ODD,min, the vehicle width 𝑤V and meas-
urement inaccuracies ∆𝑦 for state variables 
Example: Considering Germany’s traffic regulation76, a maximum vehicle width of 
𝑤V,max = 2.50 m can be found. However, for AVP systems a parking lot width of 𝑤P,min >
2.50 m is not profitable for the operator and a minimum parking lot width of Germany’s 
parking garage regulation77 𝑤P,min = 2.30 m could be considered by not allowing to enter 
oversized vehicles. In that case, a look on the European’s average passenger car size78 of 
2016 could be done. Adding a safety margin of 10 cm for withdrawn car mirrors on each 
side, we end up with an average vehicle width of around 𝑤V,avg = 2 m and therefore an 
overall error of size determination and object localization of less than ∆𝑦ego ≤ (𝑤P,min −
𝑤V,avg)/4 = 7.5 cm. Looking at the survey of indoor positioning from Einsiedler et al.
79, 
today’s valet parking systems are capable to localize in centimeter precision. However, none 
of the indoor navigation systems presented in the survey is capable to achieve the desired 
precision standalone. 
Table 5–1 summarizes the safety requirements for the sense-phase to avoid collisions by 
detecting objects in the ego-vehicle’s minimum required perception zone. The minimum re-
quired perception zone determines the required field of view and the corresponding range. 
The minimum required perception zone depends on the allowed maneuvers inside the park-
ing garage. In the context of necessary conditions, the perception zone is therefore not con-
sidered as a statically defined area required to be valid for all parking garages, but rather as 
a maneuver-dependent definition valid for the individual parking garage. Its necessity is cou-
                                                 
76 Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz: StVZO (2012). 
77 Hessisches Ministerium der Justiz: Garagenverordnung - GaV (2014). 
78 International Council on Clean Transportation: European Vehicle Market Statistics Pocketbook (2017). 
79 Einsiedler, J. et al.: Vehicle indoor positioning: A survey (2017). 
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pled on executable maneuvers and constraints within the specific parking garage. The de-
tailed specification is given in chapter 6. The derived safety requirements are necessary con-
ditions for collision avoidance targeted in safety goals SG03, SG05 and SG09. 
Table 5–1: Derivation of FSR3.1: “The system shall detect objects in its minimum required percep-
tion area.” Functional safety requirements are necessary conditions for a safe AVP. In terms of ne-
cessity the minimum required perception zone is seen as a parking garage-specific area. 
ID Functional Safety Requirement 
FSR3.1.1 The system shall detect its own and the object’s state variables sufficiently 
accurate. 
FSR3.1.1.1 The system shall detect its own and the object’s pose in its minimum re-
quired perception zone. The absolute lateral and longitudinal error for the 
object’s state variables shall be less than ∆𝑦ego and ∆𝑥max , respectively. 
FSR3.1.1.1.1 The system shall detect objects in a front and rear horizontal field of view 
defined by the minimum required perception zone and a sufficiently high 
vertical field of view. 
FSR3.1.1.2 The system shall determine its own and the object’s dimensions length 
ℓ
obj
, width 𝑤
obj
, height ℎ
obj
 in its minimum required perception zone. The 
absolute lateral and longitudinal error for the object’s state variables shall 
be less than ∆𝑦ego and ∆𝑥max, respectively. 
FSR3.1.1.3 The system shall determine its own and the object’s velocity 𝑣
obj
 in its 
minimum required perception zone. The absolute lateral and longitudinal 
error for the object’s state variables shall be less than ∆𝑦ego and ∆𝑥max , 
respectively. 
FSR3.1.1.4 The system shall detect objects under all possible environment conditions 
in the PAM area. 
FSR3.1.1.5 The system shall diagnose broken/ occluded or misplaced sensors. 
FSR3.1.1.6 The system shall detect objects that are occluded from the vehicle’s view 
in its minimum required perception area. 
FSR3.1.3 The system’s object classification shall not lead to harmful situational in-
terpretation. 
5.2 Minimum Requirements for Planning 
After the AVP system received the required sensing information about its surrounding, a 
trajectory has to be planned accordingly. Hereby, the planning segment includes the situation 
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comprehension and action planning. The transportation mission can be split into five tasks 
according to Lotz et al. 80 The starting point is the driving mission which is determined within 
the given road network and is required as the input for route planning. A behavior planer 
determines the sequence of maneuvers to reach the destination. For each maneuver, a spe-
cific trajectory is computed. These five steps are given in Figure 5–6:  
 Mission Planning: In the first step, a mission has to be planned from the current lo-
cation to the destination such as the next free parking space upon a service request 
or the exit in case of handback request. 
 Route Planning: A route has to be determined in order to get to the destination. A 
Route planner determines a route based on the topological representation of the road 
network. 
 Behavior Planning: Provides a sequence of maneuvers to reach the destination by 
considering other traffic participants, traffic rules and restrictions. 
 Maneuver Planning: An element of the sequence provided by the behavior planner 
is selected which has to be executed. 
 Trajectory Planning: A trajectory for the specified maneuver has to be calculated to 
perform instructions in the act-phase. 
Timing constraints for the start and end of each maneuver and the calculation of the maneu-
ver trajectory have to be specified. 
 
 
Figure 5–6: A plan failure is given by a failure in one of the planning submodules. The driving 
mission can be split into mission planning, route planning, behavior planning, maneuver planning, 
and trajectory planning. For maneuver and trajectory planning, timing constraints for calculation and 
                                                 
80 Lotz, F. G.: Eine Referenzarchitektur für die assistierte und automatisierte Fahrzeugführung (2017). pp. 85 
– 90. 
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execution are crucial. The split according to Lotz80 was taken for automated driving without driver 
interaction to derive low level safety requirements. 
The system has to localize its pose and requires the knowledge of the destination in order to 
plan a safe mission. The defined maximum lateral and longitudinal errors for the determina-
tion of the object’s state variables have to be met at any point of time. Routes are computed 
based on graphs of road networks which have to be up-to-date, accessible and connected. 
The sequence of maneuvers has to be in compliance with the traffic regulations81 for public 
road traffic or in compliance with the parking garage operator’s regulations for non-public 
traffic. The collision free-trajectory has to be provided within the defined system’s response 
time 𝜏R,ad. The system’s response time specifies the worst-case expected time delay from 
the plausibility check until initiating the brakes. Therefore, the provision of the trajectory 
has to be fed into the brake actuators within the fixed worst case time constraint. Table 5–2 
gives an overview of the safety requirements within the plan-phase to avoid collisions. The 
safety requirements represent necessary conditions for a safe AVP service. 
Table 5–2: Derivation of FSR3.2: “The system shall not plan a harmful trajectory.” Functional 
safety requirements are necessary conditions for a safe AVP. 
ID Functional Safety Requirement 
FSR3.2.1 The system shall plan a safe mission. 
FSR3.2.2 The system shall plan routes on up-to-date, drivable, connected road seg-
ments in compliance with corresponding regulations. 
FSR3.2.3 The system shall assign maneuvers on up-to-date, drivable area in compli-
ance with corresponding regulations. 
FSR3.2.4 The system shall compute a feasible, collision-free maneuver within hard 
real-time constraints (= missing deadline leads to a collision). 
FSR3.2.5 The system shall plan a collision-free trajectory within the defined system’s 
response time 𝜏R,ad. 
5.3 Minimum Requirements for Acting 
The Act block represents the execution of the planned trajectory. The following vehicle con-
trol inputs are required for performing longitudinal and lateral vehicle dynamics: Steering, 
                                                 
81 Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz: StVZO (2012). 
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shifting, accelerating, and braking. A complete electrification of actuators is a necessary con-
dition.82 Thereby, either the targeted steering, shifting, acceleration, and braking parameters 
are not plausible for the executed maneuver in terms of range and time or corresponding 
vehicle components are corrupted. The breakdown of possible Act-failures is illustrated in 
Figure 5–7.  
 
Figure 5–7: An act-failure is introduced by one of the primitives that are required for vehicle con-
trol mechanisms: Steering, shifting, accelerating, and braking. 
Act-failures are not further broken down since an investigation is already done by e.g. Stolte 
et al.83 and state-of-the-art. However, Stolte et al. do not provide a derivation of safety re-
quirements for the sense and plan phase as introduced in this thesis. For the sake of com-
pleteness, necessary conditions for the acting are illustrated exemplary in Table 5–3. 
Thereby, mainly unintended control actions and the corruption or breakdown of necessary 
vehicle components have to be prevented. Unintended control actions are either incorrect in 
range or in time. 
Table 5–3: Derivation of FSR3.3: “The vehicle shall prevent unintended control actions.” Func-
tional safety requirements are necessary conditions for a safe AVP. 
ID Functional Safety Requirement 
FSR3.3.1 The system shall detect corrupted or uncalibrated actuators and breakdown 
of necessary vehicle components. 
FSR3.3.2 The system shall prevent unintended steering. 
FSR3.3.3 The system shall prevent unintended shifting. 
FSR3.3.4 The system shall prevent unintended accelerating. 
FSR3.3.5 The system shall prevent unintended braking. 
                                                 
82 Cacilo, A. et al.: Hochautomatisiertes Fahren auf Autobahnen–Industriepolitische Schlussfolgerungen 
(2015). 
83 Stolte, T. et al.: Safety goals and functional safety requirements for actuation systems of AV (2016). 
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5.4 Remaining Safety Requirements 
The presented sense-plan-act approach is not applicable for all safety goals. The remaining 
safety goals are discussed in the following. The derived safety requirements can be seen as 
necessary conditions for the fulfilment of related safety goal in a logical AND relationship. 
Safety goal SG01 concerns an unintended activation of the valet parking function outside of 
the PAM-controlled area. This is prevented by detecting if the automated vehicle is located 
within the handover zone. The safety mechanism avoids the activation outside the opera-
tional design domain where higher velocities lead to increased severity. Whereas SG01 tar-
geted the outside activation, the safety goal SG04 prevents an unintended activation inside 
the PAM-controlled area. This is achieved by the fulfillment of all following necessary con-
ditions 
 Detecting if the vehicle is in standstill. 
 Checking if persons are located in the handover zone. 
 Checking if doors are closed. 
 Not activating the valet parking function without user or PAM permission. 
Safety goal SG02 provides the integrity of the communication between the infrastructure 
and the vehicle. The integrity of communication between infrastructure and vehicle is en-
sured by controlling transmitted safety-relevant information for authentication, identifica-
tion, error correcting, and manipulation. The transmitted data has to be encrypted to provide 
the required degree of security. 
Safety goal SG06 performs a full stop and a notification of a human supervisor in case of 
collision or fire. The AVP system requires to detect fire and collisions. Safety goal SG07 
ensures that the vehicle stays within the (statically defined) drivable area during AVP by 
detecting the (statically defined) drivable area and placing computed trajectories within the 
drivable area. Thereby, the defined lateral error ∆𝑦ego for the lateral control of the automated 
vehicle shall not be exceeded.  
Finally, safety goal SG08 disables the AVP service if persons are inside the vehicle to prevent 
passengers getting out while driving or being trapped inside the vehicle.  
The overall safety requirements are summarized in Table 5–4. This chapter in this thesis 
contributes to minimum criteria for AVP systems by deriving low level safety requirements 
(necessary conditions) for all AVP configuration. This chapter targeted the determination of 
minimum safety requirements to avoid unreasonable risks in compliance with ISO 26262. 
Potential harmful hazards are analyzed and assessed to address the functional safety and the 
safety of the intended functionality defined in the SOTIF84 with the aim to minimize risks of 
harm AVP systems. 
                                                 
84 International Organization for Standardization: ISO/PAS 21448: Road vehicles - SOTIF (2019). 
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Table 5–4: Derivation of functional safety requirements for derived safety goals. Functional safety 
requirements are necessary conditions for related safety goals. 
ID Safety Goal (SG)/ Functional Safety Requirement (FSR) SG 
SG01 Unintended activation of the valet parking function outside of the PAM-controlled 
parking area shall be prevented. 
 
FSR1.1 The system shall detect if the automated vehicle’s position is located within the 
handover zone. 
SG01 
 
SG02 The integrity of the communication between the PAM and the vehicle shall be en-
sured if communication is present.. 
 
FSR2.1 The system shall control transmitted safety relevant information for authentication, 
identification, error correcting, and manipulation. Transmitted data shall be en-
crypted. SG02 
FSR2.1 The system shall receive safety-relevant information in time. 
SG04 Unintended activation of the valet parking function inside the PAM-controlled park-
ing area shall be prevented. 
 
FSR4.1.1 The system shall detect if the automated vehicle is in standstill. 
SG04 FSR4.1.2 The system shall detect persons in the handover zones. 
FSR4.1.3 The system shall detect if doors are closed. 
FSR4.1.4 The system shall have the ability to activate and deactivate the valet parking func-
tion. 
 
FSR4.1.5 The system shall not activate the valet parking function without user or PAM per-
mission. 
 
SG06 The system shall notify a human supervisor in case of a collision or fire.  
FSR6.1 The system shall detect collisions. 
SG06 
FSR6.2 The system shall detect fire in the parking garage. 
FSR6.3 The system shall stop the valet parking service by applying an emergency brake of 
automated vehicles in case of a fire. 
FSR6.4 The system shall notify a human supervisor. 
SG07 The system shall ensure that the vehicle stays within the (statically defined) drivable 
area during AVP. 
 
FSR7.1 The system shall detect the (statically defined) drivable area.  
FSR7.2 The system shall place the automated vehicle’s trajectories within the drivable area. SG07 
FSR7.3 The maximum lateral error of the automated vehicle’s lateral control with respect to 
the lane center shall not exceed  ∆𝑦𝑒go. 
 
SG08 The valet parking function shall be disabled if people are inside the vehicle.  
FSR8.1 The system shall detect whether people are inside the vehicle. SG08 
 
6 Minimum Required Perception Zone 
62 
6 Minimum Required Perception Zone 
This chapter introduces a maneuver-dependent minimum required perception zone (MRP 
zone) in which the monitoring of static and dynamic objects is mandatory to achieve the 
safety goal of collision avoidance. A minimum required safety zone (MRS zone) is a subset 
of the MRP zone and defines the boundary for which the deceleration has to be triggered by 
an AVP system to avoid collisions. The MRP zone and the MRS zone are based on a mathe-
matical description of minimum stopping distances and therefore are crucial for collision 
avoidance. To the best of the author's knowledge, neither a minimum required perception 
zone nor a minimum required safety zone has been defined for AVP systems in literature so 
far. Additionally, a specification for the infrastructure support for cooperative AVP is given 
in this context. The magnitude of the MRP zone is maneuver-specific and therefore an in-
vestigation of occurring maneuvers in a parking garage is required. In particular, the mini-
mum required perception zone specifies areas of interest around the ego-vehicle in which 
the traffic participant’s parameters have to be determined for collision avoidance. Hence, the 
MRP zone provides a description of the relevant space in the environment perception task 
that is executed by the parking area management system and the automated vehicle. The 
results of this work can be used for the integration of the necessary safety design for the 
maneuver-specific parking garage. Additionally, the defined MRP zone is considered as a 
minimum criterion a valet parking system has to provide to minimize the risks of harm. A 
violation of the MRS and MRP zone indicates potentially safety-critical AVP systems since 
required safety-relevant areas are not covered. For the specification of the perception zone 
the following methodology is applied: 
As illustrated in Figure 6–1 the overall valet parking system was split into functional scenar-
ios that occur during the execution of the valet parking procedure as introduced in chapter 
3. According to Ulbrich et al.85 a scenario describes snapshots of the environment and the 
interaction of entities while time is progressing. Following the proposed split in chapter 3 
subsequent major scenarios were considered for the derivation of the MRP zone: vehicle 
handover to parking area management system, automated driving to a point of interest, au-
tomated maneuvering into the parking space, automated leaving of the parking space, vehicle 
handover to driver and aborting the valet parking procedure. Each scenario is hereby exam-
ined according to specific maneuvers that are instructed by the automation system. Maneu-
vers also are extracted from layouts of car parks.86 The determination of the safety distances 
depends on the object’s class which ideally is known. If the class type equals a vehicle, it 
can be distinguished whether the potential collision partner is manually driven or driverless. 
This kind of information could be provided by the parking area management system or C2C. 
If the vehicle is operated driverless, it was registered by the PAM during the handover and 
                                                 
85 Ulbrich, S. et al.: Defining and Substantiating the Terms Scene, Situation, and Scenario for AD (2015). 
86 Pech, A. et al.: Parkhäuser - Garagen (2009). pp. 375 – 408. 
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tracked. If no object information is provided, it should be assumed that the potential collision 
partner is a manually driven vehicle. The assumption is valid since, compared to an auto-
mated vehicle, more conservative parameters will be assigned to the collision partner. Even 
if the assumption is false, a sufficient safety distance is still provided. Furthermore, the mov-
ing behavior of the potential collision partner can be examined in order to check whether the 
object is moving towards the ego-vehicle, moving away or neither moving away nor moving 
towards. Worst case constraints such as timing, maximum allowed velocity and minimum 
required deceleration are defined for the operational domain and serve as an input for each 
maneuver to specify a minimum required safety distance for collision avoidance. The super-
position of these safety distances leads to a new term: the minimum required safety zone 
MRS zone. The safety zone adapts its size according to the performed maneuver as well as 
the dynamic driving parameters of the engaged traffic participants such as velocities, timing 
constraints and deceleration capabilities. This thesis contributes to the definition of a MRP 
and MRS zone as minimum criteria. The MRP and MRS zone is introduced in Schönemann 
et al.87 
 
Figure 6–1: The MRP zone specifies the minimum area around the ego-vehicle which is required to 
be monitored. The MRP zone is maneuver-specific and therefore an investigation of occurring ma-
neuvers in a parking garage is required. Functional scenarios are investigated for possible maneuvers. 
Worst-case constraints are injected for calculation of worst-case safety distances. 
                                                 
87 Schönemann, V. et al.: Maneuver-based adaptive Safety Zone for infrastructure-supported AVP (2019). 
RQ2
RQ1-2
Scenario|Hazard|ASIL
…
...
Hazard and Risk 
Assessment
Maneuver 
Examination
Automated Driving System
…Safety Goals 1 Safety Goals X
Safety Requirements
…
Area of 
Interest 1
Area of 
Interest X
Required Perception Zone
Infrastructure
Automated 
Vehicle
Impact
Factors
ID|Functional Requirements
…
...
System 
Requirements 
Analysis
RQ1-3RQ1-1
Required System Blocks
Minimum 
Criteria
Chapter 4/5 Chapter 6/7 Chapter 8
Chapter 8
Chapter 3
Decomposition 
in Scenarios
Item Definition
RQ1
6 Minimum Required Perception Zone 
64 
6.1 Maneuver Examination and Worst Case Con-
straints 
In this thesis functional scenarios and car park layouts from Pech88 are considered to derive 
maneuvers for AVP. A stopping distance is required for each maneuver in order to avoid a 
collision with traffic participants. The stopping distance refers to the travelled distance from 
the point when the object is firstly measured until the vehicle is in standstill. The stopping 
distance includes the reaction distance and braking distance. The superposition of these ma-
neuver-specific stopping distances leads to the introduction of a minimum required percep-
tion (MRP) and a safety (MRS) zone. The MRS zone adapts its distances according to the 
performed maneuver as well as dynamic driving parameters of the engaged traffic partici-
pants such as velocities, timing constraints and deceleration capabilities. The following ma-
neuvers were found: 
M1. Following a straight or curved lane: This maneuver includes the primitives acceler-
ate and decelerate for longitudinal control as well as lane keeping for lateral control. 
The ego-vehicle’s position is thereby kept at the lane center. 
M2. Driving backwards: This maneuver is executed during the maneuvering into or leav-
ing of the parking spot.  
M3. Crossing an intersection: If the vehicle arrives at an intersection, turning left, turning 
right or crossing the intersection is possible. The maneuver addresses the crossing of 
the intersection. 
M4. Turning left/right: A turn is required at intersection crossings and when leaving the 
parking space to the left or to the right for parking spaces oriented in lateral direction.  
Additionally, occlusion may occur for the defined maneuvers. Occlusion of objects by other 
traffic participants or by parking construction may cause undetected objects inside the ego-
vehicle’s MRP zone without the vehicle’s knowledge. 
Before the safety distances are determined systematically, the defined worst case constraints 
used here should be mentioned. These assumptions serve as constraints to calculate the stop-
ping distances. Once worst-case safety distances are determined, they are also valid for less 
critical situations and should avoid collisions. Thereby, the parameters are defined as vehicle 
velocity 𝑣, system response time 𝜏R,ad from the plausibility check until the initiation of the 
brakes, driver reaction time 𝜏R,md, response time of the brakes 𝜏R,b, time delay of the brake 
until buildup of deceleration 𝜏B,b, a minimum guaranteed deceleration 𝐷min = 𝜇min ∙ 𝑔 
given by the expected friction coefficient 𝜇min and gravity constant 𝑔. In a parking garage, 
the authors assume a maximum allowed forward velocity of 𝑣max,f, a velocity in reverse 
𝑣max,r and a maximum allowed velocity at intersections 𝑣max,i. Additionally, a safety margin 
𝑑tol is required to prevent a collision. These rather conservative considerations are used in 
                                                 
88 Pech, A. et al.: Parkhäuser - Garagen (2009). pp. 375 – 408. 
 6.2 Derivation of a Minimum Required Perception Zone 
  65 
the operational design domain and are summarized in Table 6–1. However, parking garage 
operators or manufacturers can adjust the worst case constraints according their individual 
system capabilities. 
Table 6–1: Pre-defined worst case constraints for automated valet parking  
ID Description Assumed Worst Case Constraints 
C01 
Maximum allowed velocities: in for-
ward 𝑣max,f, in reverse 𝑣max,r, at in-
tersections 𝑣max,i 
89𝑣max,f = 30 km h⁄  
𝑣max,r =  10 km h⁄  
𝑣max,i =  10 km h⁄  
C02 
Worst-case expected time delays: 
system response time from the plau-
sibility check until initiating the 
brakes 𝜏R,ad, driver reaction time 
𝜏R,md, lag time of the brake 𝜏B,lag 
given by the response time of the 
brake 𝜏R,b and the time until buildup 
of deceleration 𝜏B,b 
𝜏R,ad = 0.3 s 
𝜏R,md = 1.5 s 
𝜏B,lag ≈ 𝜏R,b +
𝜏B,b
2
 
90𝜏B,lag = 0.2 s 
 
C03 
Always given deceleration 𝐷0 =
𝜇min ∙ 𝑔 for object- and ego-vehicle 
𝐷0 = 8 
m2
s
 
C04 Safety margin 𝑑tol 𝑑tol = 0.5 m 
6.2 Derivation of a Minimum Required Perception 
Zone 
In this subsection a minimum required perception and safety zone is derived based on the 
defined maneuvers in section 6.1 and worst case constraints in Table 6–1. The ego- and ob-
ject vehicle shall have sufficient space to potentially accomplish a full stop. Hereby, the 
stopping distances of the ego- and object-vehicle are required to be considered. These stop-
ping distances for all maneuvers can be expressed by a main equation which contains the 
minimum required stopping distance 𝑑req given by the ego-vehicle’s stopping distance 
𝑑req,ego, the object-vehicle’s stopping distance 𝑑req,obj and a safety margin 𝑑tol as indicated 
in Figure 6–2. The ego-vehicle’s and object-vehicle’s deceleration capabilities are assumed 
to be equal. 
 
                                                 
89 Reschka, A.: Safety Concept for Autonomous Vehicles (2016). p. 473. 
90 Breuer, B.; Bill, K. H.: Brake Technology Handbook (2008). 
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Main Equation  
𝑑req ≥ 𝑑req,ego + 𝑑req,obj  + 𝑑tol 
𝑑req ≥ (𝑣ego + 𝑣obj) ∙ (𝜏B,lag + 𝜏R) + 𝑣obj ∙ 𝜏𝑥 +
𝑣ego
2 + 𝑣obj
2
2 ∙ 𝐷0
+ 𝑑tol 
(6–1) 
 
Figure 6–2: When approaching an object in standstill, the ego and object vehicle’s stopping dis-
tance consists of the reaction distance, the distance travelled due to the lag time of the brake, the 
braking distance and a safety margin. The reaction times between a manually driven and an auto-
mated vehicle differ. 
Thereby, the moving behavior (moving towards, moving away or in standstill) of the object 
needs to be considered to identify the required cases for the MRP and MRS zone. The dis-
tinction of the moving behavior for each maneuver will be explored in the following. De-
pendent on the executed maneuver and considered case the response time 𝜏R and duration 
𝜏𝑥 may vary. 
M1. Following a straight or curved lane  
When the ego-vehicle follows the lane there are three cases regarding the stopping distances:  
 Case (M1,a): In case of bi-directional traffic a detected object may move towards the 
ego-vehicle. In this case, it is useful to distinguish between two possibilities: A col-
lision of two vehicles and either both vehicles are braking (M1,a1) or only the auto-
mated vehicle is braking (M1,a2). 
 Case (M1,b): The object is moving away and 𝑣ego > 𝑣obj. This is the case when the 
ego-vehicle drives behind an object vehicle with lower velocity. 
 Case (M1,c): The object is neither moving towards the ego-vehicle nor moving away. 
This may be a static object such as a wall. 
For each of these cases different stopping distances have to be considered. In case (M1,a1), 
it is assumed that both vehicles react at the same time. The object vehicle can either be man-
ually driven or driverless. Thus, the worst case object’s reaction time 𝜏R,obj has to be taken 
into account. The overall required stopping distance is given by the overlap of the single 
stopping distances. The time constraints are 𝜏R = 𝜏R,ad and 𝜏𝑥 = 𝜏R,obj − 𝜏R,ad. 
Equation (6–1) produce the maximum spanned safety zone for the worst-case 𝑣ego = 𝑣obj =
𝑣max,f. This can be seen as the minimum required perception range 𝑑req,f to the front for 
AVP. Once the object is measured in this area, the safety zone adapts its size according to 
the object’s velocity and reaction capability as presented in Figure 6–3. Thereby, the object 
vehicle may appear in 180° around the collision crossing point. For the manually driven 
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vehicle the driver’s reaction time has to be injected into the formula by 𝜏R,obj = 𝜏R,md, 
whereas for an automated vehicle as a collision partner the equation (6–1) simplifies by set-
ting 𝜏R,obj = 𝜏R,ad. 
The case (M1,a2) occurs if the automated vehicle has to be in standstill for collision avoid-
ance and only the control of the automated vehicle is possible (𝑣obj
2 /(2 ∙ 𝐷0) = 0). The re-
quired distance 𝑑req is then given by the stopping distance of the ego-vehicle and the driven 
distance of the manually operated or automated vehicle when the ego-vehicle’s velocity is 
zero (𝜏𝑥 = 𝑣ego/𝐷0) 
Case (M1,b) can be approximated by assuming an object that is not moving since stopping 
in front of a standing object is always more safety critical compared to objects that are mov-
ing away. When considering this approximation, the object has no impact on the stopping 
distance and therefore the stopping distance is only influenced by the ego-vehicle’s parame-
ters. This is achieved by setting 𝑣obj = 0 in equation (6–1). The same considerations can be 
applied to case (M1,c), since case (M1,b) is reduced to case (M1,c). 
Figure 6–3 demonstrates all three cases and Table 6–2 summarizes corresponding constraints 
which need to be injected into the main equation to determine the required distances. 
 
Figure 6–3: Minimum required stopping distances for following a straight or curved lane: (Case 
M1,a) object is moving towards the ego-vehicle, (Case M1,b) object is moving away and 𝑣ego >
𝑣obj, (Case M1,c) object is neither moving away nor moving towards 
 
 
 
 
Case (M1,a)
dreq,egoF
dreq,obj
dreq,egoF
dreq,egoF
Case (M1,b) Case (M1,c)
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M2. Driving backwards 
This maneuver has similar characteristics to the maneuvers following a straight lane or turn-
ing left/right. Similarly, three cases occur while driving in reverse: 
 Case (M2,a): The detected object is moving towards the ego-vehicle 
 Case (M2,b): The object is moving away and 𝑣ego > 𝑣obj  
 Case (M2,c): The object is neither moving towards the ego-vehicle nor moving away. 
The stopping distances are calculated as described in the maneuver following a straight or 
curved lane and turning left/right, but considering that the ego-vehicle is driving in reverse 
and an object is detected to the rear. The minimum required perception range to the rear for 
AVP is given for 𝑣ego = 𝑣max,r , 𝑣obj = 𝑣max,f and 𝜏R,obj = 𝜏R,md. Once an object is meas-
ured in this area, the safety zone adapts its size according to the object’s parameters. 
 
M3. Crossing an intersection 
When the ego-vehicle enters an intersection or when leaving the parking spot as shown in 
Figure 6–4, traffic participants coming from the side need to have at least a minimum dis-
tance 𝑑req,obj to the ego-vehicle in order to be able to successfully brake in case of an emer-
gency. The required distance is dependent on whether the object-vehicle is manually driven 
or driverless. By setting 𝜏𝑥 = 0, 𝑣ego = 0 and 𝜏R = 𝜏R,obj in equation (6–1) we get 
𝑑req ≥ 𝑑req,obj + 𝑑tol  = 𝑣obj ∙ (𝜏B,lag + 𝜏R,obj) +
𝑣obj
2
2 ∙ 𝐷0
+ 𝑑tol 
(6–2) 
For an automated collision partner approaching from the side with a velocity 𝑣obj, the re-
quired safety distance is given by setting the reaction time 𝜏R,obj = 𝜏R,ad. If no information 
is provided about the type of object, the system assumes that the object is a manually driven 
vehicle. The assumption is valid since rather conservative parameters are allocated to the 
traffic participant (𝜏R,md > 𝜏R,ad). A sufficient safety distance is assigned by 𝜏R,obj = 𝜏R,md. 
Table 6–2 includes the constraints that need to be injected in the main equation. 
 
Figure 6–4: Minimum required stopping distances for crossing an intersection (left) which reveals 
similar characteristics to leaving the parking spot (right). Traffic participants coming from the side 
require in worst case a minimum distance 𝑑req,obj to the ego-vehicle to brake successfully.  
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M4. Turning left/ right 
This maneuver includes the same safety distances as described in the maneuver crossing an 
intersection except that turns are performed by the ego-vehicle. Same dependencies occur: 
either the vehicle-type has to be known or a manually driven vehicle as a worst case is as-
sumed to provide a sufficient safety distance. When steering is applied the vehicle requires 
more area than its vehicle width. In case of turning left/ right the vehicle covers a tractrix 
curve. The examination of tractrix curves are also used for construction purposes of road 
networks91 and have a large impact on the construction regulations of today’s car parks. If 
the vehicle drives a circular path with a constant wheel angle, all points move around the 
center of a circle. The extension of the rear axle is perpendicular to the longitudinal vehicle 
axle and goes through the center of rotation (CR). The allowed steering angles depend on 
the vehicle type and its geometry. Considering the two track vehicle model and the Acker-
mann condition, then the track width has to be taken into account which leads to a difference 
between the inner and outer steering angle. Thereby, the inner wheel has a larger steering 
angle than the outer wheel which results in an inner radius and a larger outer radius. The 
covered area can be determined easily with the help of the Pythagorean theorem. The inner 
rear wheel point and the outer front vehicle body point determine the corresponding tractrix 
curves. The tractrix curves create the inner and outer limits of the travelled envelope. The 
relevant vehicle points forming the travelled envelopes are different for left and right turning. 
The calculation of the envelope is based on a rectangular bounding box which is sufficient 
for worst case inspection. However, trailers are not taken into account. Figure 6–5 demon-
strates the determination of the tractrix curves and the bending of the ego-vehicle’s stopping 
envelope. Beside the ego-vehicle’s stopping envelope, neighboring stopping envelopes are 
bent and therefore partially shifted towards the rear axle. 
 
Figure 6–5: Determination of tractrix curves which create the vehicle’s travelled envelope for a right 
and left turn (left, right). The inner rear wheel points and the outer front vehicle body points form the 
inner and outer limits of the envelope.  
                                                 
91 Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen- und Verkehrswesen e. V.: Richtlinien für die Anlage von Straßen, Ab-
schnitt Knotenpunkte (RAS-K-1) (1988). 
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The ego-vehicle might be overtaken by an object-vehicle in the parking garage. If the ego-
vehicle indicates a turning left or right during the overtaking process, it needs to detect the 
object-vehicle to the rear to prevent the potential collision. Thereby, the minimum required 
stopping distance of the object-vehicle 𝑑req,obj is considered as worst-case. When the ego-
vehicle is steering, 𝑑req,obj is shifted towards the rear axle. The bending is shown in Figure 
6–7. 
Overall perception zone 
The superposition of the derived maneuver-based stopping distances shows that the overall 
MRP zone is created by the ego-vehicle’s and the object’s travelled envelopes given by their 
widths 𝑤V and stopping distances 𝑑req,ego, 𝑑req,obj. A radius with the object’s stopping dis-
tance 𝑑req,obj can be spanned around the collision crossing point to the front and to the rear. 
Furthermore, the ego-vehicle’s stopping envelope 𝑤V,ego ∙ 𝑑req,ego has to be added when 
following a straight lane or driving backwards. Once the object is oriented in a 90° angle to 
the ego-vehicle such as at intersections, only the object’s stopping envelope 𝑤V,obj ∙ 𝑑req,obj 
has to be considered. As a result, the MRP zone is given by the ego-vehicle and the object’s 
travelled envelope as shown in Figure 6–6. The main equation and overall maneuver specific 
constraints are listed in Table 6–2. 
 
Figure 6–6: Minimum required perception (MRP) zone to the front given by the superposition of the 
ego-vehicle’s and object’s travelled worst case stopping envelopes. The object’s stopping envelope 
is moved around the ego-vehicle’s stropping envelope boundary when driving on a straight lane (left) 
or when crossing an intersection (middle). A potential overtaking has to be detected just before the 
ego-vehicle indicates a left or right turn to avoid a collision (right). The minimum required safety 
(MRS) zone (red) considers the critical objects in the vicinity of the ego-vehicle and adapts the re-
quired stopping envelopes according the present velocities.  
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Table 6–2: Main equation for the required stopping distance and maneuver-specific constraints for 
determining the minimum required safety zone 
Main Equation 
𝑑req ≥ (𝑣ego + 𝑣obj) ∙ (𝜏B,lag + 𝜏R) + 𝑣obj ∙ 𝜏𝑥 +
𝑣ego
2 + 𝑣obj
2
2 ∙ 𝐷0
+ 𝑑tol 
Maneuvers Safety Zone 
Following a straight or curved lane 
& 
Driving backwards 
𝜏R = 𝜏R,ad 
Obj moving towards ego, both braking: 
𝜏𝑥 = 𝜏R,obj − 𝜏R,ad 
Obj moving towards ego, only ego braking: 
𝑣obj
2
2∙𝐷0
= 0, 𝜏𝑥 =
𝑣ego
𝐷0
 
Obj neither moving away nor moving towards ego: 
𝑣obj = 0 
Crossing an intersection 
𝜏𝑥 = 0 
𝑣ego = 0 
𝜏R = 𝜏R,obj 
 
The area of the overall MRP zone 𝐴MRP consists of the MRP zone in forward direction 
𝐴MRP,F and in reverse direction 𝐴MRP,R. This is formulized by 
𝐴MRP ∶= {𝐴MRP,F, 𝐴MRP,R} (6–3) 
The area of the forward MRP zone 𝐴MRP,F consists of perception areas covered in the ma-
neuvers following a straight or curved lane (𝐴M1), crossing an intersection (𝐴M3) and turn-
ing left/ right (𝐴M4) 
𝐴MRP,F ∶= {𝐴M1, 𝐴M3, 𝐴M4} (6–4) 
A mathematical description of the covered areas 𝐴M1, 𝐴M3, 𝐴M4 for each maneuver is given 
by placing the origin of the coordinate system in the center of the ego-vehicle’s bounding 
box. Figure 6–7 shows the formed MRP zone when driving straight and the corresponding 
bending in case of turning. Table 6–3 provides the mathematical description of the forward 
MRP zone 𝐴MRP,F without bending. 
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Figure 6–7: Overall minimum required perception (MRP) zone (yellow) to the front and to the rear 
given by the superposition of the ego-vehicle’s and object’s travelled worst case stopping envelopes 
(left). The MRP zone is bent dependent on the steering angle of the inner and outer wheel (right). 
The minimum required safety (MRS) zone (red) considers the critical objects around the ego-vehicle 
and adapts the required stopping envelopes according the present velocities. The origin of the coor-
dinate system is placed in the center of the bounding box to give a mathematical description of the 
forward MRP zone 𝐴MRP,F. 
Table 6–3: Mathematical description of the forward MRP zone 𝐴MRP,F without bending con-
sisting of perception areas covered in the maneuvers following a straight or curved lane 
(𝐴M1), crossing an intersection (𝐴M3) and turning left/ right (𝐴M4). 
Covered Area Maneuver 
𝐴M1 ∶= {𝐴M1,1, 𝐴M1,2, 𝐴M1,3} 
𝐴M1,1 ∶=  {(𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℝ
2 ∶
 
ℓV
2
≤ 𝑥 ≤
ℓV
2
+ 𝑑req,ego + 𝑑req,obj + 𝑑tol,
−
𝑤𝑉
2
≤ 𝑦 ≤
𝑤𝑉
2
} 
𝐴M1,2 ∶=  
{
 
 
 
 
(𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℝ2 ∶  
ℓV
2
+ 𝑑req,ego ≤ 𝑥 ≤
ℓV
2
+ 𝑑req,ego + 𝑑req,obj + 𝑑tol ,
  
𝑤𝑉
2
< 𝑦 ≤
𝑤𝑉
2
+ √(𝑑req,obj + 𝑑tol)
2
− (𝑥 −
ℓV
2
− 𝑑req,ego)
2
}
 
 
 
 
 
𝐴M1,3 ∶=  
{
 
 
 
 
(𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℝ2 ∶  
ℓV
2
+ 𝑑req,ego ≤ 𝑥 ≤
ℓV
2
+ 𝑑req,ego + 𝑑req,obj + 𝑑tol ,
 −
𝑤𝑉
2
− √(𝑑req,obj + 𝑑tol)
2
− (𝑥 −
ℓV
2
− 𝑑req,ego)
2
≤ 𝑦 < −
𝑤𝑉
2 }
 
 
 
 
 
M1: Follow-
ing a straight 
or curved lane 
 
𝐴M3 ∶= {𝐴M3,1, 𝐴M3,2} 
𝐴M3,1 ∶=  {(𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℝ
2: 
ℓV
2
≤ 𝑥 ≤
ℓV
2
+ 𝑑req,ego,
 −
𝑤𝑉
2
− 𝑑req,obj − 𝑑tol ≤ 𝑦 < −
𝑤𝑉
2
} 
𝐴M3,2 ∶=  {(𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℝ
2: 
ℓV
2
≤ 𝑥 ≤
ℓV
2
+ 𝑑req,ego,
𝑤𝑉
2
< 𝑦 ≤
𝑤𝑉
2
+ 𝑑req,obj + 𝑑tol
} 
M3. Crossing 
an intersection 
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Covered Area Maneuver 
𝐴M4 ∶= {𝐴M4,1, 𝐴M4,2} 
𝐴M4,1 ∶=  
{
 
 
 
 
(𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℝ2: 
ℓV
2
− 𝑑req,obj − 𝑑tol ≤ 𝑥 ≤
ℓV
2
,
 −
𝑤𝑉
2
− √(𝑑req,obj + 𝑑tol)
2
− (𝑥 −
ℓV
2
)
2
≤ 𝑦 < −
𝑤𝑉
2 }
 
 
 
 
 
𝐴M4,2 ∶=  
{
 
 
 
 
(𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℝ2:  
ℓV
2
− 𝑑req,obj − 𝑑tol ≤ 𝑥 ≤
ℓV
2
,
𝑤𝑉
2
< 𝑦 ≤
𝑤𝑉
2
+ √(𝑑req,obj + 𝑑tol)
2
− (𝑥 −
ℓV
2
)
2
}
 
 
 
 
 
M4. Turning 
left/ right 
 
 
Occlusion 
Occlusion of the ego-vehicle’s sensor view may be present in one of the upper defined ma-
neuvers. This may occur when the vehicle traverses walls, ramps or parked vehicles and 
cannot perceive safety-relevant areas due to occlusion. The system has to manage potential 
collisions for each of the upper described maneuvers even if the collision partner is occluded 
for the ego-vehicle. The issue can only be solved by one of the two options: reducing the 
allowed velocities in the parking garage or receiving support from the infrastructure. Veloc-
ity reduction results in decreased stopping distances and a shrinkage of the MRP zone. How-
ever, such a reduction in velocity decreases time-efficiency of the AVP function. Infrastruc-
ture may support the automated vehicle with infrastructure sensors (e.g. top/sideways-
mounted) which will not be occluded by traffic participants or by parking construction. 
Hereby, the required information from safety areas have to be transmitted to the ego-vehicle. 
The occluded area for the ego-vehicle has to be perceived by the infrastructure sensors and 
has to replace the ego-vehicle’s sensor view. 
The case of driving on a ramp requires the system to distinguish whether a detected object 
is a ramp. Here, similar safety distances as described for following a straight or curved lane 
have to be considered just that the deceleration depends on the slope 𝛼 of the ramp 
𝐷res = 𝐷0 ∓ 𝑔 ∙ sin 𝛼 (6–5) 
These safety distances can be provided by the infrastructure system as shown in Figure 6–8. 
The case of driving towards a ramp demonstrates that occlusion of the ego-vehicle’s view is 
unavoidable and that the vertical dimension is similarly safety-relevant. The MRP and MRS 
zone requires to cover a three-dimensional space/ volume for collision avoidance. 
AM1,2 AM1,3AM1,1
AM3,2 AM3,1
AM4,1AM4,2
x
y
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Figure 6–8: Covered perception area at an intersection (left). Relevant object which is not in the ego-
vehicle’s sensor view when driving towards a ramp (right) 
6.3 Reduction of Perception Requirements 
A maximum spanned MRP zone valid for all maneuvers inside all parking garages is a suf-
ficient condition, but not a necessary condition for a specific parking garage. As stated, the 
MRP zone is seen maneuver-dependent and therefore its necessity depends on the allowed 
maneuvers and type of objects inside the individual parking garage. If specific maneuvers or 
specific traffic participants are not allowed in the parking garage, then a maximum spanned 
MRP zone can be reduced and required perception requirements can be adjusted. The reduc-
tion of perception requirements can be used in the safety design phase of the AVP system to 
save unnecessary costs and time effort. The reduction of the MRP zone is possible for auto-
mated traffic only or for mixed traffic. 
6.3.1 Automated Traffic Only 
A parking garage could be divided into two separate blocks or simply ban manually driven 
vehicles. In the case of two separate blocks, the first block is assigned to automated vehicles 
only. Manually driven vehicles or pedestrians from the second block are forbidden to enter 
the automated block. Hence, in the first block automated vehicles can be considered as the 
worst case. Expected worst-case reaction times are decreased due to the allowance of auto-
mated traffic only. The stopping distance reduction due to automated traffic only is shown 
in Figure 6–9 as well as in Figure 6–10 and is given by the ratio between the stopping dis-
tance of manually driven and automated vehicles 
1 −
𝑑req,ad(𝑣obj,ad = 𝑣)
𝑑req,md(𝑣obj,md = 𝑣)
= 1 −
(𝜏B,lag + 𝜏R,ad) +
𝑣
2 ∙ 𝐷0
(𝜏B,lag + 𝜏R,md) +
𝑣
2 ∙ 𝐷0
 (6–6) 
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Figure 6–9: Plotted stopping distance for a manually driven and automated vehicle against increasing 
velocity. A reduction in stopping distance is achieved due to a lower response time. Worst-case con-
straints such as 𝜏B,lag = 0.2 s, 𝜏R,ad = 0.3 s, 𝜏R,md = 1.5 s as defined in Table 6–1 are considered. 
The reduction in percentage is shown in Figure 6–10. 
 
 
Figure 6–10: Plotted reduction in stopping distance due to automated traffic in comparison to mixed 
traffic against increasing velocity 𝑣 = 𝑣obj,ad = 𝑣obj,md in the parking garage. The decrease in stop-
ping distance is accomplished by having shorter response times. The reduction is given by the ratio 
between the stopping distance of a manually driven and automated vehicle as indicated in equation 
(6–9). Worst-case constraints 𝜏B,lag = 0.2 s, 𝜏R,ad = 0.3 s and 𝜏R,md = 1.5 s as defined in Table 6–
1 are considered. The plot shows that a reduction potential of over 50% can be achieved in the oper-
ational velocity range of AVP by introducing automated traffic only. 
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Additionally, there are possibilities to adjust perception requirements by restricting the types 
of executable maneuvers for automated vehicles which will be investigated in the following: 
 One-way traffic: Two-way traffic may be prevented inside the parking garage and 
only one-way traffic can be established. As a result, the required perception range to 
the front can be reduced since automated vehicles are only expected to move towards 
the ego-vehicle when maneuvering into or out of the parking spot (maneuvering 
speed 𝑣man = 10 km/h). 
 Lack of intersections: If the parking garage does not contain any intersections, then 
side areas of the MRP zone can be reduced since no speeding vehicles are expected. 
Hence, vehicles at maneuvering velocities 𝑣man = 10 km/h) can be assumed. The 
need of side areas to the front when leaving the parking spot can be reduced by park-
ing in forward direction. The leaving of the parking spot has to be executed in reverse 
direction. This is beneficial since the perception to the front can be reduced. 
 Ban of overtaking/ One-lane traffic: One-lane traffic or a ban of overtaking may pro-
hibit the overtaking of the ego-vehicle. As a result, rear areas can be decreased for a 
worst case of a maneuvering vehicle. 
The reduction in stopping distance due to restriction of maneuvers leads to a decrease of 
expected velocities. The impact is shown in Figure 6–11 and is given by the ratio between 
the stopping distance of manually driven and automated vehicles 
1 −
𝑑req,manAD(𝑣obj,ad = 𝑣man = 10 km/h)
𝑑req,md(𝑣obj,md = 𝑣)
= 1 −
𝑣man(𝜏B,lag + 𝜏R,ad) +
𝑣man
2
2 ∙ 𝐷0
𝑣 ∙ (𝜏B,lag + 𝜏R,md) +
𝑣2
2 ∙ 𝐷0
 (6–7) 
 
Figure 6–11: Plotted reduction in stopping distance in comparison to mixed traffic and no restrictions 
against increasing allowed velocity 𝑣 in the parking garage. The reduction of the stopping distance 
is achieved by considering automated traffic and restricting maneuvers in the parking garage. The 
decrease in stopping distance is achieved by lower expected velocities. The reduction is given by the 
ratio between the stopping distance of a manually driven vehicle with increasing velocity and the 
stopping distance of an automated vehicle at fixed maneuvering velocity as indicated in equation (6–
7). Worst-case constraints 𝜏B,lag = 0.2 s, 𝜏R,ad = 0.3 s and 𝜏R,md = 1.5 s as defined in Table 6–1 
are considered. The plot demonstrates that a reduction in stopping distance of over 60% can be 
achieved by restricting allowed maneuvers inside the parking garage. 
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The reduction in stopping distance decreases the areas of the MRP zone. Figure 6–12 visu-
alizes the reduction of the MRP zone for automated driving traffic (decrease of response 
time) and the restriction of executable maneuvers (decrease of expected velocities) in com-
parison to mixed traffic and no restrictions. The reduction in stopping distances allows to 
decrease perception requirements for the individual parking garage. The necessary safety 
design can be configured for the specific parking garage by saving costs and efforts. Fur-
thermore, parking garage operators can restrict constraints in the parking garage such to in-
fluence the required safety design and corresponding costs. 
 
Figure 6–12: Reduction of the stopping distance due to the allowance of automated vehicles only 
(left), further decrease of the front perception area by considering one-way traffic (middle left), re-
duction of front side areas due to the lack of intersections in the parking garage (middle right) and 
further decrease of stopping distance due to a ban of overtaking (right). 
However, there are possibilities to adjust perception requirements without losing mixed traf-
fic in the parking garage, e.g. by only restricting executable maneuvers. In the following, 
these restrictions will be discussed in detail. 
6.3.2 Mixed Traffic 
The restriction of executable maneuvers can be adapted for a mixed traffic. However, the 
worst-case reaction time has to be taken into account. 
 One-way traffic: In case of one-way traffic, oncoming manually driven vehicles do 
not have to be considered. As a result, the required perception range to the front can 
be reduced by considering a worst case of a running child92 or a manually driven 
vehicle during maneuvering (𝑣run,child ≈ 𝑣man = 10 km/h) as a worst case. Adults 
and teenagers are assumed to be aware of the parking garage circumstances.  
 Lack of intersections: If the parking garage does not contain any intersections, then 
side areas of the MRP zone can be reduced since no speeding vehicles are expected. 
                                                 
92 Ahlgrimm, J. et al.: A10 Fußgängerunfälle (2017). p. 421. 
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As a result, only the occurrence of running children or manually driven vehicles 
which are leaving the parking spot needs to be taken into account. It is assumed that 
the vehicle velocity for leaving the parking space is around the worst-case velocity 
of a running child (𝑣run,child ≈ 3 m/s). 
 Ban of overtaking/ One-lane traffic: One-lane traffic or a ban of overtaking may pro-
hibit the overtaking of the ego-vehicle. Corresponding perception areas can be de-
creased by considering the worst case of a maneuvering vehicle. 
The stopping distance is given by the ratio between the stopping distance of manually driven 
and a running child 
1 −
𝑑req,manMD(𝑣obj,md = 𝑣man = 10 km/h)
𝑑req,md(𝑣obj,md = 𝑣)
= 1 −
𝑣man(𝜏B,lag + 𝜏R,md) +
𝑣man
2
2 ∙ 𝐷0
𝑣 ∙ (𝜏B,lag + 𝜏R,md) +
𝑣2
2 ∙ 𝐷0
 (6–8) 
Figure 6–13 shows the reduction in stopping distance according equation (6–8) for assumed 
constraints. A reduction is mainly present for higher allowed velocities in the parking garage. 
 
Figure 6–13: Plotted reduction in stopping distance against increasing velocity 𝑣 in the parking gar-
age. The decrease in stopping distance is achieved by considering mixed traffic and restriction of 
maneuvers (lower expected velocities). The reduction is given by the ratio between the stopping 
distance of a manually driven vehicle with increasing velocity and the stopping distance of a manu-
ally driven vehicle with fixed maneuvering velocity as indicated in equation(6–8). Worst-case con-
straints 𝜏B,lag = 0.2 s, 𝜏R,ad = 0.3 s and 𝜏R,md = 1.5 s as defined in Table 6–1 are considered. The 
plot indicates that reduction in stopping distance of below 70% can be achieved for allowed velocities 
up to 30 km/h in the parking garage. 
The reduction in stopping distance decreases the areas of the MRP zone. Figure 6–14 demon-
strates the reduction of the MRP zone for a mixed traffic and the restriction of executable 
maneuvers (decrease of expected velocities) in comparison to mixed traffic and no re-
strictions. 
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Figure 6–14: Reduction of the stopping distance due to the decrease of the front perception area by 
considering one-way traffic (left), reduction of front side areas due to the lack of intersections in the 
parking garage (middle) and further decrease of stopping distance due to a ban of overtaking (right). 
6.4 Minimum Required Safety Zone 
The overall MRP zone is built by the superposition of minimum required stopping envelopes 
of the ego and of the object vehicle. Minimum required stopping envelopes were defined for 
investigated maneuvers in the parking garage. The minimum required stopping distances 
were calculated by injecting worst case constraints into a main equation. An overlap of the 
minimum required stopping envelopes will lead to an unavoidable critical situation, e.g. the 
object vehicle does not receive the minimum required stopping distance. The point prior to 
an overlap of the ego vehicle’s and of the object’s minimum required stopping envelopes 
defines the last possible border for which a valet parking system has to brake. Therefore, the 
following minimum criterion serves for collision avoidance: 
A potential collision occurs if minimum required stopping distances are not provided be-
tween the collision point and ego (distance 𝐸𝐶 ) or object (distance 𝑂𝐶 ). The collision point 
is categorized as the first overlapping point between the stopping envelopes. The local con-
straint to avoid a collision can be formulated as 
𝐸𝐶 ≤ 𝑑req,ego (6–9) 
𝑂𝐶 ≤ 𝑑req,obj (6–10) 
The equations (6–5) and (6–7) serve as the trigger condition for the deceleration of the ego-
vehicle. The constraints characterize the last possible threshold for which the deceleration 
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has to be triggered for a valet parking system. The created area for the given time frame leads 
to the term: minimum required safety (MRS) zone. The MRS zone is a subset of the MRP 
zone and defines the border for deceleration. Figure 6–15 illustrates the trigger criteria and 
the relationship between MRP and MRS zone. The MRS zone cannot be defined as a neces-
sary condition for collision avoidance due to its limitations as discussed in the following. 
 
Figure 6–15: Trigger criteria for deceleration to avoid a collision. Perception zone (yellow) and safety 
zone (red) due to the fulfilling of the trigger criteria. The safety zone is a subset of the perception 
zone. 
6.5 Limitations 
The MRP zone provides a technology-independent and geometric representation of areas. A 
major benefit is therefore its validity for all AVP configurations. The description of the 
safety-relevant space is independent of the function distribution. Vehicle-based or infrastruc-
ture-supported valet parking systems require to perceive the space. Even if used technologies 
will change over time, the definition will be still valid. The developer has to decide which 
sensors he prefers to perceive all safety-relevant areas or which approach he applies.  
However, the definition of the required perception zone has its limitations. This can be illus-
trated with the aid of the main equation. First of all, worst case constraints have to be known. 
This concerns the lag time of the brake 𝜏B,lag, the corresponding reaction or response time 
𝜏R and the minimum expected deceleration capability 𝐷min. The minimum guaranteed de-
celeration 𝐷min = 𝜇min ∙ 𝑔 is given by the friction coefficient 𝜇 and gravity constant 𝑔. 
Thereby, the minimum available friction coefficient has to be known. This is commonly 
known for a closed environment such as a parking garage. However, the friction coefficient 
in a non-closed environment is heavily dependent on the weather conditions such as rain and 
snow as well as the used materials and surfaces. The decrease of the friction coefficient in 
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other operational domains, increases the required perception and safety zones. An enlarge-
ment of the safety zone causes the automated driving system to trigger an early deceleration 
which might result in an increase of the false positive rate. A high false positive rate may 
hinder the application in other use cases. A solution for this issue could be to restrict the 
usage of the automated system for specific weather conditions or for specific surface mate-
rials. 
Furthermore, the safety zone assumes a steady movement of objects. At each time step, it is 
assumed that the object is moving uniformly. Additional predictions are not targeted and 
require knowledge. More precisely, it is unknown what the object’s intention is. The lack of 
knowledge about the object’s upcoming maneuvers might trigger unnecessary deceleration 
as depicted in Figure 6–16. Unnecessary braking in the use case valet parking is less critical 
due to low speeds. Drivers have to provide a safe distance in case of an emergency braking. 
However, especially for drivers in manually driven vehicles unnecessary braking can be an-
noying. The application of the safety zone in other use cases such as a highway pilot causes 
more critical scenarios. A solution for the described issue is the provision of the object’s 
planned moving behavior e.g. by transmitting the information via C2C. Relevant data could 
be the planned maneuver in case of an automated vehicle or the current steering angle and/ 
or indicator state in case of a manually driven vehicle. At this point, it should be mentioned 
that the prediction of the object’s moving intention is part of today’s state-of-the-art.93 How-
ever, motion prediction cannot guarantee collision-free maneuvers. 
 
Figure 6–16: The object’s predicted moving behavior and its actual intention might differ which 
causes unnecessary deceleration. Left: The ego and object vehicle’s intention is to turn left, but the 
predicted moving behavior is driving straight. An overlap of the stopping envelopes causes the ego-
vehicle to decelerate. Right: Driving on a curved straight line and expected straight formed stopping 
envelope of the object vehicle. The ego vehicle is triggered to brake due to the lack of knowledge 
about the object’s actual intention. 
In this chapter, two main contributions towards a definition of minimum criteria and safe 
AVP systems were proposed, namely the definition of a maneuver-based and technology-
independent minimum required perception (MRP) and minimum required safety (MRS) zone. 
The MRP zone can be used for the design of the necessary sensor coverage for a maneuver-
specific parking garage. Parking garages and automated vehicles can be equipped with the 
necessary sensor coverage by saving costs through necessity. As one part of the minimum 
                                                 
93 Lefèvre, S. et al.: A survey on motion prediction and risk assessment for intelligent vehicles (2014). 
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criteria, the MRP zone can be integrated in the early safety design phase to minimize poten-
tial harm. Parking garage operators may restrict constraints such as executable maneuvers, 
types of vehicles or velocities to integrate the necessary safety design. Furthermore, the MRP 
zone defines the currently acceptable velocities for collision avoidance and can be used to 
identify safety critical and time-inefficient spots such as ramps or occlusions in the parking 
garage. The safety critical spots can be equipped with infrastructure sensors to increase 
safety and time-efficiency. The MRS zone can be used for collision avoidance by considering 
the boundary of the deceleration triggering. While this chapter introduced MRP and MRS 
zones based on a mathematical and geometrical concept, the following chapter presents a 
proof of concept implementation in a simulated parking facility.  
 7.1 Virtual Test Drive 
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7 Implementation 
Virtual driving simulations provide means for rapid prototyping and evaluation of software 
for AVP prior and in parallel to physical deployment. The implementation of the elaborated 
minimum required safety (MRS) zone serves hereby a proof of concept for the mathematical 
and geometric models introduced in chapter 6. This chapter describes the implementation 
and test setup and presents the simulation framework, standardized interfaces and synchro-
nization tools in detail to demonstrate the interconnection of the components. The MRS zone 
was implemented in a driving simulation tool chain called Virtual Test Drive94 (VTD). The 
MRS zone module was implemented in C++ and outputs a deceleration signal which serves 
as an input for Virtual Test Drive to avoid collisions in a virtual environment. The automated 
vehicle follows a predefined trajectory in a simulated parking garage and reacts to its sur-
rounding by keeping required stopping distances and by decelerating the vehicle in case of 
an upcoming collision. Standardized interfaces are used to enable plug-in characteristics. 
Standardized interfaces such as the Open Simulation Interface or the Functional Mock-up 
interfaces ease the functional development when using different simulation platforms and 
distributed components. In the following, the test setup and its subsystems are explained in 
detail. 
 
Figure 7–1: The simulation framework Virtual Test Drive (VTD) supports the generic interface for 
sensor-based environment perception called Open Simulation Interface (OSI). Ground truth data 
such as the object’s pose, dimensions and velocities are forwarded into the safety zone function. In 
case of a triggering event a deceleration signal is fed into the simulation framework for collision 
avoidance. Optionally, a sensor model can be plugged in between to simulate a more realistic behav-
ior. 
7.1 Virtual Test Drive 
Virtual Test Drive (VTD) is a simulation framework which provides a complete tool chain 
for road generation, scenario definition and image generation. VTD is a modular framework 
which provides a virtual environment for the automotive industry. The system is divided in 
                                                 
94 Dupuis, M.: Virtual Test Drive User Manual (2017). 
OSI 
Export
Simulation Framework
Virtual Test Drive
O
si
::
 G
ro
u
n
d
Tr
u
th
O
si
::
 S
en
so
rD
at
a
OSI 
Import
C
o
n
ve
rt
e
r
O
si
::
 S
en
so
rD
at
a
O
si
::
 S
en
so
rM
o
d
el
Safety Zone Function
Virtual Test Drive
Deceleration Signal
Optional
AVL Model.CONNECT
7 Implementation 
84 
three categories: core components for the standard setups, optional add-ons and additional 
tools. The driving simulator is a linux-based system with the following core components: 
 SimServer: A simulation server and a parameter server manage the corresponding 
VTD processes and configuration parameters. The simulation server reads an Exten-
sible Markup Language (XML)-based process which contains all relevant entries and 
the instructions for the individual components. The user can specify additional pro-
cesses that should run on the host. 
 Vtgui: The graphical user interface (GUI) enables the creation, loading and saving of 
projects, the start/ stop functions and projects the status of the VTD tasks.  
 Image Generator: The image generator displays the 3D scenery and the correspond-
ing video data. The real-time processing of the image generator depends on several 
factors such as the CPU performance, the graphics card and the complexity of the 
designed scenario. Different weather conditions such as rain, sunlight or fog can be 
visualized according the selected conditions in the GUI. 
 ModuleManager: The module manager runs sensor, dynamics and custom plug-ins. 
Sensor plugins are filtering the simulated environment. Filtered data can be used to 
apply algorithms for active safety systems. Each sensor can be configured separately. 
A perfect sensor model provides the ground truth data of the environment within the 
defined sensor range. The dynamic plugins are simulating the vehicle’s dynamics 
behavior. The vehicle dynamics are based on a single track module, but a two track 
model can be selected as well.  
 TaskControl: The task control Unit manages the main instruction and data flow. The 
module communicates via various protocols to provide interfaces for components. 
The control unit manages the timing correctness of input and output data. Two inter-
faces are thereby used: A Simulation Control Protocol (SCP) for the exchange of 
instructions between simulation and the outside world as well as a Runtime Data Bus 
(RDB) which distributes run-time data of simulation objects to any data receiver. 
SCP allows the transmission of actions and events to other objects whereas RDB 
provides relevant information for other components.  
 Scenario Editor: The scenario editor allows to configure traffic and test scenarios. 
Vehicles and pedestrians and their moving behavior can be set as desired. Addition-
ally, it is possible to select between several vehicle models and pedestrian types. For 
both object types a specific path can be arranged which will be followed with a de-
fined velocity. The content is saved in a XML-based scenario description which con-
tains the settings for vehicles, drivers, pedestrians and the visual database.  
 Road Designer: The integrated road designer is an interactive editor for creating road 
networks with an extensive library of 3D objects. Visual and logical road networks 
can be created based on a large database. The database allows to select between var-
ious tiles and to create a parking garage according the user’s preference. The logical 
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description of road networks is based on an open file format called OpenDrive. Open-
Drive95 is vendor-independent, internationally well-known standard since 2006 and 
contains all key feature of the real road networks. Geometries and features are de-
scribed in a XML-based file format. The format is organized in nodes and enables 
the compatibility with different applications. 
Figure 7–2 illustrates the overview of the VTD components with the central task and data 
control unit which manages the data flow via interfaces to enable the driving simulator’s key 
capabilities. 
 
Figure 7–2: Virtual Test Drive developed by VIRES96 provides a simulation environment of auto-
mated driving scenarios which allows rapid prototyping and in depth testing of software components. 
Virtual Test Drive components are managed by a task and data control unit which ensures interfaces 
for other modules such as an image generator or a module manager 
7.2 Open Simulation Interface 
A generic interface ease the connection between the function development framework and 
the simulation environment. The Open Simulation Interface (OSI) enables the compatibility 
between automated driving functions and different driving simulation frameworks. It sim-
plifies the integration of virtual testing and the interchangeability of individual components 
                                                 
95 Dupuis, M. et al.: OpenDRIVE Format Specification Rev. 1.5 (2019). 
96 Dupuis, M.: Virtual Test Drive User Manual (2017). p. 29 
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such as sensor models. The OSI is a data structure which describes the object-based envi-
ronment perception. It contains two major data structures: GroundTruth and SensorData in-
terface. The GroundTruth interface provides the ideal and non-faulty description of objects 
in a global coordinate system. It is the object output of the simulation framework. The 
GroundTruth structure provides information such as environment conditions, traffic signs, 
road markings or the object’s state variables (pose, dimension, velocity). The SensorData 
interface can either be used to forward ideal sensor data or non-ideal and limited simulated 
data in a sensor coordinate system as a representation for real world sensor behavior. It in-
cludes the sensor output with its uncertainties. Since OSI 3.0.0, two additional interfaces 
have been integrated: FeatureData and SensorViewConfiguration. FeatureData lists a set of 
simple features in a sensor coordinate system to simulate object detection or feature fusion. 
SensorViewConfiguration allows the user to configure the sensor view that should be pro-
vided by the environment simulation. It specifies the input configuration that is desired by 
the sensor model. 
7.3 Model.CONNECT 
An integration platform is required to tackle the issue of simulation models which are com-
posed of multiple component models. Model.CONNECT97 is a tool for interlinking simula-
tion models into one virtual prototype. Thereby, the models use a standardized interface 
called Functional Mockup Interface (FMI). The virtual prototype is assembled from multiple 
models. The FMI standard allows to develop systems which consist of a combination of 
models from internal or external partners and which are designed by using different model-
ling tools. The intention is to enable the coupling of simulation tools via an interface stand-
ard. A master controls the data exchange and synchronization between subsystems (slaves). 
It is a tool-independent standard that supports model exchange and co-simulation. The tool 
supports more than 20 different simulation tools such as Virtual Test Drive, IPG, MATLAB, 
Simulink and others. It eases the connection of models from different domains and applica-
tions and provides the synchronization for distributed systems. In the context of the imple-
mentation Model.CONNECT is used to synchronize the components and monitor their input 
and output signals. 
7.4 Minimum Required Safety Zone 
The MRS zone function receives ground truth data from the simulation framework in the 
open simulation interface format. The function extracts all relevant state parameters of its 
                                                 
97 AVL List GmbH: Model.CONNECT Overview (2019). 
 7.5 Test Scenarios 
  87 
surrounding such as the ego’s and the object’s pose, its velocity and its dimensions. The ego 
vehicle’s state variable’s and worst case timing constraints are injected into the formula  
𝑑req,ego ≥ 𝑣ego ∙ (tB,lag + 𝑡R,ad) +
𝑣ego
2
2 ∙ 𝐷min
+ 𝑑tol (7–1) 
to calculate the ego vehicle’s required stopping distance. Thereafter, a bounding box around 
the vehicle is created by using the C++ boost library for planar boxes and polygon geometry 
data. The bounding box can be extended by the length of the ego-vehicle’s stopping enve-
lope. Similarly, the object-vehicle’s stopping distance 𝑑req,obj is calculated by considering 
the worst case for the object stopping distance of both vehicles moving towards each other 
and both are braking given by 
𝑑req,obj ≥ 𝑣obj ∙ (tB,lag + 𝑡R,obj) +
𝑣obj
2
2 ∙ 𝐷min
+ 𝑑tol (7–2) 
A bounding box around the object is spanned and extended by its stopping envelope. The 
boost library provides functions to identify an intersection of created geometries. As a result, 
an overlap of stopping envelopes between ego- and object-vehicle can be detected. The de-
celeration of the ego-vehicle is triggered once an overlap takes place. Figure 7–3 demon-
strates the bounding boxes and their extensions. 
 
Figure 7–3: A bounding box around the ego- and the object-vehicle is spanned and extended by its 
stopping envelope. An overlap of stopping envelopes is detected to trigger a deceleration of the ego-
vehicle and avoid collisions. 
7.5 Test Scenarios 
The implementation was tested for the maneuvers following a straight lane, intersection 
crossing and turning left/right which will be described in the following. Ego- and object-
vehicle are represented by their bounding boxes and stopping envelopes. Figure 7–4 shows 
two object vehicles approaching the ego-vehicle. The left figure displays the 3D scenery and 
the corresponding video data of the image generator. The middle figures demonstrate the top 
view in the scenario editor with the traffic participants in a parking garage scenario. The 
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right figures provide the visualization of bounding boxes and corresponding stopping enve-
lopes in a top view. The upper figures indicate the triggering event whereas the lower figures 
present the situation chronological after the triggering event. Thereby, the ego-vehicle is fol-
lowing a straight lane while the object’s intention in front is to execute a left turn. The traffic 
participants require to have at least a minimum distance 𝑑req,obj to the ego-vehicle’s stopping 
envelope in order to successfully brake in case of an emergency. The required distance is 
dependent on whether the object-vehicle is manually driven or driverless. In the given test 
scenarios, a worst case is taken in which all object vehicles are assumed to be manually 
driven. While turning left, the object appears in the ego-vehicles stopping envelope. The 
intersection of the stopping envelopes causes the ego-vehicle to decelerate. The deceleration 
reduces the ego-vehicle’s stopping envelope such that the overlap has vanished. The appear-
ing lack of an overlap means that the straight lane can be followed again. 
 
Figure 7–4: 3D scenery in the image generator (left) for the maneuver following a straight lane. Top 
view of the scenario editor in VTD (middle) and visualization of the stopping envelopes including 
the bounding boxes in a widget (right). The ego-vehicle is triggered to decelerate due to the intersec-
tion of stopping envelopes. Upper subfigures present the overlap of stopping envelopes whereas the 
lower subfigures show the reduction of stopping distances after deceleration. 
In the next phase, the automated vehicle approaches an intersection crossing. An object ve-
hicle is coming from the right and is hidden behind a wall. The object vehicle is actually 
occluded and the vehicle sensors do not have any line of sight. Therefore, the examination 
of the required areas by infrastructure sensors (e.g. top-mounted) is necessary. The provision 
of the safety zone is simulated by using ideal ground truth data. The object can still be de-
tected although it is occluded by the wall. This approach is used to test the safety zone and 
not to test a sensor model. The implementation is tested for the deceleration in time to avoid 
collisions. It is not used to model a realistic perception behavior, but this can be investigated 
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by integrating a more realistic sensor model in the open simulation interface instead of using 
ground truth data. However, ground truth data is used to test the safety function for the trig-
gering condition. The object vehicle is oriented in a 90° angle to the automated vehicle and 
only the object stopping envelope contributes to the safety zone. Figure 7–5 presents the 3D 
scenery in virtual test drive, the corresponding top-view of the scenario editor and the created 
stopping envelopes of the traffic participants. The overlap of stopping envelopes causes the 
ego-vehicle to brake. The braking signal is indicated by the rear lights in the scenario editor. 
The object vehicle receives priority until required safety distances can be met. If sufficient 
distances are provided, the ego-vehicle will reinitiate the acceleration to cross the intersec-
tion. 
 
Figure 7–5: 3D scenery in the image generator (left) for the maneuver intersection crossing. Top 
view of the scenario editor in VTD (middle) and visualization of the stopping envelopes including 
the bounding boxes in a widget (right). The ego-vehicle is triggered to decelerate due to the overlap 
of stopping envelopes. Upper subfigures present the overlap of stopping envelopes whereas the lower 
subfigures show the reduction of stopping distances after deceleration. 
In the next step, the automated vehicle’s intention is to perform a left turn. However, on the 
opposite lane an object vehicle is moving towards the ego-vehicle and creates its straight 
stopping envelope. A left turn at this point in time would not provide sufficient space for the 
object vehicle to brake. The intersection between the tractrix curve and the object’s stopping 
envelope triggers the ego-vehicle’s deceleration to avoid the potential collision. Compared 
to a crossing of an intersection steering has to be considered. When steering is applied the 
vehicle requires more space than its vehicle width takes up. In case of turning left/ right the 
vehicle forms a tractrix curve. The vehicle’s travelled envelope can be easily determined by 
applying tractrix curves. The inner wheel performs a larger steering angle in comparison to 
the outer wheel. As a result, an inner radius and a larger outer radius is established. The inner 
and outer radius determine the boundaries of the travelled envelope. The covered area can 
be determined easily with the help of the two track model and the Ackermann condition. The 
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inner rear wheel point and the outer front vehicle body point form the corresponding tractrix 
curves. The relevant vehicle points forming the travelled envelopes are changing cross-wise 
for left and right turning. The calculation of the tractrix curve is based on a rectangular 
bounding box for worst case inspection. Figure 7–6 demonstrates the corresponding maneu-
ver and the triggering event to avoid the collision. 
 
Figure 7–6: 3D scenery in the image generator (left) for the maneuver turning left. Top view of the 
scenario editor in VTD (middle) and visualization of the stopping envelopes including the bounding 
boxes in a widget (right). The ego-vehicle is triggered to decelerate due to the overlap of stopping 
envelopes. Upper subfigures present the overlap of stopping envelopes whereas the lower subfigures 
show the reduction of stopping distances after deceleration. The tractrix is simplified by a rectangle. 
7.6 Summary 
The presented implementation and test scenarios serve as a proof of concept rather than an 
attempt to validate the safety function. A prototype of the safety zone is integrated in a sim-
ulation environment using standardized interfaces to enable future development. The demon-
stration shall present the feasibility and applicability for collision avoidance in the context 
of automated valet parking The proof of concept implementation provides hereby a basis for 
further in depth testing of the proposed concept. To this end, it could for example be extended 
by a testing framework. Such a testing framework should provide the following capabilities: 
 Parking garage types: Each parking garage has its constructional characteristics such 
as different types of intersection crossings, parking spots, ramps and occlusions. 
 Object type: A mixed traffic leads to numerous object classes which have different 
moving behaviors. Even every vehicle type provides diversified boundaries for the 
tractrix curves by their inner and outer turning radius and the corresponding formed 
stopping envelope. Steering capabilities depend on the vehicle geometry and its de-
sign. 
 Velocities: The variation of velocity provides different sizes of stopping envelopes. 
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 Friction coefficient: The stopping distance is determined by the deceleration given 
by the friction coefficient and the gravity. Different surfaces and tire materials result 
in a varying friction coefficient. 
 Measurement inaccuracies: The determination of the ego’s and the object’s state var-
iables leads to measurement inaccuracies. These become more relevant once sensor 
models instead of ground truth data are used. 
A testing framework could be implemented based on a software-in-the-loop (SIL) or 
hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) platform. The ego-vehicle can be dropped on a HIL testbed 
and different dummy targets can be moved towards the ego-vehicle by varying their ve-
locities. The ego-vehicle can be placed on a chassis dynamometer which uses a roller 
assembly to simulate the moving behavior. Dummy targets can be rotated around the ego 
to investigate whether the minimum required perception is fulfilled and the safety 
measures are triggered. Thereafter, the ego-vehicle’s actuators can be examined for the 
required deceleration signal. The testbed serves for frontal and reverse collision avoid-
ance. Additionally, steering will bend the ego-vehicles stopping envelope which can be 
tested using the described testbed. 
 
Figure 7–7: HIL platform with ego-vehicle placed on a chassis dynamometer and dummy targets 
moving towards the ego-vehicle. The actuators are investigated for a deceleration D signal in time. 
The safety requirements valid for the minimum perception zone will be used to derive pos-
sible AVP configurations. Especially, the minimum perception zone shows its impact on 
time-efficiency and safety of the valet parking system. The elaborated safety zone and cor-
responding trigger conditions can be taken as a minimum criterion to avoid collisions. The 
investigated results will be used in the following to justify the module allocation between 
automated vehicle and infrastructure.  
dreq,obj
dreq,egoFdreq,egoR dreq,obj
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8 Derivation of AVP Configurations 
This chapter introduces the derivation of different AVP configurations, which allow car man-
ufactures or parking garage operators to choose between different distributions and imple-
mentations of AVP systems. Hereby, the impacts costs, efficiency, safety and availability are 
taken into account for the distribution of function modules. Figure 8–1 indicates the applied 
methodology to derive possible system configurations for automated valet parking. In the 
item definition the overall valet parking procedure was analyzed and split into scenarios that 
occur during the execution. The following scenarios were investigated: vehicle handover to 
the PAM system, automated driving to a point of interest, automated maneuvering into the 
parking space, automated leaving of the parking space, and aborting of the AVP process. 
Each scenario is examined according to functional requirements (functions) that the system 
has to provide to manage the dynamic driving task. Functional system requirements are 
grouped to form function modules. The function modules can either be assigned to the park-
ing area management (PAM) and/ or to the automated vehicle. Impact factors such as costs, 
efficiency, safety and availability are investigated for the distribution process. The evaluation 
provides the input for possible system configurations. The configurations vary between the 
degree of costs, efficiency, safety and availability. The selection of a specific system config-
uration depends on the parking garage operator’s and car manufacturer’s constraints and/or 
preference. 
 
Figure 8–1: Decomposition of the automated driving system in functional scenarios that occur during 
infrastructure-supported valet parking. Functional system requirements are derived from functional 
scenarios and are assigned to function modules. The function modules are distributed between the 
infrastructure and the automated vehicle according to impacts. 
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Hereby, three options exist: the function is executed by the PAM, the automated vehicle or 
in a cooperative mode. Considering the possibility of all three options and a number of func-
tion modules 𝑛func, the number of possible AVP configuration 𝑛AVP is given by 
𝑛AVP = 3
𝑛func (8–1) 
For ten function modules 𝑛func = 10 this results in 𝑛AVP = 3
10 = 59049 combinations are 
derivable and even more are possible if various cooperation modes are taken into account. 
The example illustrates that it is not feasible to evaluate all AVP configurations. Therefore, 
this thesis discusses the benefits of the allocation on module level and not on configuration 
level. Functional system requirements are derived from functional scenarios to build func-
tion modules, which can be distributed between the infrastructure and the automated vehicle. 
This work assumes the fulfillment of minimum requirements for AVP such as the need for a 
sufficient amount of handover and pickup zones, the capability of vehicles to drive auto-
mated and switch to standby as well as activation of electric park brakes. The derived func-
tional requirements include the perception to estimate the ego-vehicle’s and the object’s state 
such as their pose, velocity, dimensions, existence and class. The system has to be able to 
activate the AVP function to transition from manually driving to automated mode and to plan 
a safe trajectory to the desired point of interest. The trajectory execution requires the control 
of the automated vehicle’s steering, shifting, accelerating and braking. Data transmission 
between infrastructure, automated vehicle and terminal has to be done via a C2X module. 
The AVP user requires a HMI to pay service and to get feedback about the current status. 
Table 8–1 summarizes the functional system requirements and required system modules. 
Table 8–1: Derived functional system requirements from functional scenarios are assigned to func-
tion modules 
Function Module Functional System Requirements 
Self-Perception: 
Ego-Vehicle State 
Estimation 
 The system shall determine the ego-vehicle’s pose, its velocity 
and have knowledge about its dimensions and class. 
 The system shall detect whether all doors are closed.  
Env. Perception: 
Object Pose, Veloc-
ity, Dimension and 
Class Estimation 
 The system shall determine the object’s pose, velocity, dimen-
sions, existence and class located in areas of interest under all 
possible environmental conditions. 
Static Map Provi-
sion 
 The system shall provide a static map of the parking garage. 
Parking Space Oc-
cupation Status 
 The system shall detect free and occupied parking spaces. 
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Function Module Functional System Requirements 
Mission Planner 
 
 The system shall have the ability to activate and deactivate the 
valet parking function. 
 The system shall assign a safe mission. 
 The system shall know the destination position and dimensions 
of the handover and pickup zones as well as of parking spaces. 
 The system shall assign free parking spaces for automated vehi-
cles. 
Route Planner  The system shall determine a collision-free route to the destina-
tion. 
Behavior & 
Maneuver & 
Trajectory Planner 
 The system shall plan maneuvers based on the current traffic 
situation with its traffic participants in compliance with traffic 
regulations. 
 The system shall plan a collision-free trajectory on up-to-date, 
accessible and connected drivable areas to the destination. 
Trajectory Control-
ler 
 The system shall control the automated vehicle’s steering, shift-
ing, accelerating and braking. 
C2X  The system shall be able to transmit data between PAM, auto-
mated vehicles and a terminal. 
HMI  The system shall inform the driver about the current status. The 
system shall provide the ability to cancel the valet parking pro-
cess and to pay service. 
 
The AVP system architecture is based on the reference architecture of Lotz98 for assisted and 
automated vehicle guidance. A reference architecture contains the most important function 
modules. Thereby, the architecture is split into a three-level hierarchy of the driving task 
according to Donges99,100. At navigation level, a suitable route is chosen from an available 
road network by considering accidents, traffic congestion or roadworks. The actual dynamic 
driving task is performed at guidance and stabilization level. At guidance level, the desired 
track and speed are derived from the traffic scenery for open-loop control. Finally, at stabi-
lization level the driver has to compensate the deviations which occurred at guidance level 
                                                 
98 Lotz, F. G.: Eine Referenzarchitektur für die assistierte und automatisierte Fahrzeugführung (2017). p. 130. 
99 Donges, E.: Aspekte der aktiven Sicherheit bei der Führung von Personenkraftwagen (1982). 
100 Donges, E.: Driver behavior models (2014). 
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via corrective actions (closed-loop control). Applied to the reference architecture of auto-
mated valet parking, the following three-level categorization is done: 
At navigation level, the mission planner assigns the destinations such as the next free parking 
space upon a service request or the exit in case of handback request. After the definition of 
a mission, the route planner determines a route based on the topological representation of 
the road network. A best possible route can only be planned if a topological road network is 
known a priori. The determination is done by using a graph which represents the road net-
work. The AVP system may take into account the current status of free/ occupied parking 
spaces in the parking garage. 
At guidance level, the behavior planner shall select a sequence of behaviors that enables the 
vehicle to reach the assigned destination by taking into account other traffic participants or 
objects and the traffic regulations. An element of the behavior sequence is selected in the 
maneuver planner. The selection is based on the traffic scenery which contains the relevant 
information in the scenario perceived by the environment sensors. The environment percep-
tion module includes the object state estimation such as the determination of the object’s 
pose, its velocity, its dimensions, its existence probability and its class. The local scenery is 
mapped into an appropriate representation such as a digital map. The possibility of a maneu-
ver is restricted by the traffic scenery and the behavior of its traffic participants. Therefore, 
for the decision process not only a snapshot of the traffic scenery is required, but also the 
predicted moving behavior of the identified objects. The information has to be passed to the 
trajectory planner to determine a collision-free trajectory based on the maneuver specifica-
tion of the behavior planner. The world model is required to provide the predicted moving 
behavior at trajectory level. The execution status of the trajectory planner has to be fed back 
to the maneuver planner to react according the dynamic environment. 
At stabilization level, the low-level stabilization of the requested trajectory takes place. De-
viations between target and actual trajectory are evaluated and minimized via control com-
mands. The trajectory controller requires the input of the ego-vehicle’s state estimation 
which is captured by the vehicle’s internal sensors. The trajectory controller outputs target 
control commands that are executed by the vehicle’s actuators for acceleration, braking and 
steering purposes. The control loop of the overall system starts again by perceiving the en-
vironment with its sensors and by reinitiating the navigation, guidance and stabilization. 
Figure 8–2 visualizes the overall control loop in a reference architecture for automated valet 
parking. 
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Figure 8–2: Reference architecture for automated valet parking divided into a three-level hierarchy 
according to Donges. At navigation level, a suitable route is determined from a road network. At 
guidance level, a desired trajectory is selected which deviations have to be compensated via correc-
tive actions at stabilization level. 
8.1 Distribution of Functions 
After identifying all the modules needed for AVP, it is required to analyze for each function 
module whether an integration into the infrastructure or the vehicle is more reasonable. For 
this purpose, valid impact factors have to be determined for each module in order to quantify 
the comparison. This thesis applies the following impact factors:  
 Costs: Characterizes additional efforts and expenses that have to be made to realize the 
described functionality apart from today’s state-of-the-art parking garages or vehicles. 
 Time efficiency: Describes a quick handover, parking and pickup process to increase the 
vehicle throughput in a parking garage and decrease congestion. 
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 Safety: Refers to a collision-free AVP process and the avoidance of critical scenarios. 
 Availability: Specifies the impact if the functionality cannot be performed anymore. The 
degree may vary from a single AVP vehicle in standstill to a complete breakdown of the 
AVP service. 
Thereby, the impact factor availability has the same influence on all modules listed in Table 
8–1: Derived functional system requirements from functional scenarios are assigned to func-
tion modules. In the following, each module will be evaluated according to the impacts on 
cost, time-efficiency, safety and availability to analyze whether an integration into the park-
ing area management system or the automated vehicle is more recommended. Figure 8–3 
demonstrates the distribution process. 
 
Figure 8–3: Distribution of function modules between PAM and the automated vehicle. Each module 
is evaluated according the impact factors cost, time-efficiency, safety and availability. A function 
can be allocated to the PAM, to the vehicle or executed in cooperation. The number of possible AVP 
combinations is given by the number of non-excluded distributable function modules 𝑛func and can 
be determined by 𝑛AVP = 3
𝑛func. This thesis therefore proposes a comparison on function module 
level rather than on system level. The function modules static map provision and parking space oc-
cupancy are assigned to the infrastructure whereas the self-perception and the trajectory controller 
remain in the vehicle. 
A. Self-Perception: Ego-Vehicle State Estimation 
Sensors for measuring driving dynamics are now part of the standard equipment of today’s 
vehicles. Some of the most important sensors are:  
 Wheel speed sensors: Provide information about the movement of the wheel in terms of 
velocity, acceleration and direction. They are already used in today’s driver assistance 
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systems such as Anti-lock Braking System (ABS), Traction Control System (ASR), and 
Electronic Stability Control (ESC). 
 Steering angle sensors: Determine the steering wheel position through the measured 
steering angle. Its most important function is to support the ESC. 
 Angular rate and acceleration sensors: Provide information about the rotational move-
ments in all three spatial axes as well as the accelerations in X, Y, Z. 
Sensors for measuring the vehicle’s driving dynamics already provide sufficient information 
and have been proven in vehicle use. Therefore, there is no need to outsource these function-
alities into the infrastructure, except for the ego-vehicle’s localization, which is part of the 
environment perception. The module remains inside the vehicle. 
 
B. Static Map Provision 
A static map contains relevant information about the road network, the location of ramps, 
pickup zones and parking spaces for time-efficient navigation. The static map is stored and 
transferred at the entrance to the automated vehicle. 
Costs: A static map containing all relevant information has to be stored on a storage device 
and C2I sender module is required for map transfer. As the receiver, the automated vehicle 
requires a C2I receiver module. 
Time efficiency: A best possible route can only be planned if a topological road network is 
known a priori. The static map provides the road network and relevant points of interest to 
eliminate the search process. 
Safety: Additionally, landmarks can be placed inside the static map for the reduction of lo-
calization inaccuracies. Drivable areas in which trajectories are placed are known. Static 
objects can be avoided. 
Availability: A crash of the provision results either in a blocked AVP service at the entrance 
for arriving customers or decreases the time efficiency of the search process. Automated 
vehicles which have received the static map are still able to continue the AVP process. 
The infrastructure is the only entity that may contain the a priori knowledge. Therefore, the 
infrastructure includes the function module of map provision. 
 
C. Parking Space Occupancy Status 
The occupancy status is needed by the mission planner to assign a free parking space. Most 
of today’s parking garages are equipped with barrier or light barrier systems to count the 
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number of entering and exiting vehicles.101 However, an a priori knowledge of a free parking 
spot requires additional infrastructure sensors to assign a free parking spot at the entrance.  
Costs: An a priori knowledge of a free parking spot requires additional infrastructure sensors 
to assign a free parking spot at the entrance. Some parking facilities are already supporting 
parking guidance to a free parking spot.102 The solutions are based on ultrasonic sensors, 
camera or induction loops. The occupancy status is visualized with optical signals for driv-
ers. In comparison, today’s vehicles are already equipped with camera and ultrasonic sensors 
to detect a free parking spot and to support the driver in the maneuvering process.103 The 
major benefit lies therefore not in the detection of a free parking spot, but rather in the elim-
ination of the time-consuming search process.  
Time efficiency: The occupancy status reduces the time-consuming search for a free parking 
space. More details can be found in the evaluation of the mission planner. 
Availability: A crash of the provision results either in a blocked AVP service at the entrance 
for new customers or decreases the time efficiency of the search process. Automated vehicles 
which received an assignment are still able to continue the AVP process. 
 
D. Environment Perception: Object Pose, Velocity, Dimension and Class Estimation 
The environment perception consists of the function modules object pose estimation, object 
velocity estimation, object dimension estimation and object class estimation. The environ-
ment perception shall determine the object’s state parameters in the MRP zone. Additional 
sensors may have to be installed in today’s parking facilities or in vehicles. 
Costs: Generally speaking, the integration of the environment perception module into the 
infrastructure pays off if the costs for all AVP vehicles for environment perception exceed 
the costs of an infrastructure-based realization. A major issue is that automated vehicles are 
not just used in a parking garage and therefore require environmental sensors in other areas 
such as in urban areas, on the highway or on rural roads. If the environment perception out-
side of the parking garage is not realized infrastructure-based, an integration of the modules 
into vehicles will be mandatory. Costs depend on characteristics of a parking facility and on 
used sensor technologies which will change in the future. Additionally, different entities such 
as manufacturers, operators and finally the users will bear the costs for AVP. It is therefore 
nearly not possible to quantify costs for environment perception and establish comparability 
for the deployment of function modules into the vehicle or the infrastructure. As a result, this 
thesis describes rather additional efforts that have to be implemented in today’s standard 
parking garages and vehicles. 
                                                 
101 Pech, A. et al.: Parkhäuser - Garagen (2009). pp. 223 – 231. 
102 Q-Free ASA: Parking Guidance Solutions (2019). 
103 Gotzig, H.: Parking Assistance (2016). 
8 Derivation of AVP Configurations 
100 
Today’s road vehicles are partially equipped with radar, camera and ultrasonic sensors e.g. 
for adaptive cruise control (ACC), automated emergency braking (AEB) or for parking as-
sistance. These sensors may perform the tasks of object’s pose, velocity, dimension and class 
estimation. However, vehicle sensors may not cover the full MRP zone and are prone to 
occlusion. Indoor localization in a GNSS-denied environment is neither a standard equip-
ment in today’s parking garages nor in modern vehicle’s and is still a research topic.104 The 
infrastructure may support the localization process by providing a static map and corre-
sponding landmarks or even track vehicles with its sensors. The vehicle may combine odom-
etry with another indoor positioning system such as SLAM104 to accomplish required meas-
urement accuracies for self-localization.  
Safety: In terms of safety, the infrastructure-based perception benefits from top-mounted 
sensors as objects that are occluded for the vehicle can be detected. Therefore, as indicated 
in Figure 3, areas of interest can be perceived that are actually covered from the ego-vehicle’s 
view. The areas of interest are given by the superposition of stopping distances (envelopes) 
between collision partners. The size of these envelopes depends on the performed maneuver 
as well as the dynamic driving parameters of the engaged traffic participants such as veloc-
ities, timing constraints and deceleration capabilities. The perception of occluded areas can 
only be solved through cooperation with the infrastructure.  
Time efficiency: As illustrated in Figure 8–4 an infrastructure-based environment perception 
ensures the detection of occluded areas and allows to operate the valet parking service at 
higher velocities since detection in covered areas is provided and slowing down is only re-
quired if a potential collision partner is present. Required safety distances can be maintained 
and the throughput of vehicles can be increased. The size of stopping envelopes can be de-
creased for a vehicle-based perception by reducing allowed velocities in a parking garage. If 
the vehicle velocity is slowed down significantly, required stopping distance will reduce such 
that the system is safe. A too large restriction in velocity decreases the throughput of the 
parking garage and will annoy manual drivers in mixed traffic.  
Availability: In terms of availability, the infrastructure has a major disadvantage if no redun-
dancy or vehicle-fallback is established. A collapse of a single module located in the infra-
structure will lead to a total breakdown of the AVP service and may even block manually 
driven vehicles to continue their parking procedure (single point of failure). An error of an 
in-vehicle module causes the breakdown of a single vehicle only which can be carted away 
manually. 
The implementation of a perception module into the infrastructure has the potential to in-
crease safety and time-efficiency of AVP, but has the drawback of additional expenses for 
infrastructure sensors. 
                                                 
104 Einsiedler, J. et al.: Vehicle indoor positioning: A survey (2017). 
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Figure 8–4: Area of interest occluded from the vehicle’s view and required PAM-support for colli-
sion avoidance. 
E. Mission Planner 
The mission planner is responsible for assigning a safe mission such as a free parking space. 
The integration of the mission planner into the infrastructure can lead to considerable time 
savings for AVP.  
Costs: The parking space occupancy status has to be observed by the infrastructure in order 
to be able to instruct a mission such as a free parking space at the entrance. Therefore, addi-
tional environment sensors have to be implemented in the car park and a measure to avoid 
the occupation e.g. by reserving the parking spot or by reassigning a new mission. In con-
trast, the vehicle will be already equipped with environment sensors to fulfill the driving 
tasks of other use cases.  
Safety: A direct trajectory without detours causes a shorter driven distance in the parking 
garage. A shorter driven distance will on average lead to less interaction with traffic partici-
pants. More occurring critical scenarios can be avoided by just decreasing the driven distance 
within the parking garage per automated vehicle. 
Time efficiency: Simultaneous monitoring of all parking spaces allows it to instruct a free 
parking space at the start of the AVP. A time-consuming search for a parking space is elimi-
nated and the vehicles can drive directly to a free parking space. A mechanism is required to 
either keep the assigned parking space reserved or to reassign a new parking spot. A short-
ened search process could be particularly advantageous in a parking garage with a high oc-
cupancy rate or intensive parking space demands. The throughput can be significantly in-
creased if congestion can be decreased by directing the vehicle to the free parking space or 
to the exit. For that, the time difference for a search process is investigated if the module 
would be integrated into the infrastructure compared to an implementation in a vehicle. The 
parking module will very likely access the same environment modules for the free space 
detection as required for the environment perception. The distance that a vehicle has to drive 
PAM
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in an average parking garage shall be compared between an infrastructure- and a vehicle-
based concept in order to quantify the time savings.  
Figure 8–5 shows a parking garage configuration with its dimensions in length 𝐿Garage and 
width 𝑊Garage. Parking spaces are arranged in a matrix with 𝑖 columns and 𝑗 rows. Auto-
mated vehicles start at the handover zone and have to be placed at the pickup zone if a hand-
back is instructed. We assume that in best case the automated vehicle uses its sensors to 
detect the exit’s location nearby the entry and that the vehicle’s search algorithm tries to find 
a parking space nearby the exit for a rapid handback. If a free parking space is located in the 
1st row and in the 1st column, there is no benefit concerning the overall driven distance re-
gardless of whether the free parking space is detected by the vehicle or assigned by the PAM. 
The overall driven distance from the entry to the parking space and from the parking space 
to the exit is the same. This is a best case for the automated vehicle. However, in the worst 
case the 1st quadrant is occupied, the automated vehicle will have to drive around the 1st 
quadrant to detect if there is any free parking located and then continue searching in the 2nd 
row or the 2nd column. The additional distance 𝑑 that is driven by the vehicle is the superpo-
sition of circumferences around occupied row and column parking spaces. These can be 
calculated by introducing the number of occupied entries 𝑛occ according to 
𝑑 ≈ (2 ∙
𝐿Garage
𝑖
+ 2 ∙
𝑊Garage
𝑗
) ∙ 𝑛occ (8–2) 
Considering a typical parking garage of around 20.000 m2 with a total capacity of 600 vehi-
cles, but only 60% occupation, 𝐿Garage = 100 m, width 𝑊Garage = 40 m, 5 levels, 2 rows 
(𝑗 = 2), 3 columns (𝑖 = 3) per level and 𝑛occ = 18 (first 3 levels are occupied), results in 
𝑑 ≈1900 m and additional required time of 𝑡 ≈ 680 s for an average velocity of 𝑣 =
10 km h⁄ . The example illustrates that uncertainty of the destination will lead to a higher 
congestion and decrease the efficiency of the throughput. 
Availability: Total breakdown of the AVP service if no redundancy or vehicle-fallback is 
established. An error of an in-vehicle module causes the breakdown of a single vehicle only. 
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Figure 8–5: Parking garage with length 𝐿Garage and width 𝑊Garage, parking spaces are arranged in 
a matrix with 𝑖 columns and 𝑗 rows. An in-vehicle mission planner forces the vehicle to drive 
around each matrix entry to find a free parking space. 
F. Route Planner 
The route planner determines a global route to the destination and requires the ego-vehicle’s 
position, the mission and at least the route network of a static map as inputs. The automated 
vehicle has no knowledge about the route network beforehand. Thus, an automated vehicle 
cannot plan a route unless it receives a route network from the PAM.  
Costs: A route network map can be stored by the PAM without owning the environment 
module. Additional hardware, software and C2X is required to ensure the transmission of 
data between PAM and vehicle. 
Time efficiency: A route that is blocked or congested can be avoided and an alternative route 
can be used. Therefore, vehicles can still arrive at their destination earlier although traveling 
a longer distance. The advantage of an overview leads to shorter handback and parking du-
ration, especially in rush hour. 
Safety: The avoidance of additional driven distance leads to less interaction between traffic 
participants and therefore results in less frequent critical situations on average. 
Availability: Total breakdown of the AVP service if no redundancy or vehicle-fallback is 
established. An error of an in-vehicle module causes the breakdown of a single vehicle only. 
 
G. Behavior & Maneuver & Trajectory Planner 
The behavior & maneuver planner shall provide maneuvers based on the current traffic sit-
uation in compliance with traffic regulations whereas based on the suggested maneuvers the 
trajectory planner calculates a collision-free trajectory on up-to-date, accessible and con-
nected drivable areas to the destination. A separation of the planners in different entities will 
result in additional C2I data transmission. The trajectory planner requires the input data of 
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the traffic scenery. To avoid a huge amount of data transmission, it might be useful to place 
environment perception as well as behavior and trajectory planner into the same entity. 
Cost: In the upcoming future, planners will be included in automated vehicles to perform 
tasks in other use cases such as in a highway pilot. A vehicle will be already equipped with 
the corresponding hardware and software but may require the adaption to a parking garage. 
An integration into the PAM will require additional hardware and software to process data 
for many vehicles and coordinate them. 
Time efficiency: The PAM-based knowledge of the other traffic participants’ moving behav-
ior provides the capability of coordination and decrease of congestion. More efficient man-
agement of several participants is possible. 
Safety: The PAM as the coordinator can assign collision-free trajectories based on prior 
knowledge, whereas an automated vehicle has no prior knowledge about the other automated 
vehicle’s intentions and has to predict future maneuvers. The prediction of other automated 
vehicles’ behavior is not required for the PAM. Only a prediction of manually driven vehicles 
and persons is necessary. 
Availability: Total breakdown of the AVP service if no redundancy or vehicle-fallback is 
established. An error of an in-vehicle module causes the breakdown of a single vehicle only. 
 
H. Trajectory Controller 
The task of the trajectory controller is to keep deviations of required and actual control sig-
nals of the automated vehicle’s steering, accelerating and braking at a minimum. There is no 
benefit by outsourcing the trajectory controller into the infrastructure. In either way, the ve-
hicle actuators require the control signals from the trajectory controller. An in-vehicle im-
plementation reduces additional delay and unnecessary C2X data transmission. Therefore, it 
is suggested to place the module inside the vehicle. 
 
I. C2X Communication  
The module enables the communication between the PAM and the vehicle. The transmission 
of data is required if one of the upper modules is integrated into the PAM. If the PAM does 
not support the vehicle, only the instructions for a handover or handback have to be sent to 
the vehicle.  
Costs: A vehicle-centric AVP service does not require any C2X communication and costs 
can be saved. There are several degrees in terms of costs for the communication module. 
The integration of a mission and route planner requires additional C2X modules mainly at 
the entrance, whereas perception and other planner modules demand the availability in a 
complete parking garage. 
The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 8–2. Only modules which are not yet 
assigned or optional are considered. 
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Table 8–2: Evaluation of perception, planning and controlling modules based on the impacts fac-
tors costs, safety, efficiency and availability to distribute AVP modules between the infrastructure 
(parking area management, PAM) and the automated vehicle 
Impacts Self-Perception Static Map Provision Parking Space Occupancy Status Environment Perception 
 Vehicle PAM PAM PAM Vehicle PAM 
Costs ++ - - - / / 
Safety 
++ - + / 
lower 𝑣: 
+ 
higher 𝑣: 
-- 
higher 𝑣: 
++ 
Time Efficiency ++ - ++ ++ - ++ 
Availability + -- - - + -- 
 
Impacts Mission Planner Route Planner Behavior & Maneuver & Trajec-
tory Planner 
Trajectory Controller 
 Vehicle PAM Vehicle PAM Vehicle PAM Vehicle PAM 
Costs + - + - + - + - 
Safety - ++ - + - + + - 
Time Efficiency - ++ - + - + + - 
Availability + -- + -- + -- + -- 
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8.2 Possible AVP Configurations 
The analysis of the defined impact factors for distribution of functions between the auto-
mated vehicle and the infrastructure, as presented in Table 8–2, reveals conflicts between the 
different objectives. As can be seen from the discussion, there is a tradeoff between costs 
and the system’s efficiency. The gap can be narrowed by investing for example in a static 
map provision or parking occupancy detection to establish mission and route planning. An 
increase in velocity increases the minimum required perception zone for collision avoidance. 
Integration of some functions into the PAM without any fallback options paralyzes the whole 
AVP service including manually driven vehicles if not prevented by construction. A collapse 
of an in-vehicle function results in a single breakdown Since the number of possible AVP 
configurations is 𝑛AVP ≥ 3
𝑛func, it is not feasible to evaluate all AVP configurations. In the 
following, each upper defined functional module is assigned gradually to the infrastructure 
to demonstrate the resulting impacts exemplary. Starting from a fully vehicle-based AVP 
configuration each functional module from perception to planning is flipped over to the in-
frastructure. Hence, the beneficial influence of an increasing infrastructure support will be 
described. This thesis does neither demand the identification of an optimal AVP configura-
tion nor the completeness of possible AVP configurations. However, the benefits of infra-
structure support should be illustrated in the following. The AVP configurations are visual-
ized in Figure 8–6 and corresponding system architectures for each configuration will be 
introduced. 
 
 
Figure 8–6: AVP configurations with an increasing takeover of functions by the infrastructure: 
fully vehicle-based AVP (Config.1), provision of a static map and the amount of free parking 
spaces (Config.2), inclusion of the mission planner and parking space observation (Config.3), inte-
gration of the object state estimation (Config.4), embedding of the route planner (Config.5) and all 
remaining planning modules (Config.6) into the infrastructure.  
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Configuration 1: Figure 8–7 shows a fully vehicle-based concept which results in the least 
integration effort for the infrastructure. The major advantage of the vehicle is that its func-
tionalities are required in other use cases and thus efforts lie mainly in the software develop-
ment of an AVP service. However, the inexpensiveness has its disadvantages, especially in 
time efficiency. If no infrastructure-based perception is present, a free parking space and the 
corresponding route cannot be assigned a priori. Furthermore, areas of interest that are oc-
cluded from the vehicle’s view cannot be perceived for collision avoidance. The efficiency 
is not just decreased by longer distances. It is also decreased due to the reduction in velocity 
to investigate the minimum required perception zone.  
 
Figure 8–7: AVP configuration 1 is a fully vehicle-based AVP system architecture in which the AVP 
service is executed by the automated vehicle standalone. No additional active support is required by 
the infrastructure. Perception, planning and execution of control commands is managed by the vehi-
cle. The vehicle does not know the location of a free parking spot a priori. The environment percep-
tion provides the traffic scenery for the search of a free parking spot. 
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Configuration 2: Figure 8–8 shows the parking area management (PAM) system’s provision 
of a static (topological) map containing the floor plan of the parking garage. The static map 
is stored initially and is transferred at the entrance to the automated vehicle. The amount of 
occupied and free parking spaces can be detected indirectly by counting the number of ve-
hicle entries and exits through a light barrier system in the parking garage. By transmitting 
this knowledge, the vehicle gains information of desired locations such as exits, ramps and 
parking spaces and can estimate the occupancy status to target the correct parking garage 
level. Thereafter, the vehicle can determine a route to the desired parking level. Additional 
distances to drive are reduced without implementing environment sensors in the parking 
garage. However, velocities have to be limited in case of occlusion. All planning modules 
from mission to trajectory planner still remain in the vehicle. 
 
Figure 8–8: AVP configuration 2 demonstrates a parking area management (PAM) system which 
transfers a topological map and the status of free/ occupied parking spots gathered by a light barrier 
system found in today’s parking facilities. This information provides knowledge about relevant point 
of interests such as exits, ramps and parking locations to increase time-efficiency. The vehicle deter-
mines which level of the parking facility should be targeted to find a free parking space. Perception 
and planning modules remain inside the vehicle by receiving limited support by the infrastructure 
via a topological map and the parking status. The implementation of environment sensors inside the 
infrastructure is not required. Today’s parking facilities require minimal modifications such as a 
communication module for C2I and data storage for map provision 
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Configuration 3: Figure 8–9 illustrates the inclusion of the mission planner and the parking 
space observation in combination with a topological map. From now on, sensors for parking 
space occupancy have to be implemented in the parking garage in order to instruct the vehi-
cle to a specific free parking space. Mission planning is taken over by the PAM to assign a 
free parking space at the entrance. Driven distances are heavily reduced due to the exact 
knowledge of the destination. However, only parking spaces are investigated for occupancy. 
The remaining area in the parking garage has to be perceived by the vehicle which will be 
exposed to occlusion. Hence, limitations in velocity are given by the minimum required per-
ception zone. 
 
Figure 8–9: AVP configuration 3 illustrates a parking area management system (PAM) which trans-
fers a topological map and assigns a free parking spot to the automated vehicle at the entrance of the 
parking garage. The determination of the occupancy status requires additional modifications such as 
infrastructure sensors. The automated vehicle can directly navigate towards the parking spot without 
searching procedures. The infrastructure observes only parking space area, but no lanes. Other per-
ception and planning modules remain in the vehicle. 
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Configuration 4: Figure 8–10 demonstrates the incorporation of the object state estimation 
into the PAM. Beside the perception of the parking space occupancy, areas of interest in the 
parking garage can be provided. Areas of interest that are occluded from the vehicle’s view 
are detected via a top view. The vehicle does not have to be slowed down unnecessarily in 
case of occlusion. A time efficient route in this configuration is still calculated by the vehicle. 
The PAM provides the traffic scenery for the behavior, maneuver and trajectory planner.  
 
Figure 8–10: AVP configuration 4 assigns a topological map and parking space occupancy to the 
parking area management (PAM) system. The PAM perceives the overall parking facility and trans-
fers the traffic scenery to the vehicle. Infrastructure sensors are less sensitive to occlusion and ensure 
the observation of safety-relevant areas which are occluded for the vehicle’s sensor view. Time-
efficiency is increased due to the increase in vehicle velocities. 
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Configuration 5: Beside the provision of a static map and the perception, the infrastructure 
embeds the route planner. Figure 8–11 illustrates the PAM-takeover of the route planner for 
vehicle coordination and congestion avoidance. If a route is heavily congested, the percep-
tion module is able to detect the circumstances and propose another route to decrease further 
congestion. Time efficiency can be further increased by avoiding crowded paths. 
 
Figure 8–11: AVP configuration 5 assigns a route planner to the parking area management (PAM) 
system. A route planner determines the route to a point of interest based on the road network of the 
topological map. A centralized route planner allows to detect congested routes for traffic rerouting. 
Congested routes may appear due to a vehicle breakdown or occurred accidents.  
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Configuration 6: Figure 8–12 exhibits a fully infrastructure-based AVP system. The PAM 
takes over the environment perception and all planning modules. Behavior, maneuver and 
trajectory planner to know the traffic participant’s trajectories a priori and improve safety 
and time efficiency are integrated into the PAM. In the vehicle remains the trajectory con-
troller and the self-perception module. The automated vehicle executes the control com-
mands provided by the infrastructure. 
 
Figure 8–12: AVP configuration 6 illustrates the infrastructure takeover of perception and planning 
modules such that the vehicle only executes control commands. A static map and a free parking space 
is transmitted by the parking area management (PAM) to the vehicle at the handover zone. Hereby, 
mission planner and corresponding detection of parking space occupancy are allocated to the PAM. 
The environment perception module is assigned to the infrastructure. Route, behavior, maneuver and 
trajectory planner are integrated into the PAM. As a result, trajectories of automated vehicles are 
known a priori and can be taken into account for collision-free intention prediction and planning. 
The described AVP configurations with gradually shifting of distributable functions towards 
the infrastructure show the major benefits of an infrastructure support: Least costs with PAM 
support are given by transferring a static map and the free/ occupied status gathered by a 
light barrier system present in today’s parking garages. The parking space occupancy status 
requires additional infrastructure sensors, but allows a priori assignment of a free parking 
spot. An infrastructure-based object state estimation ensures higher velocities. The takeover 
of route to trajectory planning avoids congestion and provides knowledge of trajectories. 
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8.3 Migration Concepts 
The derivation of various AVP configurations raises the question whether today’s existing 
parking garages can be used for an AVP service or if the construction of new parking facili-
ties is required. A smooth transition from the current state to a widely used AVP system is 
desired. However, still some issues need to be solved before the introduction of AVP systems 
in today’s parking garages is possible. Existing parking garages differ in the already inte-
grated technology. Some of the equipped technology shall briefly described to derive possi-
ble migration concepts: 
 Barrier Systems: Barrier systems can be often found at entrances and exits of today’s 
parking garages. The systems control the output and receipt of parking ticket and 
require an average check-in time of around 7 to 10 seconds. Light barrier systems are 
capable to count the number of free/ occupied parking spaces by counting the number 
of entering and exiting vehicles. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) ensures con-
tactless entrance and exit at short distances. 105 
 Parking Space Occupancy: A sensor detects a vehicle’s presence or absence and up-
dates the information. Some parking facilities are already detecting free or occupied 
parking spaces with infrastructure sensors to visualize drivers possible parking space 
availabilities. Observation of parking space occupancy is based on infrastructure sen-
sors such as ultrasonic sensors, camera or induction loops.106 Different types of park-
ing detection sensors are discussed by Lin et al.107 
 Guidance Systems: Guidance systems shall ensure driving path to several potential 
parking spaces to avoid search time. Parking space sensors sense the status and trans-
mit the information to guidance systems.108 
 Surveillance Cameras: Some parking garages are already equipped with surveillance 
cameras to protect against theft or vandalism. 
 Ticket machine: Ticket machines serve as payment stations in parking garages. Ex-
isting parking garages provide mainly payment of service by cash or bank card. 
In the following, a migration concept shall be discussed in the sequence of occurring func-
tional scenarios. It is described which steps need to be solved for a smooth introduction of 
AVP systems in today’s existing parking garages: 
Vehicle handover to AVP system & vehicle handover to driver: An AVP service starts with 
the handover of the automated vehicle at the handover zone. The activation process consists 
of the conditions: vehicle standstill, no person located in the handover zone, all doors closed 
                                                 
105 Pech, A. et al.: Parkhäuser - Garagen (2009). pp. 225 - 233. 
106 Q-Free ASA: Parking Guidance Solutions (2019). 
107 Lin, T. et al.: A Survey of Smart Parking Solutions (2017). 
108 Qiu, R.: A System framework of active parking guidance and information system (2010). 
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and required user or PAM permission. The handover as well as the corresponding pickup 
process may last additional time. In comparison to the barrier system’s check-in times of 
around 7 to 10 seconds, this may mean that several handover and pickup zones will be 
needed to accomplish appropriate handover and pickup times especially at rush hour. Timp-
ner et al.109 shows that pick-up times of about 1 min are possible. Thereby, the availability 
of the AVP service has to be given. The separation of entrances for manually driven and 
automated vehicles could be considered to avoid annoyed customers. Even in case of sepa-
ration, AVP systems have to provide value in terms of comfort and time savings to receive 
the acceptance of customers. This also may result in appropriate ways for service payment 
which avoid waiting queues, e.g. by paying via app rather than using a conventional ticket 
machine. The functionalities of a typical terminal found in today’s parking garages need to 
be extended. An intuitive HMI concept is required for the communication between users and 
AVP systems to instruct handover/ handback requests, to retrieve the current vehicle status 
or to pay service.  
Automated driving to a point of interest: When driving to a point of interest, the infrastruc-
ture may support optionally. A static map of the corresponding parking facility can be stored 
and transferred optionally at the entrance. An integration of device storage and C2I modules 
into the infrastructure will be necessary for the transmission of the digital map. Additional 
infrastructure sensors are required for the parking space occupancy status if these are not 
already integrated. The occupancy status in today’s parking garages is visualized with optical 
signals for drivers, but needs to be transferred to automated vehicles. If perception modules 
are outsourced into the infrastructure, the parking garage has to be equipped with environ-
ment sensors for object state estimation, especially at locations in which occlusion is una-
voidable such as ramps. As a result, planning and perception modules will require additional 
processing units for signal processing and C2I modules for data transmission. Occurred 
blocking which may be solved easily by human drivers e.g. by performing evasive maneu-
vers or tight maneuvering, become more challenging for automated vehicles e.g. if evasion 
is prohibited by safety design. Deadlocks formed by automated behavior have to be pre-
vented to ensure the availability of the overall parking service. A human supervisor may 
support in terms of troubleshooting such as blocked automated vehicles, collisions, break-
down of function modules or activation issues. Limitations in indoor positioning110 or in 
measurement accuracy may restrict vehicle types simply due to narrow parking construction. 
The results of the MRP and MRS zone show that restrictions of executable maneuvers or 
restrictions in velocity may have to be introduced for cost-efficient AVP systems. 
Automated maneuvering into the parking space/ Automated leaving of the parking space: 
When parking the automated vehicle, an optimal utilization of the parking area is desired for 
                                                 
109 Timpner, J. et al.: k-Stacks: High-density valet parking for automated vehicles (2015). 
110 Einsiedler, J. et al.: Vehicle indoor positioning: A survey (2017). 
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capacity and throughput purposes, especially for peak demands. High density parking111,112 
is a promising solution for the increasing demand of parking spaces in urban areas by pack-
ing vehicles denser since humans do not need to access automated vehicles in the parking 
area. Ferreira et al.113 presents parking layouts which reduces 50% of the necessary parking 
space compared to conventional parking. However, high density parking becomes challeng-
ing in a mixed traffic since vehicle doors should be openable. This may result in a separation 
of existing parking garages in two parking space blocks to enable high density parking in a 
mixed traffic and to ensure optimal utilization of parking area.  
Further issues: 
The advances towards electromobility114,115 still have two major disadvantages: reduced 
driving ranges and increased charging duration. AVP may ease the traveler’s transfer by 
charging electric vehicles while these are parking. Consequently, charging stations to pro-
vide additional service have to be integrated in today’s parking facilities either for each park-
ing space or by sharing charging stations. Electric vehicles are switched once the charging 
process has finished. The switching process has the advantage of less required charging sta-
tions. A docking process of automated charging to serve different vehicle types has to be 
established. Finally, a legal basis is required in case of caused harm to participants in the 
parking garage. A legal basis is required to clarify the responsibilities between manufacturers 
which design AVP systems, parking garage operators which provide AVP systems and cus-
tomers which use the systems. The issue becomes especially crucial if a cooperation between 
infrastructure providers and manufacturers of automated vehicles takes place. 
The discussion shows that a major issue for today’s parking garages will be a quick handover 
and pick-up process at rush hour to ensure time savings. Additional efforts lie in the preser-
vation of service availability, the infrastructure support of automated vehicles, the imple-
mentation of high density parking, the integration of e-mobility for AVP systems as well as 
the provision of a legal basis. The derived AVP configurations and minimum criteria ease 
the migration of AVP systems in today’s existing and newly constructed parking garages by 
integrating the necessary safety design for a preferred AVP configuration. Parking garage 
operators and manufacturers can influence their required degree of infrastructure support by 
maneuver or vehicle type restriction. Both can choose between personally preferred version 
of AVP configurations based on the relevance of costs, time-efficiency, safety, availability 
and accessibility. 
                                                 
111 Timpner, J. et al.: k-Stacks: High-density valet parking for automated vehicles (2015). 
112 Banzhaf, H. et al.: High density valet parking using k-deques in driveways (2017). 
113 Ferreira, M. et al.: Self-automated parking lots for autonomous vehicles based on vehicular ad hoc network-
ing (2014). 
114 Schwesinger, U. et al.: Automated valet parking and charging for e-mobility (2016). 
115 Klemm, S. et al.: Autonomous multi-story navigation for valet parking (2016). 
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9 Conclusion and Outlook 
Automated Valet Parking (AVP) systems are one of the first systems in automated driving 
that may be introduced soon by manufacturers116. The race of the development has already 
started.117 However, a clear definition of minimum criteria for AVP systems is crucial to 
ensure safety by design in the early development process. The minimum criteria shall hereby 
consider diverse parking garage topologies and the required allocation of responsibilities 
between the infrastructure and the automated vehicle for a safe AVP service. The integration 
of minimum criteria in the early design process shall hereby minimize the risks of harm. 
In particular, the state-of-the-art reveals a lack of minimum criteria for the use case AVP. 
Today’s standards assume for AVP the minimum capability of longitudinal and the lateral 
control performance, the monitoring of the driving environment and a minimal risk state in 
case of a fallback situation. None of the existing literature describes how to integrate AVP 
into existing diverse parking structures and which necessary conditions are expected from 
cooperative AVP systems to prevent risks of harm. Today’s technical realizations focus on 
the provision of a digital map at the entrance in combination with the detection of free park-
ing spaces to assign a free spot. However, additional beneficial AVP configurations are pos-
sible which were not yet addressed in the state-of-the-art. Two major research questions (RQ) 
were derived in this thesis: 
 RQ1: What is the essential subset of minimum criteria AVP configurations require to 
fulfill for safe operation? 
 RQ2: Which degrees of infrastructure support are needed and what are their benefits? 
The contributions of this thesis regarding the identified research questions can be mainly 
summarized as follows: 
First, this thesis decomposes the AVP service into functional scenarios for system abstrac-
tion.118 Functional scenarios are used to give a functional description of the system. Major 
scenarios are the vehicle handover to the parking area management system, automated driv-
ing to a point of interest, automated maneuvering into the parking space, automated leaving 
of the parking space, vehicle handover to driver and aborting the valet parking procedure. 
Identified functional scenarios serve as an input for the followed derivation of safety require-
ments from safety goals, the specification of a minimum required perception zone and the 
identification of function modules. 
                                                 
116 Gasser, T. M. et al.: Rechtsfolgen zunehmender Fahrzeugautomatisierung (2012). pp. 7-8 
117 Banzhaf, H. et al.: The future of parking: A survey on AVP with an outlook on high density parking (2017). 
118 Schönemann, V. et al.: Scenario-based functional Safety for AD on the Example of AVP (2018). 
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Second, this thesis introduces the derivation of low level safety requirements from safety 
goals in compliance with the international standard ISO 26262 and SOTIF.119 The hazard 
analysis and risk assessment has revealed that an unintended activation of the valet parking 
function outside of the infrastructure-controlled parking area and incorrect data transmission 
between parking area management are categorized as most dangerous. Moreover, a key fac-
tor is to avoid collisions between the ego-vehicle and other objects such as pedestrians or 
manually driven vehicles. Thereby, the object’s state variables, its existence and class have 
to be determined to successfully avoid a collision. The state variables include the object’s 
dimensions, the object’s pose and the object’s velocity. A threshold is defined for the maxi-
mum allowed longitudinal and lateral measurement error of automated vehicles.  
Third, this thesis presents the mathematical and geometrical formulation of a minimum re-
quired perception (MRP) and safety (MRS) zone.120 In particular, a definition of an area, in 
which the determination of the object’s state variables, its existence and its class is manda-
tory for collision avoidance, is given. The magnitude of this area is maneuver-specific and 
therefore an investigation of occurring maneuvers for each individual parking garage is re-
quired. The maneuvers following a straight lane, driving backwards, crossing an intersec-
tion, turning left/right have been investigated. The worst case for the resulting stopping dis-
tance is formed when a manually driven vehicle moves with the maximum allowed velocity 
towards the ego-vehicle and both vehicles are breaking. In case of turning left/ right the 
vehicle covers a tractrix curve. The superposition of the ego- and object’s stopping envelopes 
at maximum allowed velocities for the executable maneuvers in the operational design do-
main forms the MRP zone. A reduction of the MRP zone is possible by introducing auto-
mated driving only or by restricting executable maneuvers in the parking garage. The MRS 
zone, a subset of the MRP zone, determines the last possible border in which a deceleration 
requires to be triggered. However, the MRS zone has its limitations. The MRS zone assumes 
a linear moving behavior of the object due to the knowledge lack of its intention. A prototype 
of the MRS zone shall present the feasibility and applicability for collision avoidance (proof 
of concept) in the context of automated valet parking, but requires additional extensive test-
ing.  
Fourth, this thesis illustrates the functional modules to derive needed AVP configurations. 
Hereby, the derivation of needed AVP configurations required the identification of function 
modules of an AVP architecture. In the first step, system requirements are assigned to func-
tion modules. The function modules form an AVP system architecture. The architecture is 
split into a three-level hierarchy of the driving task according to Donges121,122. At navigation 
level, a suitable route is chosen from an available road network by considering the road 
                                                 
119 Schönemann, V. et al.: Fault Tree-based Derivation of Safety Requirements for AVP (2019). 
120 Schönemann, V. et al.: Maneuver-based adaptive Safety Zone for infrastructure-supported AVP (2019). 
121 Donges, E.: Aspekte der aktiven Sicherheit bei der Führung von Personenkraftwagen (1982). 
122 Donges, E.: Driver behavior models (2014). 
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network. At guidance level, a behavior planner selects a sequence of behaviors that enables 
the vehicle to reach the assigned destination by taking into account other traffic participants 
or objects and the traffic regulations. A maneuver of the sequence is selected in the maneuver 
planner and is passed to the trajectory planner to determine a collision-free trajectory based 
on the maneuver specification. At stabilization level, the deviations between target and actual 
trajectory are evaluated and minimized via corrective control actions (closed-loop control).  
Finally, this thesis demonstrates the distribution of function modules between the infrastruc-
ture and the automated vehicle. The analysis shows that there is no optimal system architec-
ture for the given impacts. A tradeoff exists between overall costs, time efficiency, safety, 
and availability of AVP systems with today’s vehicles. The analysis illustrates that the num-
ber of derivable AVP configurations is too large for comparison on configuration level. 
Therefore, this thesis presents the benefits of infrastructure support by gradually assigning 
function modules towards the PAM. A fully vehicle-based AVP has to perform the automated 
driving task without the help of an infrastructure (Configuration 1). Time-efficiency can be 
increased at minimum effort by transmitting a static map and the amount of free and occu-
pied parking spaces (Configuration 2). Further efficiency can be established at the costs of 
environment sensors by detecting free and occupied parking spaces to assign free parking 
spaces directly at the entrance (Configuration 3). An increase in vehicle velocity triggers the 
need for an infrastructure-based environment perception. Infrastructure sensors provide re-
quired occluded areas (Configuration 4). If the PAM additionally takes over the route plan-
ner, several vehicles can be coordinated for most time-efficient placement and congestion 
avoidance (Configuration 5). An infrastructure-based AVP takes over all perception and 
planning modules and sends the required control commands to the automated vehicle (Con-
figuration 6).  
The contributions of this thesis add value to the design of future AVP systems: 
AVP configurations and minimum criteria ease the migration of AVP systems in today’s ex-
isting and in newly constructed parking garages. Minimum criteria lay the foundation for the 
development of a necessary safety design. Manufacturers and suppliers benefit from the 
identification of minimum criteria by integrating the derived minimum criteria in their early 
system development process to ensure safety by design. Safety by design will minimize the 
risks of harm caused by developed AVP systems. Hereby, the safety by design affects the 
infrastructure and the automated vehicle. The fulfillment of minimum criteria can be 
achieved cooperatively between the infrastructure and the automated vehicle. This thesis 
illustrates the needed infrastructure-support for AVP systems. However, manufacturers have 
the option to distribute the functions between both entities according their preferences to 
accomplish the defined minimum criteria. Manufacturers and suppliers benefit from the 
specification of necessary conditions for AVP systems. The developers only require to con-
sider the necessity for an individual parking garage and therefore save efforts by avoiding 
unnecessary above needed safety performance. Safety requirements are reduced by consid-
ering the specific parking garage topology such as the executable maneuvers or reducing 
required stopping distances by parameter adjustment for the individual parking garage. For 
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example, the defined MRP zone can be used for the necessary sensor coverage for a maneu-
ver-specific parking garage and the integration of required infrastructure support at specific 
locations such as ramps or occlusions. These safety critical spots can be equipped with in-
frastructure sensors to increase safety and time-efficiency. AVP systems can be configured 
with the necessary sensor coverage by saving costs through necessity. AVP systems can be 
configured according the required safety performance for the individual parking garage.  The 
MRP and MRS zone provide the option to control velocities dependent on the distance to 
occlusions and to traffic participants. The MRS zone can be integrated for collision avoid-
ance. Parking garage operators are more willing to invest in AVP systems which provide less 
risks of harm to customers. 
Parking garage operators benefit from AVP services with less risks of harm. As a result, less 
harm caused by AVP systems will ensure less collisions and therefore will positively influ-
ence the availability and throughput of the parking garage. Customers will accept a safe AVP 
service more likely. Parking garage operators save costs by only investing in the required 
safety configuration for their specific parking garage. There is no need to pay for a more 
extensive AVP system. Furthermore, parking garage operators can restrict executable ma-
neuvers, vehicle velocities or vehicle types to reduce safety requirements and corresponding 
costs for their infrastructure modifications. Layouts for newly constructed parking garages 
can be designed to ensure time-efficient and safe AVP systems. A safe AVP service provides 
the opportunity to integrate high density parking for the increase of parking capacity. The 
progression of e-mobility in combination with AVP systems allows the parking garage oper-
ator to integrate charging stations in the parking garage and provide additional value for 
customers. Parking garage operators can select between AVP configurations according the 
constraints present in their parking facilities. They can prefer which distribution of functions 
is more beneficial for their individual circumstances. Some may favor a low cost application 
whereas others find time-efficient services more attractive.  
Customers of the parking garage benefit from the reduced risk and a safer execution of the 
AVP service. They are more willing to use and pay for a safer AVP system which saves their 
valuable time and releases them from the burden of parking manually. A safer AVP system 
causes less harm to health and life of parking garage participants. Since the parking garage 
operator invested in a parking garage-specific safety configuration, lower costs of the oper-
ator’s modifications are shifted towards customers. Safe AVP systems indirectly enable high 
density parking and charging stations. Customers may benefit from lower parking ticket 
prices due to high density parking. Parked electric vehicles of customers are charged during 
the parking process. 
However, still many issues are unresolved in the AVP domain. Future work needs to be done 
to pave the way for automated parking pilots. This thesis proposes a three-fold strategy: 
First, AVP systems have to provide value in terms of comfort and time savings to receive the 
acceptance of customers. This may mean to ensure a flowing traffic through the increase of 
handover/ pickup zones and provide solutions for a breakdown of the AVP system. Long 
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waiting times need to be avoided. The AVP system needs to be migrated in today’s existing 
parking garages. 
Second, AVP systems need to be beneficial for parking garage operators and manufacturers. 
AVP systems have to be economically. The commercialization of AVP systems requires cus-
tomers willing to pay for AVP systems. This may result in high density parking which in-
crease the demands on future AVP systems in terms of time efficiency, localization and ad-
ditional constructional changes.  
Third, legislative authorities need to approve AVP systems. This raises the question of lia-
bility in case of accidents or fatalities. As a first step, the elaborated minimum criteria can 
be used as a checklist to ensure safety by design. Minimum criteria for AVP systems will 
also be required for liability reasons. A more complete set of minimum criteria is desired to 
additionally minimize risks of harm. The corporation of independent entities, operators and 
manufacturers is required to increase the set of minimum criteria and integrate them in the 
early system development phase. Minimum criteria need to be specified on low level instead 
of at overall system level. For example, maximum allowed lateral and longitudinal errors for 
state variables have to be broken down on parameter level to assign individual errors for the 
determination of position, orientation, dimension and velocity. Furthermore, a threshold for 
the existence probability to specify the accepted amount of false positive and false negative 
detections is desired. Further verification and validation of the minimum required safety 
zone and its applicability could be progressed. Hereby, the limitation in motion prediction 
for collision avoidance has to be addressed. 
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Figure 9–1: Decomposition of the automated driving system in functional scenarios which served as 
input for the specification of safety requirements from safety goals (left), a minimum required per-
ception zone (middle), identification of required module functions (right) to derive minimum criteria 
for AVP and characterize possible degrees of infrastructure support 
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RQ1: 
What is the essential subset of minimum criteria AVP configurations require to fulfill for safe operation?
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A Appendix 
A.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis and Risk Assess-
ment 
Table 9–1: Preliminary hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA) which shows an initial high-
level screening to identify hazards for automated valet parking. The Automotive Safety Integrity 
Level (ASIL) QM is not shown for clarity purposes. Repetitive hazards are listed once in the single 
scenario. 
Sce-
nario 
Failure 
Mode 
Hazard Specific Situation 
Hazardous 
events & con-
sequences 
S Rationale E Rationale C Rationale ASIL 
Safety 
Goal 
1 
Unintended 
activation 
of AVP in-
side the op-
erational 
design do-
main 
Safety-critical 
situation due 
to unclear 
handover sta-
tus 
Persons getting into 
the vehicle just be-
fore it starts mov-
ing 
Collision with 
person 
S1 
Activation in 
low speed 
E4 
AVP activa-
tion process 
every hando-
ver  
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
B SG04 
1 
Unintended 
activation 
of AVP in-
side the op-
erational 
design do-
main 
Collision due 
to unclear 
handover sta-
tus 
Persons are still lo-
cated inside hando-
ver zone, but vehi-
cle starts moving 
Collision with 
person 
S1 
Activation in 
low speed 
E4 
AVP activa-
tion process 
every hando-
ver  
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
B SG04 
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Sce-
nario 
Failure 
Mode 
Hazard Specific Situation 
Hazardous 
events & con-
sequences 
S Rationale E Rationale C Rationale ASIL 
Safety 
Goal 
1 
Opened 
doors not 
detected 
Collision with 
open doors 
Driver forget to 
(completely) close 
door/trunk door 
vehicle may 
start moving 
while doors 
are still open 
and may col-
lide 
S1 
Activation in 
low speed 
E4 
AVP activa-
tion process 
every hando-
ver  
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
B SG04 
1 
Incorrect 
detected ve-
hicle  posi-
tioning  
Safety-critical 
situation due 
to incorrect 
positioning 
Vehicle is not posi-
tioned in handover 
zone 
vehicle may 
start moving 
while position 
is incorrect 
S1 
Activation in 
low speed 
E4 
AVP activa-
tion process 
every hando-
ver  
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
B SG04 
1 
Incorrect 
detected ve-
hicle  orien-
tation 
Safety-critical 
situation due 
to incorrect 
orientation 
Vehicle is not ori-
ented correctly in 
handover zone 
vehicle may 
start moving 
while orienta-
tion is incor-
rect 
S1 
Activation in 
low speed 
E4 
AVP activa-
tion process 
every hando-
ver  
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
B SG04 
1 
Incorrect 
detected ve-
hicle veloc-
ity  
Safety-critical 
situation due 
to vehicle ve-
locity 
Vehicle is not in 
standstill in hando-
ver zone 
vehicle is 
moving while 
still in the ini-
tializing pro-
cess 
S1 
Activation in 
low speed 
E4 
AVP activa-
tion process 
every hando-
ver  
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
B SG04 
1/6 
Missed pas-
senger 
Undetected 
passenger in 
vehicle getting 
out during 
AVP 
Passenger tries to 
get off during AVP 
Collision with 
person 
S2 
Collision at me-
dium speed 
causes severe 
injuries 
E4 
Passengers 
almost every 
drive ex-
pected 
C1 
Passengers are 
able to stay in 
the vehicle 
A SG08 
1/6 
Missed pas-
senger 
Undetected 
passenger in 
vehicle  
Passenger is 
trapped inside the 
vehicle. 
Trapping in-
side closed 
vehicle 
S2 
Potential dehy-
dration 
E4 
Passengers 
almost every 
drive ex-
pected 
C1 
Passengers are 
able to call 
help 
A SG08 
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Sce-
nario 
Failure 
Mode 
Hazard Specific Situation 
Hazardous 
events & con-
sequences 
S Rationale E Rationale C Rationale ASIL 
Safety 
Goal 
1/2 
Incorrect 
data trans-
mission by 
PAM 
Collision due 
to incorrect 
data received 
by vehicle 
Incorrect map/ path 
is loaded 
Collision with 
person 
S3 
Incorrect speed 
profiles  
E4 
Communica-
tion between 
PAM and 
vehicle 
throughout 
every AVP 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable  
D SG02 
2 
Data trans-
mission not 
in time by 
PAM 
Collision due 
to correct, but 
not in time re-
ceived data by 
vehicle 
Safety-relevant data 
is not received in 
time.  
Collision with 
person 
S3 
Brake signal 
not in time  
E4 
Communica-
tion between 
PAM and 
vehicle 
throughout 
every AVP 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable  
D SG02 
2 
Loss of data 
communi-
cation 
Collision due 
to loss of data 
communica-
tion 
Safety-relevant data 
is not provided 
Collision with 
person 
S3 
Collision at me-
dium speed 
causes severe 
injuries 
E4 
Communica-
tion between 
PAM and 
vehicle 
throughout 
every AVP 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable  
D SG02 
2 
Missed or 
incorrect 
detection in 
position, 
orientation, 
dimensions 
Collison with 
object 
Automated vehicle 
crashes into object 
which in turn col-
lides with persons 
Medium 
structural 
damages or 
flying/ falling 
objects 
S1 
The vehicle’s 
medium speed 
causes lower ki-
netic energy  
E3 
Limited 
combination 
of dangerous 
objects for 
moving per-
sons 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable; 
Probably less 
than 90% per-
sons are able 
to evade 
A SG09 
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Sce-
nario 
Failure 
Mode 
Hazard Specific Situation 
Hazardous 
events & con-
sequences 
S Rationale E Rationale C Rationale ASIL 
Safety 
Goal 
2 
Incorrect 
detection of 
class 
Collison with 
person 
Automated vehicle 
predicts incorrect 
moving behavior of 
object 
Incorrect in-
terpretation of 
moving be-
havior leads 
to collision 
S2 
Collision at me-
dium speed 
causes severe 
injuries 
E4 
Encounters 
with moving 
persons 
every drive 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
C SG03 
2 
Vehicle not 
compliant 
with regula-
tions 
Collison with 
person 
Automated vehicle 
operates not in 
compliance with 
traffic regulations 
Persons and 
vehicles are 
not expecting 
the moving 
behavior. 
S2 
Collision at me-
dium speed 
causes severe 
injuries 
E4 
Encounters 
with moving 
persons 
every drive 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
C SG03 
2 
Missed fuel 
status 
Safety-critical 
situation due 
to missed fuel 
status 
vehicle is moving 
with low fuel and 
shuts down 
Collision with 
person  
S2 
Collision at me-
dium speed 
causes severe 
injuries 
E4 
AVP usage 
every drive 
C1 
Energy status 
controlled by 
drivers before-
hand 
A SG03 
2 
Missed or 
incorrect 
detection in 
position, 
orientation, 
dimensions 
Collison with 
other vehicle 
Automated vehicle 
crashes into other 
vehicle 
The system 
does not de-
tect the vehi-
cle 
S1 
Person pro-
tected in vehi-
cle 
E4 
Encounters 
with moving 
vehicles 
every drive 
C3 
Limited space 
for evading 
maneuvers; 
Automated 
system cannot 
be controlled. 
B SG05 
2 
Safety-criti-
cal mission 
planned 
Collison with 
person 
Automated vehicle 
plans trajectory to 
safety-critical desti-
nation 
Vehicle 
moves to-
wards safety-
critical desti-
nation 
S2 
Collision at me-
dium speed 
causes severe 
injuries 
E4 
Mission 
planning 
every drive 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
C SG03 
2 
Safety-criti-
cal route 
planned 
Collison with 
person 
Automated vehicle 
plans route to 
safety-critical desti-
nation 
Vehicle 
moves to-
wards safety-
S2 
Collision at me-
dium speed 
causes severe 
injuries 
E4 
Route plan-
ning every 
drive 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
C SG03 
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Sce-
nario 
Failure 
Mode 
Hazard Specific Situation 
Hazardous 
events & con-
sequences 
S Rationale E Rationale C Rationale ASIL 
Safety 
Goal 
critical desti-
nation 
2 
Safety-criti-
cal trajec-
tory 
planned 
Collison with 
person 
Automated vehicle 
plans safety-critical 
trajectory 
Vehicle 
moves to-
wards safety-
critical desti-
nation 
S2 
Collision at me-
dium speed 
causes severe 
injuries 
E4 
Trajectory 
planning 
every drive 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
C SG03 
2 
Incorrect 
interpreta-
tion of traf-
fic scenery 
Collison with 
person 
Automated vehicle 
interprets scenery 
as not safety-criti-
cal 
Vehicle 
misses safety-
critical traffic 
scenery 
S2 
Collision at me-
dium speed 
causes severe 
injuries 
E4 
Trajectory 
planning 
every drive 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
C SG03 
2 
Missed 
deadline for 
computed 
trajectory  
Collison with 
person 
Automated vehicle 
misses deadline for 
trajectory provi-
sion. 
Vehicle 
brakes after 
delay 
S2 
Collision at me-
dium speed 
causes severe 
injuries 
E4 
Trajectory 
planning 
every drive 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
C SG03 
2 
Missed or 
incorrect 
detection in 
position, 
orientation, 
dimensions 
Collision with 
person 
Person runs into 
moving vehicle 
The AVP sys-
tem does not 
detect the Per-
son 
S2 
Collision at me-
dium speed 
causes severe 
injuries 
E4 
Encounters 
with moving 
persons 
every drive 
C3 
Missed detec-
tion during 
fully auto-
mated driving 
C SG03 
2 
Incorrect 
determina-
tion of own 
position, 
orientation, 
dimensions 
or velocity 
Collision with 
person 
The AVP system 
does not determine 
safety-relevant pa-
rameters suffi-
ciently accurate. 
Safety-critical 
AVP system 
due to inaccu-
racy  
S2 
Collision at me-
dium speed 
causes severe 
injuries 
E4 
Encounters 
with moving 
persons 
every drive 
C3 
Missed detec-
tion during 
fully auto-
mated driving 
C SG03 
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Sce-
nario 
Failure 
Mode 
Hazard Specific Situation 
Hazardous 
events & con-
sequences 
S Rationale E Rationale C Rationale ASIL 
Safety 
Goal 
2 
Missed 
emergency 
call 
Disregarded 
emergency 
call after colli-
sion 
Collision occurred 
Unexpected 
continuation 
of AVP with-
out emer-
gency call 
S2 
Emergency call 
required if col-
lision occurs; 
every second 
counts 
E4 
Encounters 
with moving 
persons 
every drive 
C2 
Other persons 
can still set up 
an emergency 
call 
B SG06 
2 
Unintended 
leaving of 
the drivable 
area 
Vehicle falls 
off the brim 
and crashes 
into people  
Automated driving 
close to the brim, 
people stand below 
the brim. 
Collision with 
person 
S3 Fatal injury E4 
Staying in 
drivable area 
has to be al-
ways en-
sured during 
AVP 
C1 
Other objects 
prevent vehi-
cle from leav-
ing drivable 
area 
B SG07 
2 
Vehicle 
component 
breakdown 
Safety-critical 
driving behav-
ior 
Breakdown of 
safety-relevant ve-
hicle component 
Collision with 
person 
S2 
Collision at me-
dium speed 
causes severe 
injuries 
E2 
Unlikely 
breakdown 
of vehicle 
component 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
A SG03 
2 
No actuator 
signal 
Safety-critical 
actuator signal 
Vehicle actuator 
sends no actuator 
signal to controller. 
Collision with 
person 
S2 
Collision at me-
dium speed 
causes severe 
injuries 
E4 
Frequent 
computation 
of actuator 
signals. 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
C SG03 
2 
Unintended 
accelerating 
signal 
Safety-critical 
accelerating 
signal 
Vehicle actuator 
sends unintended 
accelerating signal 
to controller. 
Collision with 
person 
S2 
Collision at me-
dium speed 
causes severe 
injuries 
E4 
Frequent 
computation 
of actuator 
signals. 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
C SG03 
2 
Unintended 
braking sig-
nal 
Safety-critical 
braking signal 
Vehicle actuator 
sends unintended 
braking signal to 
controller. 
Collision with 
other vehicle 
S1 
Person pro-
tected in vehi-
cle 
E4 
Frequent 
computation 
of actuator 
signals. 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
B SG03 
 128 
Sce-
nario 
Failure 
Mode 
Hazard Specific Situation 
Hazardous 
events & con-
sequences 
S Rationale E Rationale C Rationale ASIL 
Safety 
Goal 
2 
Unintended 
steering sig-
nal 
Safety-critical 
steering signal 
Vehicle actuator 
sends unintended 
steering signal to 
controller. 
Collision with 
person 
S2 
Collision at me-
dium speed 
causes severe 
injuries 
E4 
Frequent 
computation 
of actuator 
signals. 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
C SG03 
2 
Missed 
deadline for 
computed 
actuator 
signal  
Safety-critical 
actuator signal 
Vehicle actuator 
sends correct, but 
delayed signal to 
controller. 
Collision with 
person 
S2 
Collision at me-
dium speed 
causes severe 
injuries 
E4 
Frequent 
computation 
of actuator 
signals. 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
C SG03 
2 
Missed de-
tection of 
fire 
Safety-critical 
encounters 
with pedestri-
ans 
Vehicle continues 
AVP service during 
fire 
Collision with 
person 
S3 
Collision at me-
dium speed in 
combination 
with fire 
E2 
Unlikely fire 
outbreak 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
B SG03 
2 
Missed de-
tection of 
collision 
Breakdown of 
safety-relevant 
vehicle com-
ponents 
Vehicle continues 
AVP service after 
collision 
Uncontrolled 
proceeding of 
the AVP ser-
vice after col-
lision 
S3 
Collision at me-
dium speed in 
combination 
with fire 
E4 
Encounters 
with moving 
persons 
every drive 
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
B SG03 
3 
Parking 
brake not 
applied. 
Safety-critical 
situation due 
to roll off in 
standby 
Vehicle is not in 
standstill in parking 
spot 
vehicle is 
moving while 
still in 
standby 
S1 
Activation in 
low speed 
E4 
AVP activa-
tion process 
every hando-
ver  
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
B SG04 
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Sce-
nario 
Failure 
Mode 
Hazard Specific Situation 
Hazardous 
events & con-
sequences 
S Rationale E Rationale C Rationale ASIL 
Safety 
Goal 
4 
Unintended 
activation 
of a hand-
back re-
quest inside 
the opera-
tional de-
sign domain 
Safety-critical 
situation due 
to unintended 
handback sta-
tus 
Persons getting into 
the vehicle just be-
fore it starts mov-
ing 
Collision with 
person 
S1 
Activation in 
low speed 
E4 
AVP activa-
tion process 
every hando-
ver  
C3 
Automated 
vehicle is un-
controllable 
B SG04 
7 
Unintended 
activation 
of AVP 
outside the 
operational 
design do-
main 
Safety-critical 
traffic situa-
tion resulting 
from an unin-
tended activa-
tion 
Driving on high-
way or in urban ar-
eas 
Unexpected 
vehicle be-
havior on 
highway 
S3 
Life-threatening 
injuries due to 
accidents at 
high speeds 
E4 
AVP is 
available 
during nor-
mal vehicle 
use 
C3 
Assumption: it 
is not possible 
to override 
D SG01 
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